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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of the internet and associated online activities exposes users to numer-
ous information security (InfoSec) threats. Such online activities attract a variety of online 
users who include novice computer users with no basic InfoSec awareness knowledge. 
Information systems that collect and use sensitive and confidential personal information 
of users need to provide reliable protection mechanisms to safeguard this information. 
Given the constant user involvement in these systems and the notion of users being the 
weakest link in the InfoSec chain, technical solutions alone are insufficient. The usability 
of online InfoSec systems can play an integral role in making sure that users use the 
applications effectively, thereby improving the overall security of the applications. 
 
The development of online InfoSec systems calls for addressing the InfoSec problem as 
a social problem, and such development must seek to find a balance between technical 
and social aspects. The research addressed the problem of usable security in online 
InfoSec applications by using an approach that enabled the consideration of both InfoSec 
and usability in viewing the system as a socio-technical system with technical and social 
sub-systems. Therefore, the research proposed a socio-technical framework that promotes 
the development of usable security for online information systems using online banking 
as a case study. 
 
Using a convergent mixed methods research (MMR) design, the research collected data 
from online banking users through a survey and obtained the views of online banking 
developers through unstructured interviews. The findings from the two research methods 
contributed to the selection of 12 usable security design principles proposed in the socio-
technical information security (STInfoSec) framework. 
 
The research contributed to online InfoSec systems theory by developing a validated 
STInfoSec framework that went through an evaluation process by seven field experts. 
Although intended for online banking, the framework can be applied to other similar 
online InfoSec applications, with minimum adaptation. The STInfoSec framework pro-
vides checklist items that allow for easy application during the development process. The 
checklist items can also be used to evaluate existing online banking websites to identify 
possible usable security problems. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Figure 1-1: The research roadmap 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The internet and other technological services have transformed how individuals and pri-
vate or public organisations conduct their business; all have subsequently evolved to 
incorporate some form of online communication technology. With the internet as medium 
for information dissemination, organisations and individuals are becoming progressively 
more reliant on electronic information and distribution of information. However, being 
an open and public medium, the internet brings about new risks and threats to the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of information. The internet initially had a single 
objective of a free and open exchange of information, as it was developed during a period 
when users and hosts were mutually trusting (Oppliger 1997). Since then, the expansion 
of internet usage beyond the boundaries of trust and security has meant that security of 
information in transit and storage has become critical to achieving organisational goals. 
 
Today, the internet is plagued with a variety of malicious software, commonly referred to 
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changed from or removed from, a software system to intentionally cause harm or subvert 
the intended function of the system (He, Chan & Guizani 2015). Malware attacks 
computer systems and gathers sensitive information such as credit card numbers and 
passwords (He et al. 2015). As such, online information systems are at risk of personal 
and confidential information being accessed by these unauthorised entities that carry out 
malware attacks. 
 
1.1.1 Information security 
Electronic commerce (ecommerce) websites and other related technologies rely on web 
browser technology to access internet content from a multitude of devices. However, the 
proliferation of smartphones has brought about a variety of applications that provide inter-
net content directly through smartphone apps without the use of the ‘traditional’ web 
browser application. The web browser is still the primary means of accessing internet 
content from desktop and portable (laptop) computers, including smartphones. Browser 
security can only protect users against certain types of attacks through additional security, 
depending on users’ vigilance, such as avoiding sending sensitive information through 
unsecure web browser sessions. 
 
Ecommerce is the buying and selling of information, products, or services over an elec-
tronic channel such as the internet or an intranet (Turban, King, Lee, Liang & Turban 
2015). Significantly, ecommerce has revolutionised the way organisations and 
governments do business and how individuals perform their day-to-day lifestyle 
activities. This has evolved into a number of industries, with the emergence of terms such 
as ‘elearning’, ‘ehealth’, ‘egovernment’, and ‘ebanking’, were ‘e’ refers to ‘electronic’. 
However, with the widespread adoption of ecommerce, the data transmitted through 
ecommerce channels include sensitive and confidential information such as personal and 
financial details. Consequently, with the internet being open, it is important to protect 
data in transmission against unauthorised access or modification. Hence, information 
security (InfoSec) has become an integral part of the success or failure of ecommerce. 
 
There have been significant advances in the technical aspects of systems security for pro-
tecting confidential information and data in storage and transmission (Choo 2011b). 
These include the use of data encryption standards, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, 
and biometric devices (Mitnick & Simon 2005). Unfortunately, any information system 
is only as secure as its weakest link, and InfoSec attacks normally look for the path of 
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least resistance. It is generally acknowledged that users are the weakest link in the InfoSec 
chain (Crossler, Johnston, Lowry, Hu, Warkentin & Baskerville 2013). Since most 
systems rely on the actions of users, the weaknesses brought about by user interactions 
with the systems usually erode the technical gains. 
The Oxford Dictionary (2018) defines security as “the state of being or feeling secure” 
and information as “what is conveyed or represented by a particular arrangement or se-
quence of things”. In computing terms, the phrase ‘information security’ has become 
common. Depending on one’s viewpoint, there are many definitions of InfoSec, as it can 
be viewed from a technical, behavioural, managerial, philosophical, and/or organisational 
perspective (Zafar & Clark 2009). 
 
If viewed as a social science that examines the behaviour of individuals as they interact 
with systems, InfoSec begins and ends with the people inside and outside the organisation 
who interact with the system (Whitman & Mattord 2017). Dhamija & Perrig (2000) argue 
that systems should be evaluated not only theoretically, but also by how secure they are 
in common practice. Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, and Ferguson (2010) affirm that 
for InfoSec to adequately provide protection to information assets it has to consider how 
human users will interact with the system. Nevertheless, designers do not always take 
human cognitive limitations into consideration when designing and evaluating infor-
mation system security (Dhamija & Perrig 2000). 
 
What is certain, however, is that organisations have to guard against InfoSec threats from 
both outsiders and insiders when protecting organisational digital assets and that major 
threats come from insiders (Hu, Dinev, Hart & Cooke 2012). Recent surveys from tech-
nical reports regarding InfoSec and empirical research studies suggest that more damag-
ing breaches are caused by the actions of internal employees than outside hackers 
(Crossler et al. 2013). It is worth noting that most insider threats are not considered inten-
tional, but unintentional mistakes (Stanton & Stam 2006). Hence, it is vital to address the 
causes of such unintentional mistakes, and a usable system goes a long way to mitigate 
these mistakes. 
 
InfoSec and privacy are among the major concerns of consumers when making 
ecommerce and online banking adoption decisions (Adapa & Cooksey 2013, Yousafzai 
& Yani-de-Soriano 2012). Technical reports compiled by security, risk, and insurance 
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organisations identify the importance of internet security, citing an increase in hackers 
and attackers targeting small firms (Symantec 2015). 
 
1.1.2 Online banking 
Since the late 1990s, the financial landscape has changed significantly thanks to the inter-
net (Gkoutzinis 2006). Before online banking, there was distance banking or telephone 
banking, through which financial services were offered over telephone systems. Financial 
services are comprised of the full range of functions performed by financial institutions, 
including, but not limited to, lending, payment services, financial advice, application for 
products, and inter-account transfers. The provision of ebanking entails “banking services 
and the initiation and performance of payments through the banking system by electronic 
means and other advanced technologies” (Gkoutzinis 2006). This, therefore, means that 
internet banking or online banking is the provision of ebanking services over a computer 
network, such as the internet, through a computer or other access device with internet 
capabilities (Gkoutzinis 2006).  
 
The researcher uses the term ‘online banking’ throughout the thesis to refer to any form 
of electronic or internet banking. Online banking can be provided through a plethora of 
devices. Apart from personal computers, online banking can be accessed through mobile 
phones and tablets, giving rise to mobile banking (mbanking). Mbanking is a service that 
enables users to access banking services through mobile devices (such as a mobile phone 
or tablet) to conduct banking transactions (Shaikh & Karjaluoto 2015, Alafeef, Singh & 
Ahmad 2011). Essentially, mbanking is a subset of online banking, as some services are 
unavailable on mbanking platforms. In the context of this study, online banking 
encompasses aspects of both mbanking and online banking. 
 
Online banking involves the creation of a login profile. Like any other online profile, the 
user is required to supply some kind of personal identification information such as bank 
account details. Given the sensitive nature of online banking, users usually need to visit 
a branch for verification before their profile is activated. This is important to avoid profile 
activation based on pseudo-identity, as scammers can create a profile based on credentials 
obtained through identity theft. The range of value-added services provided varies 
significantly from one bank to another. Banks usually enter into agreements with other 
organisations to provide additional services to their clients, such as paying traffic fines, 
buying electricity, and playing the national lottery through online banking profiles. Given 
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the wide range of transactions that can be performed through online banking, the security 
of online banking needs to be effective. 
 
From the point of view of the banks, InfoSec of online banking services is vital to limit 
liability for possible security breaches and to be compliant with the legislation that gov-
erns the industry. Sadly, this means that the usability of the service and user experience 
(UX) come second. In addition, owing to the immaturity of some of the legal frameworks 
that govern online transactions in South Africa, loopholes are often exploited to circum-
vent liability for online fraud. This is exacerbated by the spreading of lucrative global 
cybercrime operated by organised crime syndicates, which is estimated to be beyond a 
trillion dollars (Grabosky 2014). One way to mitigate InfoSec attacks is to develop online 
applications that are both secure and usable. This is by no means the ultimate solution to 
eliminating cybercrime, but it goes a long way in making sure that users use protection 
mechanisms effectively, without exposing themselves to cyberattacks. 
 
The choice of online banking as case study for this research was motivated by two factors. 
Firstly, the service fits into the ‘sensitive online application’ domain, as it involves the 
storage and transmission of financial and personal information of users over the internet. 
Secondly, security has been identified as one of the obstacles to the adoption of online 
applications such as online banking and ecommerce. As such, the low adoption of online 
banking prompted the researcher to investigate the link between the security and usability 
of the service in the context of usable security. 
 
1.1.3 Usable security design 
Interactive design and user-centred design approaches are mainly concerned with devel-
oping systems that are usable. Interaction design is about “designing interactive products 
to support people in their everyday and working lives” (Preece, Rogers & Sharp 2015). 
However, since InfoSec and ease of use are often traded off against each other, the 
complexity and overheads of InfoSec solutions are often obstacles to their effective and 
efficient deployment (Dourish & Redmiles 2002). In addition, despite technological 
advances that have created impressive technical security systems (Choo 2011b), technol-
ogy does not solve all the InfoSec problems (Schneier 2000). Achieving this balance is a 
challenge, and while extensive research has been conducted on the technical aspects of 
InfoSec and usable security principles, there is little research on how to apply these design 
principles in practice to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Among the more 
6 | P a g e  
 
prominent works are the guidelines proposed by Yeratziotis, Pottas, and Van Greunen 
(2012), Yee (2004b), and Johnston, Eloff, and Labuschagne (2003). 
 
Preece et al. (2015) also outline ways of involving users in the design and development 
process of products/artefacts through user-centred design. The user-centred design 
concept has been around since the 1990s, but how to achieve it has not been clear to many 
designers (Endsley & Jones 2011). Preece et al. (2015) identify three key principles to be 
used for user-centred design, namely, (1) organise technology around the user’s goals, 
tasks, and abilities, (2) technology should be organised around the way users process 
information and make decisions, and (3) technology must keep the user in control and 
aware of the state of the system. 
 
User-centred and interaction design approaches are mainly concerned with developing 
products that are usable, meaning easy to learn, effective to use, and an enjoyable UX 
(Preece et al. 2015). Traditionally, usability was associated with learnability, efficiency, 
memorability, errors, and satisfaction (Nielsen 2010). Apart from usability goals, 
researchers and practitioners are now looking at improving interaction design systems to 
cater for additional goals such as UX. Preece et al. (2015) identify a number of UX goals 
such as being fun, entertaining, and helpful, to name but a few. 
 
Design principles used in practice are commonly referred to as heuristics, which need to 
be understood in the context of system design by drawing on experience (Preece et al. 
2015). An example of a heuristic is how to design a feedback tool, this being quite general 
and applicable to a wide range of systems. Usability principles (also known as usability 
guidelines) are more prescriptive by going further, suggesting exactly how to implement 
design principles (Preece et al. 2015). For example, “always place the quit or exit button 
at the bottom of the first menu list in an application” (Preece et al. 2015). This is a 
usability principle that specifically tells the designer how to design a system. In addition, 
whereas design principles, on the one hand, tend to be used mainly for informing a design, 
usability principles, on the other hand, provide the framework for heuristic evaluation, as 
they provide more detail to evaluate the usability score of a system (Preece et al. 2015). 
The need to address not only functional aspects of InfoSec systems, but also system 
usability, effectively makes such systems socio-technical systems (STS). 
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1.1.4 Socio-technical systems theory 
The importance of designing information systems (ISs) with a view to assisting users to 
achieve their efficient and effective use dates back to the late 1970s. Bostrom and Heinen 
(1977) developed the STS theory illustrated in Figure 1-2. The theory describes an IS as 
comprised of two components, namely, a social sub-system and a technical sub-system, 
which are independent, but interactive. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Socio-technical system components (Bostrom & Heinen 1977) 
 
The social system is concerned with the attributes of people, while the technical system 
consists of processes, tasks, and technology needed to transform inputs into outputs. The 
consideration of usability principles in designing information systems is essentially a way 
of incorporating socio-technical aspects (Baxter & Sommerville 2011). Online InfoSec 
systems fit perfectly into this socio-technical definition; hence, their design can be 
improved by applying this approach. This prompts designers to find a balance between 
security and usability to allow ISs, especially InfoSec systems, to be used effectively and 
efficiently by end-users. 
 
1.1.5 Heuristic evaluation 
There are a number of usability inspection methods, which include cognitive 
walkthroughs, formal usability inspections, pluralistic walk-throughs, feature inspection, 
consistency inspection, standards inspection, and heuristic evaluation (Nielsen 1994c). 
These methods can be used to evaluate proposed usability design principles. The suita-





Technical system Social system 
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system designers. The current research used heuristic evaluation to validate the proposed 
STInfoSec framework. 
 
The Oxford Dictionary (2018) defines heuristic in computing terms as “finding a solution 
by trial and error or by rules that are only loosely defined”, with evaluation defined as 
“the making of a judgement about the amount, number, or value of something; assess-
ment”. Heuristic evaluation is a usability inspection method that investigates the compli-
ance of interface features with reputable usability principles (Nielsen 1994b). Evaluation 
is “the making of a judgement about the amount, number, or value of something; 
assessment” (Oxford Dictionary 2018). 
 
Heuristic evaluation and the use of checklists are closely linked approaches, through 
which an expert rates the usability of the product on a number of criteria (Lehto & Landry 
2012). The first step in a heuristic evaluation is to identify a set of usable security guide-
lines considered most important for the evaluated product or service. A small number of 
usability experts (usually five) then use the guidelines to identify usability issues (Nielsen 
1994a). Heuristic evaluation is a cost-effective way compared to other usability testing 
techniques (Nielsen 1994b). The current research involved developing a framework 
evaluation tool for the design of a secure and usable InfoSec system based on the literature 
review and findings from the quantitative and qualitative data analyses. The framework 
was evaluated using the heuristic evaluation method, which allows field experts to 
evaluate design principles based on checklist items. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
InfoSec inevitably involves human users for the successful achievement of its intended 
goals, making its success or failure dependent on how the users use the InfoSec mecha-
nisms designed to protect InfoSec assets. There is an armoury of technical solutions to 
protect information assets against various attacks, such as properly configured firewalls, 
antivirus software, and intrusion detection systems. These solutions, on their own, look 
insurmountable from the perspective of outside attacks, and attackers have acknowledged 
this fact. Attackers have, therefore, started targeting the generally accepted weakest link 
in the security chain: the user. Researchers and practitioners agree that InfoSec systems 
can be better protected through improved design practices. 
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Given the above assertions, it is clear that an information system that addresses both 
InfoSec and usability aspects is essentially a socio-technical system that requires an 
interdisciplinary approach. In 2009, the US Department of Homeland Security listed 
usable security as one of the 11 most difficult problems to solve in the cybersecurity field 
(Maughan 2009). Eight years later (2017), that sentiment still holds true, with no clearly 
defined solution. Although a large body of knowledge has been developed since, usable 
security remains a challenge, especially with the ever-changing cybersecurity landscape. 
Hence, in addition to general usable security research, researchers have turned to tackling 
the problem as it applies to specific applications/information systems. 
 
Green and Smith (2016) argue that not all security problems are caused by end-users, as 
developers also make mistakes in application development. Hence, the authors call for 
developer-friendly tools for a holistic solution to application development. The authors, 
furthermore, argue that security mechanisms are often too complicated, time-consuming, 
and error-prone for end-users. This has prompted the emergence of the field of ‘usable 
security’. Researchers in this field attempt to combat user problems with regard to 
information security through interdisciplinary research to create security mechanisms that 
are compatible with ordinary users (Green & Smith 2016). 
 
To this end, security and usability have long been considered trade-off aspects in most 
authentication systems (Van Hamme, Rimmer, Preuveneers, Joosen, Mustafa, Abidin & 
Rúa 2017, Shay, Komanduri, Durity, Huh, Mazurek, Segreti, Ur, Bauer, Christin & 
Cranor 2014, Braz, Seffah & M’Raihi 2007, Cranor & Garfinkel 2005). This is 
highlighted by the fact that, as security increases (for example, long and complex 
passwords), usability aspects such as memorability and learnability suffer, resulting in 
users’ insecure behaviour, for example, writing down passwords. Information security 
and computer security have focused mainly on technological solutions to prevent 
vulnerabilities, while neglecting a socio-technical approach that addresses social aspects 
from the human side of information security (Kraemer, Carayon & Clem 2009). 
 
There is consensus that systems that are not usable cannot be secure when deployed in 
the real world (Garfinkel & Lipford 2014). Although the need to address socio-technical 
aspects in InfoSec has been recognised by practitioners and researchers, the task of 
developing usable security is proving to be challenging (Cranor & Garfinkel 2005). This 
phenomenon is not limited to usable security, but also involves InfoSec in general. One 
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aspect identified in achieving usable security is the conversion of theory to practice. There 
are numerous studies of different aspects of usable security. Besides the challenges of 
designing usable security, a second dimension of difficulty is the challenge of applying 
research results in practice (Theofanos & Pfleeger 2011). 
 
Aligning the often-opposing goals of InfoSec and usability has been a challenge so far. 
This has become a focal area of research with the introduction of the term ‘usable secu-
rity’, which essentially strives to find ways of developing systems that meet both InfoSec 
and usability goals. However, while there are several gaps in the knowledge of designing 
usable security systems, there is extensive research in the separate fields of information 
security and usability. Currently, there is no agreement on exactly how to design usable 
security. Scholars have proposed a number of different methods for achieving usable 
security. 
 
Given that most online applications, such as online banking, are meant for a variety of 
users with diverse computing skills and InfoSec awareness levels, it is imperative that the 
design of these systems must address both social and technical aspects. As researchers 
believe that the application of user-centred design can mitigate online security threats, 
there is an obvious need for these approaches in developing online InfoSec applications. 
The problem addressed in this research is that sensitive online applications do not meet 
both InfoSec and usability objectives. 
 
In the context of this research, the term ‘sensitive online applications’ refers to online 
InfoSec applications that involve the storage or transmission of sensitive and confidential 
personal information over the internet. Therefore, the applications require effective 
information security mechanisms for users to use them. This research proposes a socio-
technical framework that aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice in 
developing applications that are both secure and usable. 
 
These applications rely on InfoSec mechanisms to protect sensitive and confidential 
personal information of users in providing the relevant functionalities. Undoubtedly, all 
online IS applications require InfoSec mechanisms, but those within the scope of this 
study deal with critical personal information of end-users. Examples of these applications 
include online banking, ehealth, and online shopping, to mention but a few. The research 
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proposed a framework to help in the development of secure and usable online InfoSec 
applications in the context of online banking service. 
 
The framework attempts to provide a solution to fill the gap that still exists between 
InfoSec solutions and the effective use of these solutions for a secure online environment. 
Studies on usable security have proposed giving users tools to protect their information 
such as domain highlighting in browsers (Xiong, Proctor, Yang & Li 2017), strong 
password guidelines, browser technology, and encryption applications. However, given 
the diverse skills of online users, it is critical to develop applications with usability 
considerations built in. Generally, users ignore warnings, not because they intend to be 
negligent, but due to human habitual behaviour (Anderson, Vance, Kirwan, Jenkins & 
Eargle 2016). Alsharnouby, Alaca, and Chiasson (2015) found that phishing still worked 
because users ignored toolbar warnings about phishing threats. As a result, expecting 
users to act for effective protection against online threats is generally ineffective. The 
provision of tools without regard for how usable an average user will find them will not 
improve the InfoSec environment. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
This section provides the research questions guiding the research and outlines the research 
objectives attained by the end of the research. 
 
1.3.1 Primary research question 
The main research question of this study addressed the usability of online InfoSec 
applications, using online banking as a case study. The main research question was 
formulated as follows:  
How can information security-sensitive online applications be designed to be 
both secure and usable? 
 
1.3.2 Research sub-questions 
The main research question was answered by addressing the following sub-questions: 
1. What are the requirements for a socio-technical framework for the development of 
secure and usable information security online applications? 
2. How can a socio-technical framework for the development of secure and usable 
information security online applications be designed? 
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3. How can a socio-technical framework for the development of secure and usable 
information security online applications be validated? 
 
1.3.3 Primary research objective 
The main objective of this research is: 
To develop a socio-technical framework that assists in the development of 
secure and usable information security-sensitive online applications. 
 
1.3.4 Research sub-objectives 
The main objective was achieved by addressing the following specific objectives: 
1. To identify the requirements for a socio-technical framework for the development of 
secure and usable information security online applications. 
2. To design a socio-technical framework for the development of secure and usable 
information security online applications. 
3. To validate the socio-technical framework for the development of secure and usable 
information security online applications. 
 
The research aimed to develop a socio-technical framework that assist in the development 
of secure and usable sensitive online applications using online banking as a case study to 
address both the technical and social aspects of an online environment. The developed 
framework can be applied to other online InfoSec applications that have similar 
characteristics as online banking. 
 
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
User behaviour and acceptance of technology in information systems have been explained 
by a number of theories in the literature, from adoption to acceptance and continued use. 
The most popular model to explain user behaviour in the interaction with information 
systems is the second version of the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology 
(UTAUT) by Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003). UTAUT2 by Venkatesh, 
Thong, and Xu (2012) is an extension of UTAUT and is, currently, the latest model that 
theorises user behaviour with regard to technology acceptance and continued use. 
UTAUT unifies eight technology acceptance and user behaviour-related theories. Hence, 
it covers a wide range of constructs that model user interaction and behaviour with 
information systems. This research applied UTAUT2 in the context of online banking to 
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evaluate the adoption, acceptance, and continued use of the service and a detailed discus-
sion of the model is provided in Chapter 3. The proposed model has additional moderating 
factors specific to online banking in the South African context. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The main purpose of this research was to develop a socio-technical framework that assist 
in the development of secure and usable sensitive online applications. The proposed 
framework brings various InfoSec application design principles, guidelines, and concepts 
together in a comprehensible framework that could be useful for the development of 
secure and usable information system security applications. The framework consists of 
socio-technical issues that need to be addressed in developing secure and usable 
information system applications, especially those that involve InfoSec mechanisms and 
user interactions. To achieve this objective, the researcher used an MMR design under 
the pragmatic research paradigm. This section provides a brief overview of the research 
design and methodology. A detailed discussion of choices made at every stage of the 
research design is presented in Chapter 4 based on the ‘research onion’ by Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill (2016). 
 
1.5.1 The research process 
A research process is a multistage process followed when undertaking a research project. 
It follows a predetermined number of stages. The stages vary in number and exact name 
based on a number of aspects, which include the author’s preference and the type of 
research being undertaken. Nonetheless, the stages in scientific academic research usually 
include articulating a research topic, reviewing the literature, identifying the problem, 
discussing the research philosophy subscribed to, designing the research, describing the 
research strategy employed, choosing research instruments, collecting research data, per-
forming data analysis, and reporting on results. 
 
The steps of the research process vary depending on the type of research; for instance, the 
process followed by scientific research differs from that followed in market research. In 
addition, although the stages are presented in a linear format, the process is essentially 
iterative, moving back and forth among all stages during the course of the research. Figure 
1-3 illustrates the five phases of the research process for this research, mapping each stage 
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to the respective thesis chapter. The research process was guided by the research 































Figure 1-3: The research process 
 
Furthermore, in scientific research, the process may differ based on whether the research 
is exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, or evaluation research. The rest of this chapter 
expands on the research design, highlighting decisions made in selecting research options 
at every stage. 
 
1.5.2 Research design 
There are mainly two major philosophical worldviews: interpretive and positivist. Denzin 
and Lincoln (2017:15) state that, with positivism, “objective accounts of the real world 
can be given”. Positivist researchers assume that reality is objective and can be measured 
with properties that are independent of the researcher and instruments used (Myers 2013). 
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Positivism is mainly associated with quantitative research that focuses on collecting 
quantitative data for theory testing. The interpretive paradigm is primarily associated with 
qualitative research designs. It is also worth noting that both (positivism and interpretive) 
paradigms can be applied in quantitative or qualitative research, based on the way the 
researcher chooses to frame the study. Among the other paradigms besides positivism and 
interpretivism are social constructivism, postpositivism, critical realism, and pragmatism, 
to mention but a few. 
 
Pragmatism, the paradigm used for this research, is located in the middle between the 
opposing forces of positivism and interpretivism, giving the researcher the freedom to use 
aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research methods (Creswell & Clark 2017, 
Doyle, Brady & Byrne 2009). Pragmatism acknowledges philosophical assumptions of 
both positivism and interpretivism, such as the existence of a single objective reality and 
that reality consists of subjective views wedged in the mind, respectively (Creswell & 
Poth 2017). The pragmatic philosophy asserts that human action cannot be separated from 
past experiences and behaviour that has arisen from those experiences; hence, the 
meaning of actions and beliefs is found in their consequences (Levin & Greenwood 
2013). Morgan (2014) succinctly summarises the relevance of pragmatism by stating that 
individuals will have different worldviews because no two previous experiences can truly 
be identical; as such, worldviews are both individually unique at the most detailed level 
and socially shared at broader levels. 
 
This research followed a mixed methods research (MMR) design, making pragmatism 
the paradigm of choice. The paradigm used here acknowledges the philosophical 
assumptions of both the positivist and interpretivist paradigms and, thus, asserts that 
human action cannot be separated from experiences and behaviour arising from those 
experiences; hence, the meaning of actions and beliefs is found in their consequences 
(Levin & Greenwood 2013). In other words, reality is discovered through abduction, 
which is “uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for understanding 
one’s results” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004:17). The researcher argued that the 
intersection of human behaviour and InfoSec, commonly referred to as ‘usable security’, 
which was the subject of this research, was an area that was not straightforward and that 
conventional solutions had failed to provide effective solutions. Therefore, applying a 
pragmatic philosophy that did not view the world through a single lens was likely to 
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contribute significantly to, firstly, understanding the problem and, secondly, proposing 
solutions. 
 
1.5.3 Research methodology 
The research methodology outlines all aspects of research project implementation, guided 
by the research design. Research methodology is a part of the overall research design that 
concentrates on the intrinsic details of gathering research evidence, that is, aspects with 
regard to data collection and analysis. The researcher used an abductive approach, as this 
fitted in with the pragmatic mixed research design that involved testing an extant theory 
and establishing an explanation for InfoSec user behaviour. The research collected survey 
data to explain online banking adoption and continued use, while investigating design 
principles that might assist in developing a service that met both security and usability 
goals. This formed the deductive part of the abductive approach, while qualitative inter-
views of system designers inductively investigated perceptions of user behaviour in 
system development and maintenance. 
 
1.5.4 Mixed methods research design 
There is an ongoing debate on different stances that ought to be taken in MMR designs. 
Creswell (2010) and Greene and Hall (2010) note the resistance to mixing paradigms 
based on the argument that paradigms are unique and cannot be combined in a single 
research project. Denzin and Lincoln (2013) contend that paradigms are independent and 
can be combined into achieving the objectives of a single research project. In addition, 
Mingers (2001) argues that research methods can be separated from paradigms and can 
be used critically and knowledgeably to address social problems that are laden with 
societal and individual self-understandings. This debate leads Creswell (2010) to 
acknowledge the differences in paradigms – hence, the need to keep them separate in 
MMR designs. This essentially implies the use of two paradigms in MMR. Given these 
disparate views, the discussion of MMR paradigms continues. The researcher subscribed 
to the notion of applying two paradigms (interpretivism and positivism) in a pragmatic 
study. Creswell and Clark (2017:5) define MMR as follows: 
“As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction 
of the collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in many phases of the research process. As a method, it focuses on 
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collecting, analysing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single 
study or series of studies.” 
 
The researcher used MMR for additional coverage that sought to assign different 
strengths of different methods to different goals of the research project (Morgan 2014). 
This approach was used through the convergent parallel mixed methods design, as illus-
trated in Figure 1-4. 
 
 
The researcher independently implemented both the quantitative and qualitative strands, 
with separate analysis, before combining the findings in a final interpretation. The final 
interpretation fed into the proposed research framework for the development of secure 
and usable online InfoSec applications. The framework was evaluated through a heuristic 
evaluation method. 
 
1.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The research was reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
College of Science, Engineering, and Technology, Unisa. A written approval certificate 
was issued to the researcher that was made available to both research participants and 
respondents. The ethical clearance certificate was included in the documentation package 
containing the invitation to participate, while the certificate was made available to survey 
respondents on request. The ethical certificates are included as Appendix A. 
 
The research participants and respondents were given informed consent forms explaining 
the research and their respective participation. These forms included the contact details 
of the researcher, the supervisors, the research ethics chairperson, and the university’s 
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toll-free hotline to allow research participants and respondents to report any unethical 
behaviour. The ‘letter of informed consent’ and ‘participant’s information sheet’ for 
survey respondents, interview participants, and framework evaluators are included as 
Appendix B, Appendix C, and Appendix D, respectively. The researcher also applied for 
permission to invite Unisa staff and students to participate as survey respondents. Unisa’s 
approval to conduct research involving Unisa staff and students is included as part of the 
ethical certificates in Appendix A. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH PURPOSE AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The purpose of this research was to examine social and technical aspects that could assist 
in the design of online security systems and to propose a usable security framework to 
assist in addressing socio-technical aspects in the design of online InfoSec applications. 
The research aimed to make the following contributions to the fields of ISs and usable 
security: 
 Contribute to the field of usable security by proposing a framework for designing 
usable security that addresses socio-technical aspects. 
 Develop a usable security framework evaluation tool for the assessment of an online 
InfoSec application website. 
 Provide new insights into the use of an MMR design in information systems. 
 Make a practical contribution to the envisaged improvement in the user-centred 
design and development of online banking websites. This would help make the wider 
ecommerce environment more secure. 
 
1.8 RESEARCH SCOPE 
The intention of the research was to investigate the acceptance of online banking and 
evaluate the usability of online banking security websites based on relevant data gathered 
from the users of major banks in South Africa. A framework for the design of usable 
security of online InfoSec applications was proposed. The proposed framework was 
evaluated by means of a heuristic evaluation method using a checklist of items based on 
identified usable security principles. 
 
1.9 LIMITATIONS 
The research used online banking as a case study for the development of usable security 
of online applications. Hence, the application of the proposed framework to similar online 
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applications might need small adaptations, depending on how similar or dissimilar the 
application environment is from the case study used. The researcher envisaged that the 
findings of this research would provide fundamental building blocks to provide solutions 
to similar problems in a different environment. 
 
The research investigated barriers to the adoption and continued use of online banking 
based on the perceptions of users who were currently using the service. Although these 
users could help highlight factors that made users hesitant to take up the service, a more 
in-depth investigation of adoption problems can be achieved by obtaining the perceptions 
of users not yet using the service. 
 
The proposed framework was not intended to solve problems associated with user behav-
iour regarding InfoSec, but was meant to complement current proposed solutions in the 
field by contributing to the body of knowledge. Hence, even its implementation would 
need to take other aspects into consideration that might come from other fields and 
research studies and ought not to be done in isolation. The InfoSec problem is now consid-
ered a social problem, with many facets that require a holistic socio-technical approach 
to finding solutions. This holistic view requires the input of all stakeholders in the 
environment where information systems are developed and deployed, with emphasis on 
a user-centred approach. The government needs to play a central role in educating citizens 
(especially at an early age) regarding the threats to InfoSec in a digital economy. 
 
1.10 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The research roadmap presented at the beginning of each chapter was based on the five 
stages of the research process, as illustrated in Figure 1-5. The research roadmap illus-
trates the position of each of the eight chapters of the thesis. The left-most column indi-
cates the stage in the research process, accompanied by the chapter(s) in each stage to its 
right. The position of each chapter on the roadmap is in bold and highlighted with a darker 
shade. The roadmap is presented at the beginning of each chapter. The following is a 
synopsis of the content covered in each of the eight chapters of the thesis. 
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Figure 1-5: The research roadmap 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The chapter defines the scope of the research by first giving the background, which then 
builds up to the problem statement. This is followed by the presentation of the research 
questions and research objectives, which guide all the other activities and decisions made 
in addressing the problem area. A brief introduction to the theoretical framework that 
guides the research is given, followed by a brief discussion of the research design and 
methodology. Lastly, the chapter concludes with ethical considerations, research contri-
bution, and limitations. 
 
Chapter 2: Information security 
The literature review is presented in two chapters. The first of these chapters briefly 
touches on the topics of the internet and ecommerce, as online banking is provided 
through the internet and an integral part of the ecommerce payment system. This is 
followed by a detailed discussion of InfoSec, which includes the fundamental principles, 
InfoSec threats, online InfoSec, and – lastly – threats to online banking security. 
 
Chapter 3: Framework development 
This second literature review chapter discusses details of human-computer interaction 







Chapter 2: Information 
security








Chapter 5: Quantitative 
data analysis
Chapter 6: Qualitative 
data analysis
Interpretation 
and write-up of 
findings




21 | P a g e  
 
usable security. The chapter also presents usable security as a socio-technical system, as 
it relates to both technology and human aspects. This is followed by usability and UX 
goals, user-centred interaction design, and website usability. Finally, the chapter presents 
the preliminary STInfoSec framework, for whose validation the research collected data. 
 
Chapter 4: Research design and methodology 
The chapter outlines the overall blueprint of the research project, giving details of the 
selected research design and methodology, including motivations for each selection. The 
chapter provides detailed discussions of, and motivations for, the following research 
choices: the research paradigm (pragmatism), the research process, the research approach 
(abductive), research strategies (survey and case study), and data collection and analysis 
techniques. 
 
Chapter 5: Quantitative data analysis 
The process of the quantitative data collection and analysis of the MMR design is 
presented in this chapter. The chapter starts with an outline of the theoretical framework 
guiding data collection and research hypotheses, followed by details of data collection 
techniques used. This is followed by a brief discussion of the data analysis techniques 
used and how these were applied in the research. The analysis included descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Structural equation modelling was used for inferential statistics, and 
this is presented together with the respective measurement models. Finally, the model is 
interpreted and linked to the research objectives. 
 
Chapter 6: Qualitative data analysis 
The qualitative part of the research is presented in this qualitative data collection and 
analysis chapter. The chapter starts by discussing the sources of data, namely, interviews 
and qualitative survey responses. This is followed by a detailed discussion and application 
of the data analysis method used in the research, that is, framework analysis. The stages 
of framework analysis are outlined, followed by the final stage, which summarises the 
mapping and interpretation of the qualitative findings, linking them to the overall objec-
tives of the research project. The chapter concludes with a presentation of six themes 
identified based on thematic and open coding, using an in vivo coding technique on partic-
ipants’ responses and, finally, linking them to the usable security principles that formed 
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the preliminary socio-technical information security (STInfoSec) framework, for evalua-
tion in Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 7: Framework evaluation 
The main objective of the preceding chapters was to develop a socio-technical framework. 
The objective of this chapter is to present the framework and conduct an evaluation. The 
chapter first presents the integration of quantitative and qualitative findings, highlighting 
how these support the proposed preliminary STInfoSec framework. The preliminary 
framework is presented, followed by the evaluation process carried out through heuristic 
evaluation by field experts in the areas of security and usability. Finally, the validated 
STInfoSec framework is presented. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The final chapter concludes the research project by first discussing how the research 
questions were answered and research objectives achieved after conclusion of the 
research project. This is followed by a discussion of the research contribution both in 
theory and in practical terms. Limitations of the study are provided, followed by sugges-
tions for further work. Lastly, a summary that provides the researcher’s reflections is 
given. 
 
1.11 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chapter 1 pointed out the research gap and outlined the problem statement, including 
stating research questions and objectives. The challenge in designing usable security is 
finding a balance between information security and usability needs. The use of design 
principles has been identified as one potential solution to achieve usable security. Several 
design principles are proposed in the literature; however, the challenge is that such 
principles are generalised, while there is a need for specific design principles for 
applications. This research proposes a design framework for sensitive online applications, 
using a socio-technical approach, validated specifically for online banking service. 
Chapter 2 outlines the information security needs of online applications; hence, it focuses 
on the technical component of the socio-technical approach of this research. 
-- ooo -- 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Figure 2-1: The research roadmap 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since its development, the internet has evolved, and it has advanced to such an extent that 
it has changed the way people carry out their daily activities. Almost any activity can be 
performed online, from communication and entertainment to buying and selling products 
and services. Organisations and governments hire, train, and pay their employees online. 
The advent of ecommerce, which relies on the internet, has revolutionised individuals’ 
lifestyles and the business processes of organisations. The migration of business 
processes to online platforms has drastically reduced the operating costs of organisations 
(Hernando & Nieto 2007). Hence, most organisations encourage their clientele to use 
online channels rather than brick-and-mortar channels, thereby cutting down on the 
operational costs of these brick-and-mortar locations. For financial institutions, the move 
allows for a reduction in behind-the-desk employees to service walk-in clients at 
branches. Banks now offer a free online banking service to encourage the adoption of the 
service, but, in spite of the obvious benefits of ecommerce and related services, the uptake 
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2.2 INTERNET 
Online ISs rely on the internet to remotely access data through a plethora of connected 
end-user devices. The internet is a public network that connects billions of computing 
devices and networks of different sizes globally, giving internet access to billions of users 
(Bidgoli 2006). The internet has revolutionised modern society, as described by Leiner, 
Cerf, Clark, Kahn, Kleinrock, Lynch, Postel, Roberts, and Wolff (2009:22): 
“The internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism for 
information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction 
between individuals and their computers without regard for geographic location.” 
 
With the internet as a medium for information dissemination, organisations and 
individuals are becoming progressively more reliant on the internet’s 24/7 connectivity 
for access to, and distribution of, information. Unfortunately, the internet was not built 
with security as an integral component. Oppliger (1997:92) describes the beginning of 
the internet as: 
“[a] collegial environment, where the users and hosts were mutually trusting and 
interested in a free and open exchange of information. In this environment, the 
people on the internet were the people who actually built the internet”. 
 
Today, the internet environment is expansive with potentially adversary nodes that are 
untrustworthy. At the time of writing this thesis, there were over 3.83 billion internet users 
and even more devices connected to the internet, transmitting over a billion gigabytes of 
data a day (Internet Live Stats 2018). Given these figures, it is inevitable that a number 
of online users will be novices with little or no basic InfoSec awareness – hence, the need 
to address the InfoSec problem to protect sensitive and confidential information, as it is 
stored on devices and transmitted over the internet. In a layered InfoSec approach, 
different aspects of InfoSec are addressed at different layers. Usable security, the focus 
of this research, is essentially situated at the topmost layer. 
 
The web browser is still the primary means of accessing internet content from desktop 
and portable (laptop) computers. However, the introduction of smartphones has brought 
about a variety of applications that provide internet content directly without the use of the 
web browser. Such applications need to be developed with InfoSec intrinsically included 
without relying on web browser security. The web browser is also used in mobile devices 
such as smartphones for internet access, bringing the internet to the fingertips of users, 
25 | P a g e  
 
regardless of computer-proficiency levels. However, being an open and public medium, 
the internet brings with it new risks and threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information. Web browser security mechanisms such as the HTTP over 
TLS (HTTPS) protocol can only go so far in protecting users’ information, but recent 
attacks such as phishing bypass these protections and leave users vulnerable to numerous 
online security threats. Therefore, the search for effective solutions to online InfoSec 
problems is ongoing. One area that has gained momentum is the development of usable 
IS applications. This research investigated a framework to promote the development of 
secure and usable online InfoSec applications, using online banking as a case study. 
Online banking is a major component of electronic commerce, as it forms part of the 
payment system when products and services are sold online. 
 
2.3 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
Electronic commerce (ecommerce) is the buying, selling, transferring, or exchanging of 
products, services, and/or information via a computer network, including the internet 
(Turban et al. 2015). Ecommerce has evolved from just the selling and buying of products 
and services to involving servicing customers and collaboration among business partners. 
Therefore, the term ‘electronic business’ (ebusiness) has been coined to sufficiently cover 
broader aspects of ecommerce, essentially making ecommerce a subset of ebusiness 
(Turban et al. 2015). Turban et al. (2015) define ebusiness as an extension of ecommerce 
in that it goes beyond the selling of products and services online and also includes 
conducting business processes online such as communications, customer services, and 
marketing. 
 
Significantly, as mentioned before, ecommerce has revolutionised the way organisations 
and governments do business and how individuals perform their day-to-day lifestyle 
activities. However, with the widespread adoption of ecommerce, the data transmitted 
through ecommerce channels include sensitive and confidential information such as 
personal and financial details. Consequently, with the internet being open, it is important 
to protect data during transmission and storage against unauthorised access or 
modification. Ecommerce is a global model, and the sections that follow discuss general 
ecommerce issues that are prevalent in the majority of economies. Undeniably, certain 
regions face additional challenges. For example, in developing countries, there is a lack 
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of internet infrastructure, which adversely affects internet speed and cost, resulting in low 
internet penetration rates (Shiferaw & Zolfo 2012). 
 
Although ecommerce is growing globally, the Information Infrastructure Task Force 
(IITF) has identified the following key issues that need to be addressed before ecommerce 
can be fully realised. The issues include security of electronic transactions, interoperation 
of communications, data management, and security services, plus the identification and 
removal of economic, cultural, regulatory, and legal barriers (Han & Noh 1999). These 
barriers are applicable globally, although with varying severity from country to country. 
In the context of South Africa, the cost of internet connectivity, coupled with lack of 
internet infrastructure, continues to be a major barrier to ecommerce adoption (Chetty, 
Banks, Brush, Donner & Grinter 2012). Therefore, a lot of work still needs to be done to 
improve the speed of broadband connection and reduce internet cost to allow the majority 
of the population easy access. An improvement in ecommerce adoption will directly 
influence adoption of other services such as online shopping and online banking, as well 
as service delivery by government through initiatives such as egovernment. Electronic 
services such as online banking and online shopping, tend to have common barriers to 
adoption. One such barrier is InfoSec, which strives to protect personal and confidential 
information in storage and in transit over an open and public internet connection. This 
research investigated ways of improving online InfoSec through the design of online 
applications. The researcher proposes a socio-technical approach that promote effective 
use of InfoSec mechanisms in online applications, thereby encouraging adoption of these 
InfoSec sensitive applications. 
 
2.4 INFORMATION SECURITY 
There is no doubt that, in this digital world, information is important to individuals and 
organisations alike. This section defines InfoSec and provide fundamental principles that 
need to be addressed for effective protection of information assets. The nature of an online 
environment make InfoSec critical for trust between geographically dispersed and often 
untrustworthy entities. To address the InfoSec problem, these aspects are applicable to 
both online and offline environments, but with special emphasis on online InfoSec, the 
main subject of this research. In business, information can be the difference between 
achieving business objectives and failing to meet these objectives. It then follows that 
information is the most important business asset (Peltier, Peltier & Blackley 2005) and 
that its protection and safeguarding against unauthorised access are important (Thomson 
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& Von Solms 2005) and essential to maintaining the competitive edge, profitability, cash 
flow, and reputation of an organisation (Tryfonas 2010). 
 
Security, in general, is concerned with the protection of assets, and one has to know one’s 
assets to be able to protect them (Gollmann 2011). The Oxford Dictionary (2018) defines 
security as “the state of being or feeling secure”. The primary objective of security is 
protection against intentional or unintentional harm. There are multiple layers of security 
in an organisation. Whitman and Mattord (2017) outline six layers of security, as 
illustrated in Figure 2-2. For effective protection, each of these layers needs attention, and 
a weakness in one layer can compromise the whole system. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Layers of security (Whitman & Mattord 2017) 
 
The first layer, physical security, protects physical objects or areas against unauthorised 
access. Personnel security protects the individual or group of individuals authorised to 
access the organisation and its operations. The next layer, operations security, protects 
the details of a particular operation or series of activities. Communications media, 
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protects networking components, connections, and content. Lastly, information security 
protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets in storage, 
processing, or transit. 
 
Computer security is the prevention and detection of unauthorised actions by users of a 
computer system (Gollmann 2011). Computer security first concentrated on securing data 
storage before the widespread use of computer networks. It evolved into the securing of 
data in transmission and the transmission medium itself. Computer security is synony-
mous with cybersecurity, which Touhill and Touhill (2014:1) define as: 
“[t]he deliberate synergy of technologies, processes and practices to protect infor-
mation and the networks, computer systems and appliances and programs used to 
collect, process, store and transport that information from attack, damage and 
unauthorised access”. 
 
The term ‘information security’ has a broader meaning than ‘computer security’. There 
is, however, no consensus on the precise definition of InfoSec, as the definition changes 
based on the context. Depending on one’s viewpoint, there are many definitions of 
InfoSec, as it can be viewed from a technical, behavioural, managerial, philosophical, or 
organisational standpoint (Zafar & Clark 2009). A number of different definitions have 
been advanced by researchers and practitioners. Some of the definitions from varying 
sources are given below. 
 
Peltier (2014) argues that InfoSec covers a number of aspects, namely, security policy, 
organisational security, asset classification, personnel security, physical security, access 
control, communications and operations management, system development and mainte-
nance, disaster management, and – lastly – compliance. This implies that InfoSec is not 
only concerned with information stored in digital form, but even printed information and 
tacit knowledge of personnel. 
 
InfoSec is “[t]he protection of information against unauthorised disclosure, transfer, 
modification, or destruction, whether accidental or intentional” (Blyth & Kovacich 
2006:4). According to Peltier (2014), InfoSec consists of using access controls to grant 
access to information assets and prevent unauthorised access and damage. McDaniel 
(1994) defines InfoSec as the use of concepts, techniques, and technical and 
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administrative measures to protect information assets against deliberate or unintentional 
authorised acquisition, damage, disclosure, manipulation, modification, loss, or use. 
 
A recurring phrase in most definitions of InfoSec is ‘information asset’. An information 
asset is an organisational resource being protected. Assets can be logical, such as data, or 
physical, such as a computer server (Whitman & Mattord 2017). Many definitions of 
InfoSec and some definitions of computer security include the principles of the CIA 
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) triad as the fundamentals of InfoSec. 
Anderson (2003) argues that InfoSec cannot be all about CIA due to the lack of agreed 
meanings of the CIA principles; hence, we need a new definition. Therefore, for InfoSec 
measures to work, security professionals need to agree on exactly what constitutes 
InfoSec. One theme found in all definitions is that InfoSec is an all-encompassing concept 
that can be achieved by subdividing numerous information system concepts and 
addressing them individually for the protection of the information assets of an organisa-
tion (Anderson 2003). 
 
The protection of information against unauthorised access is becoming more important, 
especially now that many organisations store and transmit personal and confidential data 
pertaining to individuals. Such data is now stored at remote cloud locations and retrieved 
through the public and open internet. Given the recent high-profile security and privacy 
breaches at Yahoo, Target, JPMorgan Chase, Ashley Madison, and eBay (Information is 
Beautiful 2018), it has become apparent that organisations that collect personal infor-
mation cannot be left to monitor themselves. 
 
South African organisations are not currently legally compelled to report and make secu-
rity breaches public, although this might change with the introduction of the Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity Bill, which is in the process of being enacted. A recent disclosure of 
about 60 million personal records of South African citizens, deemed the largest South 
African data breach, was attributed to poor information safeguards by a company that 
holds real estate information (Fraser 2017). It is interesting to note that the breach was 
not a hack, but due to data stored on an unprotected web server easily accessible to 
anyone. This is a violation of the Protection of Personal Information (PoPI) Act. The 
recent Equifax data breach in the USA was due to the delayed application of a fix that 
could have avoided the breach (Newman 2017). Hence, in addition to cybercriminals’ 
continuous attempts at accessing personal information of citizens, there are still some 
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organisations that are not implementing the most basic protection mechanisms to safe-
guard personal information. The PoPI Act serves the purpose of ensuring that all South 
African institutions that collect, process, store, and share another entity’s personal infor-
mation conduct themselves in a responsible manner by holding them accountable (PoPI 
2013). However, some international breaches such as those at Yahoo, Ashley Madison, 
and eBay do have a global impact that affects all individuals, regardless of country of 
residence. 
 
Governments have enacted data protection laws to give guidelines on what is expected 
when third parties collect and store personal information. Accidental or fraudulent loss of 
data can have serious implications for the custodian of information and clients. Personal 
information collected by organisations and governments ranges from names and 
addresses to sensitive data such as credit card numbers. A security breach of such infor-
mation can damage the reputation of the organisation and result in the loss of future 
business. This can lead to a serious inconvenience for clients, with threats such as identity 
theft. 
 
If viewed as a social science that examines the behaviour of individuals as they interact 
with systems, InfoSec begins and ends with the people inside and outside the organisation 
who interact with the system (Whitman & Mattord 2017). This follows Dhamija and 
Perrig’s (2000) earlier argument that systems should be evaluated not only theoretically, 
but also by how secure they are in common practice. Parsons et al. (2010) affirm that an 
exclusive focus on the technical aspects of security is inadequate without due 
consideration of how the human users interact with the system. Nevertheless, designers 
do not always take human cognitive limitations into consideration in their design and 
evaluation of information system security (Dhamija & Perrig 2000). 
 
2.5 PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
The challenge of providing solutions to the InfoSec problem involves addressing 
numerous challenges that are interdependent, resulting in a holistic solution. InfoSec in 
general consists of numerous principles that need attention to achieve effective system 
security. However, the nature of online applications poses the additional challenge of 
granting access to remotely connected devices. This section discusses the principles, 
especially those fundamental to providing InfoSec solutions to ISs that operate in an 
online environment. Traditionally, there were three main principles of InfoSec, often 
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denoted by the CIA triad (Stamp 2011). Parker (2012) has since argued that the classic 
CIA triad is inadequate to allow security practitioners to address the InfoSec problem 
practically, as many aspects are left unaddressed. Hence, Parker (2012) proposes a new 
framework with additional principles, namely, utility, authenticity, and possession. These 
principles are interdependent and cannot be addressed in isolation. The following sections 
discuss the original CIA triad principles and other principles that have emerged as 
important and that need to be addressed individually in the broader realm of InfoSec. 
These principles are critical in online InfoSec applications, as a single weakness can 




Confidentiality is the assurance that information is not disclosed to inappropriate or 
unauthorised entities or processes (Whitman & Mattord 2017). Confidentiality ensures 
that information is accessible only to those authorised to have access. Confidentiality 
ensures that those allowed to access information are able to, and will be allowed to, 
manipulate the information based on their rights and privileges. Confidentiality is often 
referred to as secrecy or privacy. Privacy refers to the protection of personal data, while 
secrecy refers to the protection of organisational data (Gollmann 2011). In an online 
environment, this principle is critical to ensure that, as data travels through numerous 
network nodes, some of which are untrustworthy, it is not intercepted and modified before 
reaching the final destination. 
 
2.5.2 Integrity 
Integrity ensures that information can be modified only by authorised entities in 
authorised ways, thereby ensuring that it is not accidentally or maliciously altered or 
destroyed, be it in storage or in transit (Whitman & Mattord 2017; Peltier 2014). 
Information assets should be modified only by authorised parties and only in authorised 
ways (Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2015). In security terms, information integrity ensures that 
information is accurate and has no unauthorised modifications (Graham, Olson & Howard 
2011). It is, therefore, important to be able to identify any modifications that might have 
been applied to the received information during transmission to allow the recipient to 
discard such information. 
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2.5.3 Availability  
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC) provide the ISO/IEC 27000:2016 standard, which defines 
availability as ensuring that authorised entities have access to information and associated 
assets when needed. This means that one is assured, with reasonable confidence and 
certainty, that the information and the information systems are always available when 
needed (Blyth & Kovacich 2006). Availability can mean different things to different 
people. Generally, a data item, service, or system is available if there is a timeous response 
and a fair allocation of resources, if the service or system is used easily, and if there is 
controlled concurrency to support simultaneous access, deadlock management, and 
exclusive access as required (Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2015). 
 
The main threat to availability is a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, particularly distributed 
DoS (DDoS) attacks that are prevalent in the current networked online environment. 
DDoS is the prevention of authorised access to system resources or the delaying of time-
critical services, which occurs by inundating web server bandwidth or resources with 
multiple targeted requests (Zargar, Joshi & Tipper 2013). DDoS attacks are usually 
carried out through compromised internet nodes, known as ‘zombie computers’; a 
collection of such interconnected nodes on the internet is called a ‘botnet’ (short for ‘robot 
network’) (Zargar et al. 2013). One of the main attractions of online services is the 
convenience of being able to access the services 24/7, which makes availability a 
principle critical to providing online services to users. 
 
2.5.4 Authenticity 
Authenticity means conformance to reality. The authenticity of information generally 
refers to wholeness, completeness, and good condition (Parker 2012). Authenticity is 
achieved through the use of authentication mechanisms. Authentication is an access 
control method that validates a system entity’s claimed identity, before granting 
permissions and creating an audit trail (Peltier 2014). There are a number of 
authentication mechanisms for specific applications. For example, computer system users 
are authenticated through usernames and passwords, and the authenticity of documents 
can be achieved through digital signatures. In other words, confidentiality ensures that 
the entity’s identity, when requesting access, is not modified (in storage or in transit) and 
reflects the entity’s originally claimed identity. Through encryption mechanisms, 
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confidentiality protects the information that uniquely identifies the entity. Authentication 
plays a significant role in online applications that are intended to be accessible remotely 
from a multitude of devices. Access devices, web servers, and remote databases that store 
personal information need to provide infallible authentication mechanisms to authorised 
users with different access rights. 
 
2.5.5 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation ensures that an entity or party cannot later deny being the origin of data 
or communication (Peltier 2014). Non-repudiation can be defined as a property that 
prevents an entity from denying actions performed on information assets (Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger 2015). It provides unforgeable evidence that a specific action occurred. 
 
2.5.6 Accuracy 
Information accuracy requires that information be free from mistakes or errors and, more 
importantly, that it has the value that the end-user expects (Whitman & Mattord 2017). 
For example, financial information such as a bank balance can be accessed at anytime 
from anywhere using multiple channels. Hence, it is vital that such information is always 
up to date. Accuracy of information is assured by gathering information from reliable 
sources and securely keeping the information in an environment where any modifications, 
authorised or unauthorised, can be identified (Pipkin 2000). 
 
2.5.7 Utility 
Parker (2012) describes loss of utility as the loss of usefulness of information that still 
has confidentiality, integrity, and availability. An example of utility loss is where an 
encryption key to an encrypted document is permanently lost. The information in the 
document is still protected against unauthorised access and modification, but is inacces-
sible to the authorised user. Nielsen (2010) suggests that a product or service first needs 
to be useful and then provide utility to the user before addressing usability. Therefore, 
online applications have to provide a utility to the user, and necessary safeguards to 
protect the utility are important. 
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2.6 ACCESS CONTROL 
Access control is a cornerstone of InfoSec and security, in general, especially since any 
security violation begins with perpetrators gaining access, be it authorised or unauthor-
ised. Hence, the starting point of any security discussion is access control. Access control 
approaches rely on a number of InfoSec principles such as identification, authentication, 
authorisation, and accountability (Whitman & Mattord 2017). Identification verifies the 
identity of an applicant, while authentication validates the purported identity using 
authentication mechanisms based on supplied information. There are three main 
approaches to identification and authentication: ‘something you know’ (for example, a 
username and password or personal identification number (PIN)), ‘something you have’ 
(for example, an access card), and ‘something you are’ (for example, a fingerprint). Based 
on how many of these three elements the system requires, the system is a one-, two-, or 
three-factor authentication mechanism. 
 
The ‘something you know’ approach is a single-factor authentication (SFA) mechanism 
widely used in online systems, where the user accesses the system by supplying a combi-
nation of a username and password, previously acquired on registration. This approach is 
simple, cost-effective to implement, and very convenient for users. System administrators 
allow users to reset forgotten passwords and request forgotten usernames through a series 
of security verification steps. Unfortunately, this method has significant shortcomings, as 
weak passwords that are easy to remember can be guessed, while strong passwords are 
difficult to remember, and users tend to write them down. Current implementations of 
single-factor authentication improve security by adding an additional step, an out-of-
bound channel, usually through sending an authentication code via email or short message 
service (SMS). 
 
A two-factor authentication (2FA) mechanism uses any two of the three approaches for 
identification and authentication, but mainly consists of SFA and ‘something you have’. 
An example of this approach is the use of bank cards to access account information and 
withdraw cash in automated teller machine (ATM) systems. The user supplies the bank 
card and enters the PIN for identification and authentication, respectively. The online 
version of this approach uses token hardware, where a server generates a code and sends 
it to the hardware token. The user enters the matching code on the website to complete 
the authentication process. This approach increases the complexity of the system by 
adding token hardware management. Research has shown that this method has a negative 
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impact on system usability, convenience, and ease of use from the users’ perspective 
(Krol, Philippou, De Cristofaro & Sasse 2015). For example, a user effectively loses 
access to his/her online banking service until a lost token has been replaced. 
 
Three-factor authentication (3FA) uses all three approaches, including biometric 
(‘something you are’) technology, such as a fingerprint scanner or voice recognition, to 
verify identity (Bhattacharyya, Ranjan, Alisherov & Choi 2009). There are a number of 
problems with biometric technology, including performance and accuracy with respect to 
balancing the cost of ‘false rejection’ and ‘false acceptance’ (Patel, Chellappa, Chandra 
& Barbello 2016) and spoofing attacks (Hadid, Evans, Marcel & Fierrez 2015). Biometric 
technology is still costly to implement, although the cost has recently been dropping to 
make it more feasible (Bonneau, Herley, Van Oorschot & Stajano 2012). Furthermore, 
an earlier study found biometric systems are perceived as intrusive by some sensitive 
users; for instance, some users are hesitant to touch a fingerprint scanner that has been 
touched by many other users (Matyas & Riha 2002). There are still logistical problems 
with biometric online authentication, especially on desktop computers. The advent of 
touchscreen smartphones is now making it possible to use some biometric mechanisms 
for online user authentication (Angulo & Wästlund 2012). Authorisation checks the levels 
the authenticated entity is allowed to access when granting access to information assets. 
Lastly, accountability ensures that all actions can be attributed to an authenticated identity 
(Whitman & Mattord 2017). Most systems use system logs to provide an audit trail. These 
need to be protected to prevent unauthorised access and modification in order to maintain 
their integrity. 
 
Cryptography is the science of keeping ‘secret codes’ (Stamp 2011). It is the practice of 
using encryption to conceal text (Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2015). Encryption is the process of 
encoding plaintext, so that its meaning is not obvious (Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2015). 
Cryptography has its roots in communications security in the old paradigm (Gollmann 
2011) and is commonly used to safely transfer information across communication 
systems without compromising integrity and authenticity (Peltier 2014). Cryptography 
through encryption is used to provide four basic InfoSec functions: confidentiality, integ-
rity, authentication, and non-repudiation (Peltier 2014). As such, cryptography plays an 
integral part in the provision of effective access control mechanisms to any system, be it 
an offline or online environment. 
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Online applications such as online banking rely on access control mechanisms to grant 
access both to the system through authentication and to system information once access 
has been granted. Access control ensures the integrity of the system by providing different 
entities with specific rights to system information. For example, administrators have 
greater control over system activities than general system users. Given that online appli-
cations such as online banking are meant to provide remote access to bank accounts of 
clients, access control plays a crucial role. Hence, any security measures for such appli-
cations begin by making sure that the authentication process is effective and usable. Once 
access has been granted, the client has access only to areas of the system that pertain to 
that particular client’s information. 
 
Research is currently being done into improving authentication techniques and making 
sure that these techniques are usable in order to avoid misuse and compromise of the 
system. Previous studies include work on the usability of sensor technology 
authentication (Chuang, Nguyen, Wang & Johnson 2013), the evolution of password 
authentication (Bonneau, Herley, Van Oorschot & Stajano 2015), the usability of two-
factor authentication (Krol et al. 2015), and the emergence of multi-factor authentication 
(Van Hamme et al. 2017). The usability of authentication mechanisms is beyond the scope 
of this research, although it does investigate system design issues that ensure that 
authentication mechanisms imposed by the system do not place an unnecessary burden 
on users, which, in turn, might compromise user behaviour when interacting with InfoSec 
applications. Biometric technology is increasingly being introduced in access control 
systems, from building access to online application authentication. Using the technology 
acceptance model (TAM), Morosan (2012) found that hotel guests approve of the use of 
biometrics. 
 
Financial institutions are experimenting with different mechanisms to secure 
authentication of online banking and other online payment systems, especially due to the 
increase in malware and social engineering attacks. Currently, various mechanisms are 
used, from simple one-factor mechanisms such as a simple username and password 
combination to more complex three-factor techniques that include biometrics. As a result 
of the pervasiveness of smartphone devices that have built-in biometric technology such 
as iris, face, and fingerprint scanners, biometric solutions are no longer too expensive to 
implement. Some South African banks such as FNB allow fingerprint authentication for 
access to the online banking application on devices that support biometric authentication. 
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Although biometric costs have been decreasing (Pons & Polak 2008), there are still 
significant challenges to the technology’s mainstream implementation such as usability 
issues on smartphones (Bhagavatula, Ur, Iacovino, Kywe, Cranor & Savvides 2015) and 
privacy in public places, as noted earlier. Research into improving the reliability of non-
intrusive biometric techniques such as 3D hand gestures and face recognition is ongoing 
(Vasiete, Chen, Char, Patel, Davis & Chellappa 2014). In the context of online banking, 
Plateaux, Lacharme, Jøsang, and Rosenberger (2014) propose the use of a device that 
allows the bank to realise authentication of the biometric information presented using 
OTP verification. 
 
2.7 INFORMATION SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS 
InfoSec risks and threats arise from a number of sources due to malicious intent or negli-
gence by all kinds of system users – end-users or administrators. Therefore, system 
administrators need to be vigilant and guard against all kinds of risks. The Oxford 
Dictionary (2018) defines risk as “[exposure to] the possibility of loss, injury, or other 
adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation involving such a possibility”. 
The need for InfoSec arises from the existence of InfoSec risks, threats, and vulnerabili-
ties as conceptualised by Talabis and Martin (2013) and illustrated in Figure 2-3. Risk is 
the possibility that some incident or attack can cause damage to one’s system (Gollmann 
2011). 
 
Talabis and Martin (2013) define a threat as an event, either an action or an inaction that 
leads to a negative or undesirable situation. InfoSec threats are actions by adversaries that 
have the potential to cause loss of, or harm to, an asset. These actions can be either inten-
tional or unintentional (Whitman & Mattord 2017; Peltier 2014). A vulnerability is a 
weakness in a system that might be exploited accidentally or intentionally to cause harm 
or loss (Gollmann 2011). For example, a server without password access represents a 
system vulnerability. The existence of a vulnerability in a system makes it possible for a 
security threat to be carried out successfully by exploiting that vulnerability. 
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Figure 2-3: Risk and information security concepts (Talabis & Martin 2013)  
 
Impact is the outcome such as loss or the potential for loss due to the threat leveraging 
the vulnerability (Talabis & Martin 2013). An example is unauthorised access to personal 
customer information. In essence, a threat is a possible danger that might exploit a vulner-
ability such as the existence of hackers. Figure 2-3 illustrates the relationships among 
three important concepts in InfoSec risk, namely, threats, vulnerabilities, and impact, as 
they apply to information assets. 
 
Information assets are increasingly at risk from natural, unintentional, and intentional 
threats. Organisations and individuals must minimise risk to match their risk appetite, 
which is the quantity and nature of risk they are willing to accept (Whitman & Mattord 
2017). With the increase in remote and online activities, there is an increase in risks and 
threats to, and vulnerabilities of, information assets, which compromises InfoSec and 
privacy for organisations and individuals alike. This calls for increased awareness for 
effective protection of information assets of organisations and individuals. The design of 
secure and usable online InfoSec applications reduces system vulnerabilities by 
addressing aspects that might open the systems to InfoSec risks. Usable IS applications 
also mitigate InfoSec risks that might arise from system misuse. The same vulnerabilities 
are often exploited by attackers to gain unauthorised access to information assets. The 
STInfoSec framework is envisaged to assist in the development of online applications 
that minimise InfoSec risks by taking socio-technical aspects into consideration. 
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2.8 INFORMATION SECURITY ATTACKS 
The main goal of all security systems is to protect assets against possible harm – inten-
tional or accidental. This harm can come from a number of possible sources, and the main 
categories are security threats and security attacks. The existence of security vulnerabili-
ties and threats, as discussed earlier, increases the probability of a security attack 
occurring. There are various kinds of security attacks on ISs and information assets. These 
vary from software bugs and design flaws to outside attacks by hackers, who exploit such 
flaws and also target the gullible nature of human beings with attacks through social engi-
neering. 
 
In RFC 2828, Shirey (2000) defines an attack in the context of security as “an assault on 
system security that derives from an intelligent threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a 
deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security 
services and violate the security policy of a system”. According to Stallings (2011b), a 
security attack is any action that compromises the security of information owned by an 
organisation, and these attacks can be either passive or active. In a passive attack, the 
assailant only eavesdrops on the communication between the sender and the receiver to 
gain information about the conversation and to later use this for malicious purposes. 
Examples of passive attacks are wiretapping and port scanning. In an active attack, the 
assailant attempts to modify, redirect, block, or destroy the data, devices, or communica-
tion links (Stallings 2011a). Examples of active attacks are denial-of-service, masquerad-
ing, and spoofing attacks. 
 
Security attacks can originate from two main sources: insider or outsider attacks. An 
insider attack refers to threats emanating from an entity with access rights to a system, 
and these privileges are misused, resulting in a violation of the security policy of the 
organisation (Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda & Kiountouzis 2005). This attack can be 
performed by disgruntled employees, authorised vendors, or employees with just criminal 
intent for financial gains. An example of insider attacks is recent SIM-swap fraud 
incidents, where cellphone service provider employees collude with online banking 
cybercriminals to intercept OTP messages sent to cellphones for authentication of online 
banking transactions. An outsider attack is one originating from outside the perimeter of 
the organisation from an entity not authorised to access the system such as a hacker. Such 
attacks usually exploit system vulnerabilities in design or use brute-force attack tech-
niques, such as password cracking. 
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What is certain, however, is that organisations have to guard against InfoSec threats from 
both outsiders and insiders when protecting organisational digital assets and that major 
threats come from insiders (Hu et al. 2012). With the advent of social engineering, 
outsider attackers gain access through the exploitation of insiders. Surveys from security 
technical reports and empirical research studies suggest that more damaging breaches are 
caused by the actions of internal employees than outside hackers (Crossler et al. 2013). It 
is worth noting that most insider threats are not considered intentional, but unintentional 
mistakes (Stanton & Stam 2006). Hence, it is vital to address the causes of such uninten-
tional mistakes, and system design and usability go a long way to mitigate these mistakes 
and minimise system attack vectors, especially considering that the human element in 
InfoSec is emerging as a significant attack vector for exploitation (Rege 2016). InfoSec 
attacks are on the rise and are becoming more complex. Admittedly, there is no one solu-
tion to all InfoSec problems; however, a socio-technical approach to IS design can 
mitigate the human element attack vector by making applications both secure and usable. 
 
2.9 ONLINE SECURITY 
The internet currently experiences unprecedented daily traffic figures, driven by the huge 
social networking presence of providers such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, Tumblr, and 
Instagram, which constitutes millions of active daily users (Internet Live Stats 2018). The 
advent of smartphones has given a large number of users access to the internet, with huge 
transfers of data, of which some are sensitive and confidential in nature. Hence, the 
internet has become a honeypot for organised cybercriminal syndicates that prey on 
unsuspecting internet users, some of whom are novice computer users without basic 
InfoSec awareness knowledge (Choo 2008; Choo & Smith 2008). The ever-present nature 
of online computer users with different levels of security awareness makes social engi-
neering attacks such as phishing more prevalent and more successful through social 
networking platforms. 
 
Online security (also known as internet security) is the sub-field of computer or infor-
mation security that is related to the internet and its related protocols, including network 
security (Walker 2014). It arises from the need to protect the internet as a transmission 
medium. Online security involves securing the internet and all its technologies such as 
the browser, since the internet is an open and public computer network with computers 
interconnected globally. For governments and organisations, as well as their clients, who 
conduct business online, online security is a major concern. Almost all organisations – 
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small or big, public or private – have some form of online presence. Military organisations 
of governments conduct sensitive and critical national security operations on the internet, 
and individuals perform confidential daily activities online. All of these activities need 
protection against the prying eyes of cybercriminals. Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin 
(2003) identify a number of classes of attacks such as the stealing of passwords, malware, 
authentication failures, information leakage, DDoS, botnets, and active attacks. 
 
2.9.1 Cybercrime 
Cybercrime or computer crime is crime committed in cyberspace, that is, against com-
puters and computer networks using computer technology (Clough 2010). Specifically, 
Loader and Thomas (2013:3) define cybercrime as “computer-mediated activities which 
are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties and which can be conducted 
through global electronic networks”. Stallings (2011a) differentiates the term ‘cyber-
crime’ from ‘computer crime’, as he defines cybercrime as a crime that specifically occurs 
in cyberspace – thus, using computer networks – while computer crime may or may not 
involve computer networks. In the context of online InfoSec and this research, the term 
‘cybercrime’ is not differentiated from ‘computer crime’, as a security breach through 
computer crime can facilitate a cybercrime attack. 
 
Cybercrime is a global problem and a major threat to online security. There has not been 
an agreed definition of ‘cyberattack’, and the term has been defined based on a number 
of contexts such as the military, national security, and business. Generally, cyberattacks 
are deliberate actions against information assets in ISs or computer networks. These 
actions may destroy, disrupt, degrade, or deny access (Denning & Denning 2010). 
 
Currently, cybercrime is organised, prompting governments and non-profit organisations 
to invest financially in initiatives to actively engage in countermeasures (Ben-Itzhak 
2009). By its nature, cybercrime is a global problem, and international organisations and 
governments have joined forces to fight it. The United Nations (UN), the European Union 
(EU), and the Council of Europe, among others, have global initiatives to provide aware-
ness and countermeasures for fighting cybercrime. They categorise cybercrime under 
economic crime due to its considerable impact on economic activities of citizens. 
 
Unfortunately, the definition of cybercrime and what exactly constitutes it are not globally 
regulated, with some countries such as South Africa yet to pass laws that accurately define 
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and prosecute cybercrime. Hence, cybercriminals take advantage of these gaps, especially 
in countries where cybercrime regulations are lagging (Glasser & Taneja 2015, Haase 
2015). Cybercrime is a global business operated by international syndicates, costing the 
world economy billions of dollars, although there is no consensus on the exact figure. 
Current estimates from different sources differ significantly (Armin, Thompson, Ariu, 
Giacinto, Roli & Kijewski 2015, Hyman 2013). 
 
The United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK) have computer crime 
regulations that list the following crimes as computer crimes: theft of computer services, 
unauthorised access to protected computers, software piracy, alteration or theft of 
electronically stored information, extortion committed with the assistance of computers, 
obtaining unauthorised access to records from banks, credit card issuers, or customer 
reporting agencies, traffic in stolen passwords, and transmission of destructive viruses or 
commands (Casey 2011). 
 
The cost of cybercrime in financial terms is increasing at an alarming rate based on 
available records. Forbes reports that cybercrime cost the global economy over US$ 450 
billion in 2016 (Graham 2017), up from US$ 100 billion in 2013 (Morgan 2016). These 
figures include direct losses and post-attack disruption to normal business. The figure is 
projected to be US$ 2.1 trillion globally by 2019 (Graham 2017). In 2016, over two 
billion personal records were stolen globally, with over 100 million personal medical 
records stolen in the US alone (Morgan 2016). In South Africa, cybercrime cost the 
economy R35 billion in 2015, and 8.8 million South Africans were victims of cybercrime 
(IOL 2016). Cybercrime is expected to cost South African businesses up to R78 trillion 
by 2021 (Venktess 2017). SABRIC reported an overall increase in card fraud of 13% to 
R374.4 million in 2016 (SABRIC 2017). These figures highlight the financial impact 
cybercrime has on the global economy. Some of these security attacks are due to design 
flaws in, and misuse of, systems. 
 
2.9.2 Malware 
Organised cybercriminals use various types of malware to illegally obtain personal and 
financial information from organisations and individuals. Choo (2011b) identifies 
malware and phishing as the two biggest online threats to consumers and organisations. 
Sophisticated cybercriminals develop a multitude of malware and distribute this through 
spam phishing emails to facilitate cyberattacks on organisations and individuals. Malware 
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is a broader term that includes security threats such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and 
backdoors, to mention just a few. Choo (2011a) categorises malware largely according to 
two groups: generic malware that targets the general population and customised infor-
mation-stealing malware targeting specific institutions. Malware and phishing protection 
is not only a technical problem, but also involves the human factor, making awareness 
and education/training critical in any threat-mitigation approach. In 2014, 28 billion spam 
emails were circulating worldwide daily (Symantec 2015). 
 
2.9.3 Social networking sites 
Boyd and Ellison (2007:211) define social networking sites (SNSs) as: 
“[w]eb-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom 
they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system”. 
 
Social networking services have grown rapidly, and currently, social networking websites 
dominate the top 10 most-visited websites (Alexa 2018). Facebook is the largest social 
network, with close to two billion active users (Internet Live Stats 2018). 
 
Social networking sites are used to create social networks among people who share 
common interests; hence, maintaining total privacy once on social networks is difficult. 
For example, most settings of Facebook are opt-in by default, including those on privacy, 
requiring users to amend these settings to improve their online security and privacy 
(Comer, McKelvey & Curran 2012). 
 
Social networking websites and services are used by a multitude of users from different 
generations and cultures. Organisations use SNS services to promote new products and 
services and maintain a social presence with their clients and customers (Zhuang, Hsu, 
Brewer & Xiao 2012). Individuals use SNSs to connect with friends and family and also 
to follow organisations and brands of interest. The services provided on SNSs include 
instant messaging, blogging, and picture and video uploading. 
 
Social networking websites allow users to communicate and share information. These 
services provide cybercriminals with a means to reach out to victims and distribute 
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malware for the sole purpose of stealing personal information. Security and privacy impli-
cations of participating in social networks are an ongoing research area. Saridakis, 
Benson, Ezingeard, and Tennakoon (2015) found that cybercrime could be alleviated by 
improving the awareness and skills of users regarding control of personal information 
disclosure and by increasing service security controls on social media websites. The 
privacy concerns of Facebook users have a direct impact on information sharing (Dhami, 
Agarwal, Chakraborty, Singh & Minj 2013), which makes users aware of security risks 
of posting personal information. 
 
Attackers can solicit and gather personal information from SNS users’ posts, and this 
information can be used for identity theft purposes. Shared links among trusted users on 
SNSs can also be used for social media phishing purposes in social engineering attacks. 
It is important to only invite people you know to join your social networks on SNSs, as 
publicly available information on the networks can be used to initiate identity theft and 
spear-phishing attacks (Chaudhry, Chaudhry & Rittenhouse 2016, Jagatic, Johnson, 
Jakobsson & Menczer 2007). 
 
2.9.4 Social engineering 
Social engineering is a non-technical security attack that makes users compromise 
computer systems by manipulating them into divulging confidential information 
(Krombholz, Hobel, Huber & Weippl 2015). Depending on how persuasive and 
convincing the social engineer is, the user can even be manipulated to carry out the 
malicious attack. Social engineering uses psychological vulnerabilities and triggers to 
influence the individual’s emotional state and cognitive abilities to obtain information 
(Mouton, Malan, Kimppa & Venter 2015). This makes social engineering a difficult kind 
of threat to mitigate, as technical protection measures are usually ineffective against this 
kind of attack. 
 
Social engineering attacks usually target online users in an attempt to make them disclose 
sensitive information about themselves or other parties. The information is then used 
maliciously to harm individuals and organisations. Users need to be taught how to identify 
potential attacks and how to reduce their chances of becoming a victim (Parsons et al. 
2010). A common social engineering attack discussed later is phishing, which uses 
spoofed emails claiming to be from legitimate organisations, directing users to bogus 
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websites with the intention of tricking recipients into revealing confidential login 
credentials. 
 
Attackers who use social engineering cast their net very wide and hope to catch any 
susceptible victims who might lack the knowledge to identify the attack. With the current 
multiple devices always on online connectivity, there are numerous ways an attack can 
be initiated. Hence, users need to be aware and vigilant. What makes social engineering 
attacks difficult to prevent is that they rely on human behaviour, which changes often and 
cannot be predicted. Furthermore, for a social engineering attack on an organisation to be 
successful, all it takes is for one individual in the organisation to be gullible. 
 
2.9.5 Identity theft 
Simply put, identity theft is the illegal use of someone else’s identification credentials to 
perpetrate economic fraud, such as obtaining credit (Saunders & Zucker 1999). Identity 
theft is regarded as the fastest-growing consumer fraud and happens both online and 
offline. With increased online activity by individuals, there is an increase in the amount 
of data people post online, making identity theft easy for criminals. Identity theft is, thus, 
emerging as a serious threat. For instance, in the USA, over 17 million adults have been 
victims of one or more incidents of identity theft (Harrell 2015). Hille, Walsh, and 
Cleveland (2015) explain the fear of online identity theft using a two-dimensional 
concept, involving fear of financial losses and fear of reputational damage. This suggests 
that consumers’ participation in online shopping is negatively affected by the fear of 
online identity theft. 
 
Offline identity theft can be mitigated through improved security checks by organisations; 
for instance, banks have begun to roll out security mechanisms that include biometric 
technology at branches to counter identity theft (Erasmus 2015). The online version of 
identity theft is proving more difficult to counter, as there are no satisfactory and main-
stream biometric solutions yet that are foolproof. Edwards (2014) suggests authentication 
mechanisms that entirely require biometric attributes for successful protection against 
identity theft in cyberspace. 
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2.9.6 Phishing 
Phishing is essentially a form of social engineering attack in which an attacker uses 
spoofed emails to deceptively obtain sensitive information or install malware on victims’ 
computers by impersonating a trustworthy third party (Hong 2012). The Oxford 
Dictionary (2018) defines phishing as “[a] type of internet fraud in which a person 
impersonates a reputable company in order to persuade others to reveal personal infor-
mation, such as passwords and credit numbers, online”. The Anti-Phishing Working 
Group (APWG) is a global industry, law enforcement, and government coalition focused 
on unifying the global response to cybercrime through the development of data resources, 
data standards, and model response systems and protocols for the private and public 
sectors. The APWG (2017) landing web page defines phishing as “[a] criminal mecha-
nism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ 
personal identity data and financial account credentials”. Phishing that targets specific 
organisations or individuals is known as spear phishing, as it uses specific information 
about the target victim (Hong 2012). 
 
Globally, phishing has emerged as a serious threat to online security. The main goal of 
phishing is to gain access to personal and confidential information that allows the perpe-
trator to steal the identity of the victim. Armed with this information, the perpetrator can 
use it for financial gains or criminal activities. In essence, phishing becomes a tool for 
accomplishing identity theft. Millions of victims are conned each year through phishing 
attacks that use emails and other messaging services to solicit login credentials and per-
sonal identification information. 
 
Although the estimates for the total global cost of phishing vary, RSA, a top security firm, 
identified 37 000 monthly phishing attacks in 2012, with an estimated annual financial 
loss of more than US$ 1.5 billion (RSA 2014). The cost of phishing for the month of 
December 2014 was estimated to be US$ 453 million (RSA 2015). RSA suggests that 
phishing is the top online threat for both consumers and organisations conducting finan-
cial transactions online. According to APWG (2017), payment and financial services are 
the industries most targeted by phishing attacks. Cybercrime reporting is not compulsory 
in South Africa; therefore, cybercrime figures are estimates. The South African Banking 
Risk Information Centre (SABRIC) is a non-profit organisation formed by the four major 
banks to assist banking and cash-in-transit companies to combat bank-related organised 
crime. SABRIC reported an increase in credit card fraud totalling R374.4 million for 
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2016. This figure represents an increase of 13% compared to 2015. In total, South Africa 
loses R2.2 billion from internet fraud and phishing attacks each year (SABRIC 2017). 
 
Phishing works for a number of reasons, as attested to by several research studies as 
highlighted below. The main reason is that people lack knowledge regarding the basics 
of how computers and related applications work (Alsharnouby et al. 2015). The following 
are some of the reasons why phishing works: 
 People have a tendency to judge a website’s validity by its ‘look-and-feel’, which 
attackers can easily reproduce (Dhamija, Tygar & Hearst 2006). 
 Many users do not understand security indicators in web browsers, and they trust 
websites without checking security indicators, such as the SSL padlock on browsers 
(Alsharnouby et al. 2015). 
 Some users are aware of phishing, but awareness does not reduce their susceptibility 
or improve their identification of phishing attacks (Downs, Holbrook & Cranor  
2006). 
 The seriousness of the consequences of phishing does not predict users’ behaviour 
(Downs, Holbrook & Cranor 2007). 
 Identifying phishing on the user interface is difficult; hence, the current method of 
relying on users to detect phishing attacks is unreliable (Alsharnouby et al. 2015). 
 
More importantly, Hong (2012) suggests that phishing works because of the poor usabil-
ity of many interfaces that provide insufficient cues to judge the legitimacy of email 
messages and websites. The author, furthermore, asserts that a deeper understanding of 
end-user motivations, beliefs, and mental models is critical for building effective counter-
measures. The nature of social engineering attacks makes awareness the most appropriate 
method for mitigating these attacks. Well-designed user security education and training 
can be effective in the real world (Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor & Downs 
2010). 
 
People are increasingly active online through SNS services, sharing a multitude of 
personal information, sometimes with privacy settings that make this information acces-
sible to other users. Such behaviour exposes users to cyberattacks through social engi-
neering, identity theft, and phishing, as cybercriminals collect this information and use it 
to attack other valuable online services such as online banking. Therefore, online users 
need to be vigilant about personal information sharing, and awareness campaigns are 
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critical, as some users are novices without basic computer literacy or InfoSec awareness 
knowledge. Hence, to mitigate these security risks, developers of such online applications 
need to take human behaviour into considerations and assist users wherever possible. 
Given the magnitude of protecting online users, it is evident that the responsibility cannot 
be shouldered by application developers alone, but must also involve all stakeholders, 
including individual users and government. The main purpose of phishing is essentially 
to deliver malware (Sawyer, Finomore, Funke, Mancuso, Miller, Warm & Hancook 
2015). With spear phishing tactics, cybercriminals increase their chances of successful 
attacks. User awareness is essential in mitigating such attacks, as technology alone is 
insufficient. 
 
2.9.7 Perceived risk 
The notion of perceived security risk plays an important role in altering people’s percep-
tions and decision-making. Biswas and Biswas (2004:31) define perceived risk in an 
online shopping context as “the nature and amount of uncertainty perceived by a 
consumer in contemplating a particular purchase decision”. According to Forsythe and 
Shi (2003), the perceived online shopping risk for users is the expectation of loss in a 
given electronic transaction. Cheng, Lam, and Yeung (2006) found perceived web secu-
rity to be a major determinant of clients’ adoption of online banking. Previous studies 
showed that perceived security risk was an important predictor of online banking 
adoption. 
 
In the context of online banking, Aldás-Manzano, Lassala-Navarre, Ruiz-Mafe, and Sanz-
Blas (2009), as well as Littler and Melanthiou (2006), demonstrate that perceived risk is 
a significant factor in online banking use. The authors expand the risk factor to four levels: 
security, performance, social, and privacy risks. Security risk is the most significant, as 
consumers fear financial loss. Most banks have developed secure online banking technol-
ogies to secure online transactions. Lack of awareness regarding the security of online 
banking keeps potential online banking users away from using the service (Yousafzai, 
Pallister & Foxall 2003). Hence, banks need to create strategies to tackle specific risk 
elements. 
 
Overall, perceived security risk plays a significant role in influencing participation in 
online activities such as online shopping and online banking, as there is always some risk 
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of financial loss associated with these activities, compared to brick-and-mortar transac-
tions. This calls for strategies not only to mitigate cyberattacks, but also to alter users’ 
perceptions of InfoSec altogether and clarify how users can play a part in creating a secure 
environment. 
The development of online applications has to consider online InfoSec threats faced by 
organisations and individuals and employ strategies that assist users in mitigating such 
attacks. The STInfoSec framework proposed in this research provides principles that 
satisfy usable security properties for online InfoSec applications. The researcher argues 
that the above-mentioned online InfoSec threats can be mitigated by designing 
applications based on validated principles that foster effective use of applications. 
 
2.10 ONLINE BANKING 
Since the late 1990s, the financial landscape has changed through the use of internet tech-
nologies (Gkoutzinis 2006). The emergence of electronic banking (ebanking) services 
such as virtual banking, home banking, and online banking, which provide various 
banking activities through electronic channels, has revolutionised the industry (Turban et 
al. 2015). At first, there was distance banking, where financial services were offered over 
the telephone system, with a bank official performing transactions based on the directives 
of the client. This has since evolved into the current online banking service provided over 
the internet. 
 
The number of online banking users has been growing throughout the world, as the 
convenience of using online banking to perform banking transactions throughout the day 
has an edge over previous delivery channels. Nonetheless, there are outstanding online 
banking issues that still need to be addressed to achieve the full benefits of the service. 
As much as adoption is increasing, the rate of adoption is not the same across different 
economies. For example, the rate of uptake in developed economies is significantly higher 
than in developing economies. There are still security and privacy risks associated with 
conducting financial activities online that need to be addressed, as cited by several 
previous studies (Mujinga, Eloff & Kroeze 2016, Montazemi & Qahri-Saremi 2015, 
Sikdar, Kumar & Makkad 2015, Tarhini, Mgbemena, Trab & Masa’Deh 2015). There 
have been significant advances in mitigating security concerns, but these need to be 
communicated to customers to alleviate fears and encourage adoption. 
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Financial services comprise the full range of functions performed by financial institutions, 
including, but not limited to, acceptance of deposits, loan applications, payment services, 
funds transfers, asset management, opening new accounts, and paying bills. Almost all 
ecommerce transactions require some form of financial payment to complete the 
transaction. Hence, payments are an integral part of doing business, be it online or in the 
old-fashioned way. Traditional payment systems such as cash, cheques, money orders, 
and manual credit cards are not effective or appropriate for online ecommerce payments. 
Online banking and other electronic payment systems allow for electronic payments that 
fit perfectly in the ecommerce model. The wide range of services offered through online 
banking makes banking convenient and saves customers time. Gkoutzinis (2006) gives 
slightly different definitions of ‘ebanking’ and ‘online banking’. He views ebanking as 
covering a wider range of banking services, including ATMs and telephone banking. 
 
Gkoutzinis (2006:7) defines ebanking as “the provision of banking services and the 
initiation and performance of payments through the banking system by electronic means 
and other advanced technologies”. Therefore, online banking is the provision of ebanking 
services over a computer network, such as the internet, through a computer or other access 
device with internet capabilities (Gkoutzinis 2006). Ebanking can be offered through a 
variety of communication methods and access devices, as depicted in Figure 2-4. 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Communication methods and access devices (Gkoutzinis 2006) 
 
Online banking, specifically the use of technological services in banking, has seen 
banking institutions reduce back-office and front-desk costs, resulting in increased 
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customer satisfaction (Berger 2003). Shah and Siddiqui (2006) identify the following as 
some of the most critical for success factors in online banking: an understanding of 
customers, availability of resources, systems security, an established brand name, 
multiple integrated channels, good customer service, and systems integration. Customer 
adoption of online banking has been on the increase worldwide, driven by the perceived 
benefits of convenience (Vatanasombut, Igbaria, Stylianou & Rodgers 2008) and reduced 
costs (Hernando & Nieto 2007). Yet banks and online banking users have increasingly 
been targeted by cybercriminals, alerting banks to stepping up security systems. Users 
cite the perceived lack of security in online banking as an obstacle to adoption, even if 
their security fears are not based on actual experience. This can be attributed to the wide 
media coverage of some notable security and privacy breaches. 
 
Among the factors affecting online banking adoption, Poon (2008) identified these 10 
determinants in Malaysia: convenience, accessibility, speed, feature availability, bank 
management and image, content, security, privacy, design, and fees and charges. The 
study also revealed that security, privacy, and convenience were significant factors that 
facilitated users’ acceptance of online banking. 
 
2.10.1 Online banking in South Africa 
The population of South Africa is approximately 55.91 million, with an adult population 
of around 37 million, based on 2016 estimates (Stats SA 2016). The country has an 
internet penetration rate of 49%, meaning that 27 million South Africans are internet 
users. Of the 36.8 million adults, 27.5 million (75%) have bank accounts (FinMark Trust 
2016). Of these adults with bank accounts, 14 million have internet access, but only 
2.3 million, which is less than 9%, use online banking services (Van Zyl 2015). This 
represents a worryingly low level of adoption of the service. 
 
Compared to the rest of the world, South Africa has a very low adoption rate of online 
banking. In the US, 67% of the internet audience used digital banking in 2016 – a rise 
from 51% the previous year (Gonzalez-Garcia 2017). In comparison with 2014 figures, 
49% of the total internet audience of European Union countries accessed online banking 
(Statista 2015), while the global average in 2012 was 28.7% of the internet audience 
(Statista 2012). Africa and the Middle East had 8.8% of internet users using online 
banking, with South Africa recording only 8.5% (Statista 2012). The online banking pene-
tration rate for South Africa and the African region is far lower than the global average. 
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A recent survey indicated that 43% of internet users in South Africa considered branch 
banking to be safer than online banking, with 64% feeling vulnerable when doing 
financial transactions online (FinMark Trust 2016). Moreover, just less than half (49%) 
reported that they believed making payments offline was more reliable than online, and 
43% agreed that offline banking was safer than online banking. 
Regardless, internet users worldwide conduct online banking transactions from a variety 
of unsecure devices, without taking basic security measures such as setting up a device 
password to protect their online transactions (Kaspersky Lab & B2B International 2016). 
This puts both the users’ finances and the bank’s reputation at risk. The desktop is still 
the dominant device for online banking access, with 57% of users using it worldwide. 
The trend is similar for other online services such as online shopping, social media, and 
email, where the desktop continues to be the most-used device to access these services. 
 
A Kaspersky Lab and B2B International (2016) survey found that a total of 75% of 
respondents believed that banks, payment systems, and online stores had to provide them 
with special solutions for secure transactions on their endpoints. Nonetheless, the survey 
also reported that users still practised unsafe behaviour, even if they were aware of, and 
worried about, online security threats. Furthermore, while fewer than 80% of computers 
were password protected, only just over half of smartphones and Android tablets had 
passwords. Given the obvious risks of free public Wi-Fi networks, only 38% of respond-
ents took precautions when using such networks (Kaspersky Lab & B2B International 
2016). 
 
2.10.2 Threats to online banking security 
The most-used tactic to get into online banking users’ accounts is the use of phishing as 
a form of social engineering attack (Yee 2004a). Users essentially believe they are 
directed to the legitimate website of their trusted bank and proceed to log in, thereby 
providing their login credentials to the attacker. Phishing basically bypasses the organi-
sation’s security infrastructure such as firewalls and authentication mechanisms, as the 
attack is directed at authenticated users to obtain sensitive information. 
 
Similarly, the attack can target the user with an email that installs a Trojan to collect login 
details when entered into a legitimate bank website. This tactic uses a banking Trojan to 
intercept the username and password. Attackers can also pose as the legitimate account 
owner, using identity theft. This can be done by getting information about the account 
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through setting up a phishing page where users unwittingly hand over their usernames 
and passwords. Computers and mobile devices are both vulnerable to these attacks. 
 
The bank’s terms and conditions for the provision of online banking often outline the 
contract between the bank and the customer to govern online banking service usage. From 
the point of view of the banks, security is vital to maintain their brand name and limit 
liability as a result of possible security breaches, while being compliant with rules and 
regulations that govern the industry. Sadly, this means that usability and UX come second 
and are second best. Given the immaturity of some of the legal frameworks that govern 
cyberspace and online transactions, loopholes are exploited to circumvent liability for 
online fraud. Hence, it has emerged as a huge competitive advantage to actually be able 
to provide security and acceptable usability and UX. 
 
The significant role played by InfoSec problems as a barrier to the adoption of services 
such as online banking calls for ideas on how to alleviate fears of users concerning 
InfoSec risks. Attacks on online banking through the tactics mentioned earlier such as 
social engineering, identity theft, and successful delivery of malware through phishing 
pose huge risks to users and financial organisations alike. The researcher investigated the 
role played by InfoSec and usability in adoption and continued use of online banking with 
regard to user interaction with InfoSec mechanisms. The ever-increasing online InfoSec 
threats and the vulnerability of novice users call for design and development approaches 
of online applications that take into account the intricacies of the online security environ-
ment, while – at the same time – being usable by the ordinary user. The researcher endeav-
oured to develop a socio-technical design framework that sought to address all aspects of 
online application development, taking user behaviour into consideration. This research 
looked at these different aspects through a socio-technical lens and proposed a framework 
to assist in the development of secure and usable online applications. The STInfoSec 
framework suggests usable security design principles, accompanied by checklist items 
for each principle. The principles satisfy usable security properties in designing online 
InfoSec applications thereby assisting user to mitigate online banking InfoSec threats. 
 
2.11 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The technical need to secure personal information of users, especially in sensitive online 
applications, requires a multifaceted approach to different aspects. In the current 
environment, online security threats are becoming more complicated and are created in 
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large numbers. This, coupled with the diverse computer and InfoSec awareness skills of 
the average online user, makes the design of sensitive online applications critical in 
mitigating security breaches. This chapter addressed the technical challenges of designing 
a socio-technical system. There are several layers of security to be addressed, and a breach 
of any one of these layers renders all protections invalid. Hence, InfoSec relies on the 
effectiveness of all five other layers, as pointed out by Whitman and Mattord (2017). In 
the InfoSec layer, there is a collection of principles anchored by the CIA triad, each of 
which needs individual attention for a holistic solution. 
 
The cornerstone of any online application, especially applications that disseminate 
sensitive information, is access control through the principle of authentication. The 
usability of authentication mechanisms is a fully fledged stand-alone research area that 
has existed for decades. At present, innovative technology such as biometrics is being 
considered for online authentication. Current major threats to personal information stored 
online are social engineering attacks that literally bypass any state-of-the-art protections 
and deceive users into revealing confidential credentials that allow access to systems. 
 
This research used online banking as the case study online application mainly because, in 
South Africa, the adoption rate of the service is less than the global average. The service 
also meets the characteristics of a sensitive online application, since it involves 
transmission of personal and financial information through a public medium: the internet. 
The aim of this chapter was to identify and characterise the nature of online applications 
and the prevalent threats to these applications, highlighting attack vectors such as social 
engineering and identity theft. Chapter 3 covers the literature review, which was used to 
gather information for the development of the preliminary framework. 
 
-- ooo -- 
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CHAPTER 3 FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
 
Figure 3-1: The research roadmap 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between humans and computers has existed since the introduction of 
computers. Although users were just glad to have computing power to perform basic tasks 
at the beginning, as time passed and computers evolved, it became apparent that computer 
functionality alone was not enough. This led to the introduction of the field of human-
computer interaction (HCI) and more emphasis on system usability. This research work 
falls into the human-computer interaction security (HCISec) or usable security category, 
where HCI meets InfoSec. Usable security involves the application of usability design 
principles in the design and development of InfoSec mechanisms in an IS application. 
 
The main goal of usable security is to enable users to use InfoSec mechanisms in order to 
mitigate InfoSec risks through effective use of applications. Ultimately, having InfoSec 
systems that users can use helps to create a viable security culture in an organisation and 
society at large. The previous chapter discussed the technical aspects of securing online 
applications. This chapter provides a critical discussion of the social aspects of the 
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the preliminary STInfoSec framework. The two chapters combined complete the 
literature review of this socio-technical approach to designing online InfoSec 
applications. 
 
The researcher argued that, for a holistic solution to InfoSec problems, both technical and 
social aspects needed equal attention in IS design. The proposed STInfoSec framework 
for the design of secure and usable online InfoSec applications, therefore, consisted of 
validated design principles. This chapter provides a critical discussion of design 
principles in the literature that guided the selection of those principles selected for 
investigation in the study. 
 
3.2 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 
HCI is an interdisciplinary field associated with a number of other fields of study, all with 
the goal of designing computer technology that is easy and pleasant to use. Related fields 
of study include computer science, cognitive science, and psychology, to mention just a 
few. There are various definitions of HCI, with the notable ones included here. According 
to ACM SIGCHI (1992:5), HCI is “[a] discipline concerned with the design, evaluation 
and implementation of interactive computing systems for human use and with the study 
of major phenomena surrounding them”. HCI relates to how humans interact with 
computer technology in their everyday work and other activities. Broadly speaking, 
computer technology involves any devices with computing capabilities. Apart from 
computers themselves, other devices include mobile phones and appliances. 
 
The concept of considering human factors in the design of equipment started during 
World War II, and it developed into HCI in the late 1960s, just after the introduction of 
mainframe computers (Grudin 2012). HCI has evolved rapidly over time. Figure 3-2 illus-
trates the timeline of the evolution of human factors, ergonomics, ISs, and HCI during 
the century between 1905 and 2005. 
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Figure 3-2: HCI events and topics (Grudin 2012) 
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Liu, Goncalves, Ferreira, Xiao, Hosio, and Kostakos (2014) presented a comparison of 
two decades of articles and keywords at ACM’s CHI Conference on Human Computer 
Interaction, which has been running since 1982 and is one of the leading conferences in 
the field of HCI. Their comparison was between the periods 1994 to 2003 and 2004 to 
2013 to identify the landscape of the field. Usability appeared significantly in both 
periods, while security was only prevalent in the second period, especially due to the 
influx of mobile devices (Liu et al. 2014). 
 
The following sections detail the evolution of HCI and other related terms, thus providing 
the context of the current trend of usable security design – the subject of this research. 
 
3.2.1 Human factors and ergonomics 
Human factors and ergonomics are important wherever people work with systems, be 
these social or technical in nature. The range of such socio-technical systems includes 
system elements such as tools, software, tasks, and environments. Human factors are 
concerned with how people interact with these systems in their workplace. The 
International Ergonomics Association (IEA) gives a combined definition of ergonomics 
(or human factors) on its homepage as (IEA 2018): 
“the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among 
humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, 
principles, data, and methods to design in order to optimise human well-being and 
overall system performance”. 
 
It is important to note that this definition does not single out any particular type of system; 
the field applies to any system, be it machinery or a software application. In the context 
of information technology, designers are more concerned with human factor aspects than 
strict ergonomics issues, since human factors specifically address concerns about how 
technology and computers, in particular, are integrated in the workplace to achieve 
optimum productivity for the user. 
 
Human factors in InfoSec are factors that can improve the use of InfoSec systems or the 
features of these systems or that can deter users from using them. The focus is on a design 
that fosters optimum use of system features, particularly security features. If designers 
fail to address human factors in security, users will misuse the systems, as they will bypass 
security mechanisms, thereby creating an unsecure environment. 
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3.2.2 Mental models 
The term ‘mental model’ was first coined in cognitive psychology and is now extensively 
applied in HCI to explain human behaviour. Users’ behaviour in relation to information 
systems can be explained through the content of their knowledge, including their theories 
and beliefs (Payne 2012). Fulfilling expectations depends on keeping behaviour and 
expectations in agreement, where user expectations are mainly influenced by users’ 
mental model of the system. Yee (2005; 2004a) asserts that security policy and the mental 
model are dynamic, since they change in response to user actions. Getting users to use 
InfoSec systems effectively is one of the key challenges (Dourish, Grinter, De la Flor & 
Joseph 2004). Hence, designers of information systems need to understand the mental 
model users have of the system’s capabilities and limitations to avoid a mismatch. This 
is even more important in InfoSec systems, as it might create an unsecure environment.  
 
Understanding unique mental models users have of InfoSec and privacy issues online 
assists in understanding the problem and providing effective solutions. Prettyman, 
Furman, Theofanos, and Stanton (2015) found that online users had multiple and often 
contradictory mental models of their understanding of, and experience with, InfoSec and 
privacy. Therefore, a socio-technical approach ensures that proposed solutions provide 
an array of social aspects such as usability and user experience (UX), thereby addressing 
some of the multiple mental models held by users. 
 
3.2.3 Memory load 
Humans are not machines. The human mind can only hold and recall a certain amount of 
information, which varies significantly from one person to another. According to Proctor 
and Vu (2012:30), memory “refers to explicit recollection of information in the absence 
of the original stimulus and persisting effects of that information on information 
processing that may be implicit”. Short-term memory (STM), also known as working 
memory, refers to “representations that are presently being used or have recently been 
used and that last for a short period” (Proctor & Vu 2012). Therefore, users of infor-
mation systems often utilise STM to remember things such as usernames, passwords, 
PINs, and essentially how to use these systems. It is imperative that system designers do 
not overload the STM. This is even more important in InfoSec systems to avoid unsecure 
behaviour such as writing down passwords. Memory load was taken into consideration in 
the proposed STInfoSec framework by making sure that the design enhanced learnability 
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and provided help and documentation to users. This ensures the application is easy to use 
for repeat users and they will not have to learn the user interface all over again. 
 
3.3 USABILITY 
Usability is invisible, and it is the reason why users love certain products or services they 
use daily. As Barnum (2011:1) puts it, “[w]hen usability is inherent in the products we 
use, it’s invisible. We don’t think about it. But we know it’s there”. The absence of 
usability in a product or service brings about frustration; in extreme cases, users decide 
not to bother using the product or service. Preece et al. (2015) note that most gadgets are 
engineered to work effectively, while neglecting the usability aspects from the users’ 
perspective. The same can be said of most software applications, even more so InfoSec 
systems. The introduction of usability early in the design process has become the norm 
to mitigate usability problems – hence, the suggestion by Mitnick and Simon (2002) that 
attackers are exploiting the human factors neglected by designers to gain access to 
computer systems. 
 
One definition of usability that has become standard is the usability process-oriented 
approach from the ISO (ISO 9241-11 1998:6), namely, “the extent to which a product 
can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, 
and satisfaction in a specified context of use”. The definition highlights three key aspects: 
specific users, specified goals, and a specified context of use. The ISO also highlights the 
importance of the context of use in its definition of product-oriented usability. ISO/IEC 
9126-1 (2001) defines usability with emphasis on the ability of users to understand, learn, 
and use a software product under specified conditions, while the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard defines usability as the ease with which users 
can learn to operate the system (IEEE Std. 610.12 1990). In the context of product-
oriented usability, product usability hinges on the user, the task, and the environment in 
which the product is being used. 
 
Subsequent definitions of usability emphasise different usability attributes, as new 
insights have given rise to new attributes, since both researchers and practitioners have 
started to appreciate that usability has many facets. Nielsen (2010) states that usability is 
not one-dimensional and specifies five quality attributes of usability, namely, learnability, 
efficiency, memorability, errors, and satisfaction. Other authors such as Rubin and 
Chisnell (2008) characterise the usability of a product or service in terms of the following 
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attributes: useful, efficient, effective, satisfying, learnable, and accessible. The main usa-
bility attributes as applied in usability studies are discussed in the following section. 
 
In this research, the researcher incorporated both the process-oriented and product-
oriented usability approaches to investigate the usability of online banking user interfaces, 
enabling users to achieve effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction from the service. 
Conversely, the researcher looked at the usability of the system as a product; that is, the 
interface needed to be learned, understood, and used and had to be satisfactory to the user. 
Rubin and Chisnell (2008:1) argue that what makes a system ‘usable’ is the absence of 
frustration while interacting with it. The authors go on to state that, when a product or 
service is truly usable, “the user can do what he or she wants to do the way he or she 
expects to be able to do it, without hindrance, hesitation, or questions” (Rubin & Chisnell 
2008:3). This highlights the significance of understanding the user’s mental model of the 
system in order to match system capabilities with user expectations. Nielsen (2010) 
explains usability as part of the larger issue of system acceptability, as depicted in Figure 
3-3. 
 
Figure 3-3: System acceptability attributes (Nielsen 2010) 
 
Social acceptability and practical acceptability form part of system acceptability. 
Practical acceptability, furthermore, considers aspects such as reliability, compatibility, 
cost, and usefulness, to mention but a few. Usefulness is explained in terms of utility and 
usability, where utility assesses whether the system provides the intended functionality 
and usability considers how well users can use the system functionality (Nielsen 2010). 
 
62 | P a g e  
 
Online applications need to ensure that users get an experience that makes them come 
back by satisfying both their functional and sensory needs. These online applications offer 
the services through some form of interface – be it web or device (such as smartphone) 
applications. A number of usability goals were found in the literature. After an in-depth 
literature review, the researcher identified the most significant of these in the context of 
the current case study: online banking. 
 
3.3.1 Error tolerance and prevention 
The system should ensure that users make as few errors as possible, where an error is any 
action that does not achieve the wanted goal. The error rate is the number of errors users 
make during the use of a system while performing a specific task (Nielsen 2010). The 
system error rate should be low to prevent users from making many errors and to allow 
them to recover without catastrophic consequences (Nielsen 2010). This goal can be 
thought of as related to the safety goals that ensure that no serious harm can result from 
users making serious mistakes when using a product or service. In the context of online 
banking, this entails, for instance, avoiding errors such as paying the wrong beneficiary, 
which might cause serious inconvenience to users. 
 
3.3.2 Satisfaction 
Satisfaction refers to the users’ perceptions, feelings, and opinions of the system, meaning 
that the users should be subjectively satisfied when using it (Nielsen 2010). This infor-
mation is generally captured by means of both oral and written questioning (Rubin & 
Chisnell 2008). A system that meets users’ needs and provides satisfaction allows users 
to perform well. 
 
3.3.3 Learnability 
Learnability is regarded as the most essential usability goal, since systems need to be easy 
to learn (Preece et al. 2015). The system should allow users to rapidly learn the design 
and quickly start to get some work done (Nielsen 2010). Rubin and Chisnell (2008) 
consider learnability as being linked to effectiveness, since users should be able to use 
the system after some period of training to some defined level of competence. Users prefer 
learning how to use a system by actually using it, especially online applications, as users 
are too impatient to read tutorial manuals. 
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3.3.4 Memorability 
Memorability refers to the ability of a returning user to use a system without having to be 
trained for it all over again (Preece et al. 2015). A system with good learnability helps 
users to remember how to use it quickly. Apparently, interface memorability is one of the 
rarely evaluated usability attributes compared to other attributes (Nielsen 2010). 
 
3.3.5 Usefulness 
Usefulness is the ability of a system to achieve a specific desired goal(s) (Nielsen 2010). 
As mentioned earlier, Nielsen (2010) considers usability as a function of usefulness; thus, 
usefulness is not an attribute of usability (refer to Figure 3-3), since a system has to be 
useful first before looking at how usable it is to the user. 
 
3.3.6 Safety 
Safety protects the user against conditions and situations that may be undesirable and 
dangerous (Preece et al. 2015; Petrie & Bevan 2009). Safety as a usability goal was 
initially intended to protect people operating machinery in workplaces (ISO 9241-210 
2010). In the context of software products, safety strives for reduced risk of harm to 
system users or other resources, including hardware or data. The ISO/IEC 9126-4 (2004) 
standard defines two aspects of software product safety. Operational safety enables a 
software product to meet user requirements during normal operation without harm to 
other resources and the environment, with attributes such as consistency, completeness, 
accuracy, insurance, and security. Contingency safety ensures that the product is capable 
of operating outside its normal operation, while still preventing risks, with attributes such 
as fault tolerance and resource safety. In general, safety ensures that no severe harm can 
result from users making serious mistakes when using a product or service. 
 
3.3.7 Utility 
Utility ensures that the product provides the right kind of functionality that allows users 
to complete their tasks (Preece et al. 2015). In other words, utility ensures that a product 
can deliver the intended results if used properly without obvious mistakes. For example, 
a calculator should give the correct sum of numbers if the numbers are entered correctly. 
As depicted in Figure 3-3, Nielsen (2010) places utility outside usability goals, arguing 
that usability is not an issue in products or services that have no functionality. 
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The usability goals presented here do not represent an exhaustive list, as there are 
numerous others for specific systems. The above list consists of the usability goals within 
the scope of this research. The order of importance of usability goals depends on system 
requirements and what designers perceive as necessary to achieve system goals. In the 
context of online InfoSec and the case study (online banking) of this research, in 
particular, the above list was deemed important in addressing usability problems. 
Although not all of the above principles were included in the final framework. There are 
also other goals that were deemed either implicit or outside the research scope, including 
effectiveness, efficiency, accessibility, universality, and flexibility, to mention but a few. 
 
3.4 USER EXPERIENCE 
Usability is a narrower concept that mainly focuses on the ability of the user to success-
fully complete some specific system task. In other words, usability is mainly concerned 
with the functionality of the system that allows the completion of a task (Albert & Tullis 
2013). Since the permeation of technology in our daily lives, our main concern is not only 
the successful completion of tasks, but also enjoyment of the whole experience of system 
interaction, referred to as user experience (UX). UX takes a broader view than, and goes 
beyond, usability, in that it includes the user’s entire interaction, including thoughts, 
feelings, and perceptions that result from interaction with the system (Albert & Tullis 
2013). UX essentially includes aspects such as HCI, human factors, ergonomics, usability, 
and accessibility, which is more than just system usability (Hassenzahl, Platz, Burmester 
& Lehner 2000). 
 
Therefore, the term ‘user experience’ has emerged to address aspects of users’ interac-
tions with systems that go beyond effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction (Petrie & 
Bevan 2009). In essence, usability is included in the broader realm of UX, as current 
systems seek to amuse and entertain users (Albert & Tullis 2013). Yet usability uses 
objective metrics for measurement, while UX is more about users’ hedonic reactions, 
which are generally subjective, to the system (Petrie & Bevan 2009). 
 
Law, Roto, Hassenzahl, Vermeeren, and Kort (2009) argue for the separation of UX from 
other experiences, such as the broader product experience and service experience, 
recommending that the term should exclusively refer to products, systems, services, and 
objects with which a user interacts through a user interface. Bevan (2008) advocates that 
usability can be extended to encompass UX by interpreting ‘satisfaction in use’, a sub-
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characteristic of usability, as proposed in ISO/IEC 25010 (2011), as a UX attribute. The 
four sub-characteristics are likability, deals with the satisfaction from the perceived 
achievement of pragmatic goals. Pleasure is the extent to which the user gains satisfaction 
from the perceived achievement of hedonic goals of stimulation, identification, evocation, 
and associated emotional responses. Comfort relates to satisfaction of physical comfort. 
Lastly, trust deals with satisfaction that the product will behave as intended. User 
satisfaction is usually measured using a psychometrically designed questionnaire for 
more reliable results (Hornbæk 2006). 
 
Apart from usability goals, researchers and practitioners are now looking at improving 
interaction design systems to cater for additional goals such as UX. Compared to the more 
objective usability goals, UX goals are mostly subjective, since they are based on how 
users experience the product from their perspective (Preece et al. 2015). Preece et al. 
(2015) provide UX goals that include a wide range of emotions and felt experiences, 
grouped according to two categories: desirable and undesirable aspects. Table 3-1 lists 
some of these emotions. 
 
Table 3-1: Aspects of user experience 


















Making one feel guilty 
Making one feel stupid  
(Preece et al. 2015) 
 
The list of UX goals in Table 3-1 is not exhaustive, as there are many more qualifying 
UX goals, given the highly subjective nature of UX. Hence, system designers do not need 
to cater for each and every UX goal users might come up with. Although that might be 
preferable, it is difficult and even impossible to achieve. In contrast, system designers 
should strive to eliminate all undesirable aspects from system design. Therefore, just as 
in the case of usability, the decision regarding which goals to include in the design of a 
system depends on the type of system and the aspects that are important to system 
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designers. For example, the goals relevant to a system such as an online multiplayer game 
are different from those important in an ehealth application for patients and doctors. There 
are some goals that are important for any system such as being satisfying and enjoyable, 
which all systems should strive to achieve. 
 
3.5 WEBSITE USABILITY 
Website usability and its design principles are important in the context of this research, 
as online banking service is primarily provided through some form of web interface, be 
it computers or portable devices. The desktop is the leading device used to access the 
internet and online IS applications (Kaspersky Lab & B2B International 2014). This 
means that web usability (or, specifically, website usability) is still an important aspect 
of designing successful ecommerce portals. This is not only restricted to ecommerce, but 
includes any other portal that provides products, services, or information to users; 
examples include library catalogues and government portals for citizens. To quote 
Nielsen (2000:10), one of the main web usability authors, “[u]sability rules the Web. 
Simply stated, if the customer can’t find a product, then he or she will not buy it”. There 
is extensive research into what constitutes web usability, and this discussion is dominated 
by design principles that cater for user needs. Website usability strives to make a website 
easy to use, while UX aims to make the user happy before, during, and after using that 
website. Essentially, website usability, on the one hand, is concerned with users 
navigating the website with ease and being able to perform specific tasks. UX, on the 
other hand, focuses on the way users perceive their interaction while performing tasks on 
the website. 
 
Usability principles are similar to design principles, the exception being that they are 
more prescriptive (Preece et al. 2015). Additionally, whereas design principles are mainly 
used for informing a design, usability principles also provide the framework for heuristic 
evaluation of system usability (Preece et al. 2015). Nielsen’s 10 widely applied usability 
principles, which also overlap with design principles, include visibility of system status, 
the match between the system and the real world, user control and freedom, consistency 
and standards, helping users recognise, diagnose, and recover from errors, error preven-
tion, recognition rather than recall, flexibility and efficiency of use, aesthetic and mini-
malist design, and help and documentation (Nielsen 1995). 
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The usability principles outlined in this section are generic and can be adapted to any kind 
of product or service, including user interfaces. Nonetheless, there are a number of studies 
that suggest usability principles specifically for website usability. Shneiderman, Plaisant, 
Cohen, Jacobs, Elmqvist, and Diakopoulos (2016) propose the following eight ‘golden 
rules’ widely adopted for interface design: 
1. Strive for consistency for aspects such as layout, terminology, and command use. 
2. Enable frequent users to use short cuts by allowing the use of abbreviations, special 
key sequences, and macros. 
3. Offer informative feedback for every user action. 
4. Design dialogs to yield closure to inform the user when a task has been completed. 
5. Offer error prevention and simple error handling to prevent users from making 
mistakes in the first place, and provide clear error recovery instructions. 
6. Permit easy reversal of actions to encourage exploration and relieve anxiety, as users 
can always return to the previous state. 
7. Support internal locus of control that puts the user in control of the system. 
8. Reduce short-term memory load by providing displays that are simple and multiple-
page displays. 
 
The design principles discussed so far are more or less meant to address usability and UX 
problems in interactive systems through the use of user-centred design approaches. The 
following sections discuss the notion of usable security, which is the cornerstone of this 
research. Website usability is critical in online applications as they are usually provided 
through some form of user interface on a variety of devices. As such, design of the user 
interface using a socio-technical approach that incorporates usable security properties is 
critical. The STInfoSec framework proposed in this research provides the usable security 
principles and checklist items to assist system designers in usable interface design. 
 
3.6 USER-CENTRED INTERACTION DESIGN 
Interactive computer systems are characterised by a significant amount of interaction 
between users and the computer. Interactive products include systems, technologies, 
environments, tools, applications, services, and devices with interactive characteristics 
(Preece et al. 2015). In 1975, Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) introduced the notion of design 
principles to improve security and protection of computer systems. They suggested that 
proper design mechanisms could improve access rights to information stored in computer 
systems and avoid unauthorised access. More recently, researchers and practitioners have 
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given more attention to design principles in the development of products and services 
with which users interact directly. Design is now a main topic in creating user-friendly 
information systems that are usable and secure. A number of studies have proposed 
general design principles and best practices for usable information systems and specific 
usable security design principles for InfoSec systems. 
 
Researchers and practitioners in the field of HCI and related disciplines have developed 
considerable empirical evidence material that designers can apply in user interface 
designs. Shneiderman et al. (2016) group the material into the following three categories: 
guidelines are specific and practical, prescribe good practices, and caution against 
dangers; principles are middle level and less prescriptive and analyse and compare design 
alternatives; and theories and models are high level and describe objects and actions with 
consistent terminology that allows comprehensible explanations to support 
communication and teaching. 
 
Two such often-related approaches are user-centred design (UCD) and interactive design 
(IXD); both are concerned with developing systems that are usable. Preece et al. (2015:8) 
define IXD as “designing interactive products to support people in their everyday and 
working lives”. The aim is to design and develop systems that are easy to learn, are 
effective to use, and provide an enjoyable UX (Preece et al. 2015). UCD places the user 
at the centre of the process of designing usable products and systems by considering 
techniques, processes, methods, and procedures in the design process (Rubin & Chisnell 
2008). These approaches are at the heart of system development that caters for users’ 
needs and improves usability and UX in interactive information systems. 
 
A principle can be defined as “a truth or general law that is used as a basis for a theory 
or system of belief” (Oxford Dictionary 2018). Preece et al. (2015:25) define design 
principles as “generalisable abstractions intended to orient designers towards thinking 
about different aspects of their designs”. In general, design principles are developed from 
a combination of theory-based knowledge, common sense, and experience (Preece et al. 
2015). There are general design principles for designing information systems, and then 
there are more specific principles that are meant to accomplish specific design goals. For 
example, researchers have developed design principles that are meant to achieve usability 
and UX goals in user interfaces (websites) and other interactive systems. Gould and Lewis 
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(1985) propose three principles for a computer system to be useful and easy to use. These 
are widely accepted in the field as key guidelines. 
 
1. Early focus on users and tasks 
This is a widely accepted principle in all aspects of system design. System requirements 
need to address the users’ needs and, where possible, involve users at every stage of 
system development. This requires understanding the users from the start by studying 
their cognitive, behavioural, and attitudinal characteristics, including understanding their 
mental model of the system (Gould & Lewis 1985). 
 
2. Empirical measurement 
This involves observing and measuring performance of the intended users using simula-
tions or prototypes and incorporating the performance in the final system. At the 
beginning of the project, specific usability and UX goals should be identified, clearly 
documented, and agreed on. 
 
3. Iterative design 
The design and implementation are iterative, with as much iteration as necessary. This 
allows problems found in user testing to be fixed, and more tests and observations are 
carried out to check the effects of the fixes. Preece et al. (2015) provide three key princi-
ples for UCD that involve users in the design and development process of a product: (1) 
technology must be organised around the user’s goals, tasks, and abilities; (2) technology 
should be organised around the way users process information and make decisions; and 
(3) technology must keep the user in control and aware of the state of the system. 
 
General design principles are applicable to a variety of systems, but as the concept 
evolved, usability and UX scholars and practitioners have begun to propose more 
prescriptive design principles for specific types of systems. The more prescriptive design 
principle studies in the literature include ehealth (Van Gemert-Pijnen, Nijland, Van 
Limburg, Ossebaard, Kelders, Eysenbach & Seydel 2011), smartphone interface (Mi, 
Cavuoto, Benson, Smith-Jackson & Nussbaum 2014), gaming UX (Desurvire & Wiberg 
2015), user interface (Johnson 2013), and general usable security (Sasse & Flechais 
2005). These studies all address the design of specific applications, with little relevance 
to other categories such as online applications that rely on InfoSec for fulfilling their 
utility goals. 
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The wide variety of, and unique nature of, IS applications mean that design principles 
specifically developed for a particular type of application are almost irrelevant to another 
category of applications – hence, the need to come up with solutions tailor-made for 
specific applications. Not many studies have been conducted to address online InfoSec 
application design, and given the growth of such applications and their reliance on remote 
authentication, it is critical to come up with solutions that specifically tackle their unique 
InfoSec challenges. For this reason, this research proposed socio-technical design princi-
ples to address the knowledge gap in the design of online InfoSec applications, using 
online banking as a case study. These design principles were envisaged to be applicable 
– with minimum adaptation – to other online applications with similar characteristics. 
 
3.7 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION SECURITY 
Human-computer interaction security (HCISec) is a field that deals with aspects in the 
areas of HCI and InfoSec and is specifically concerned with designing InfoSec systems 
that are usable. It intends to improve usability of security features in information systems. 
HCISec is used as an acronym for different terms in the literature, including ‘human-
computer interaction in security’, ‘human-computer interaction and security’, ‘human-
computer interaction security’, and ‘human-computer interaction (security)’. There is 
generally no consensus on the exact expanded term, and in this research, the researcher 
uses human-computer interaction security. Regardless, all the above-mentioned terms 
generally mean the same, that is, HCI as it pertains to InfoSec in end-user applications. 
 
Karat, Brodie, and Karat (2005) identify four unique aspects in HCI design that present 
challenges and opportunities. Firstly, security is not the main goal of users, and they want 
it to be transparent and seamless, but still want to be in control of the situation. Secondly, 
security, which is often designed with highly trained technical users in mind, is now sup-
posed to be used by a totally different type of user, including non-technical novice users. 
Thirdly, usability is a bigger problem in security, since complexity is at the heart of many 
InfoSec systems. Lastly, systems must be designed to enable easy and effective updates 
for continuous protection with minimum user intervention. 
 
Given human memory limitations, most users fail to comply, leading to unsecure behav-
iour such as sharing passwords, using memorable passwords, or writing down passwords. 
Sasse and Flechais (2005) argue that, usually, users fail to comply with required security 
71 | P a g e  
 
behaviour because it is awkward, not because it is too difficult. For example, insistence 
on locking computer screens even for brief periods can be construed as hiding something 
from colleagues in a shared office space (Sasse & Flechais 2005). Human behaviour is 
generally goal-driven (Payne, Youngcourt & Beaubien 2007); therefore, successful 
execution of users’ tasks is a key aspect of designing successful systems. This calls for 
InfoSec applications that are goal- and task-driven. This has led to the conclusion that 
security tasks must be designed to support production tasks, and they must not conflict 
with production tasks. Hence, there is a need to design systems that have performance 
requirements for security tasks that are derived from performance of production tasks 
(Sasse & Flechais 2005). 
 
It is important for users to know that they have a significant role to play in creating a 
secure environment, and as such, they need to be held accountable for non-compliance. 
Users must be provided with adequate education and training in the workings of the 
InfoSec system, with possible actions to be taken against them for non-compliance. 
Mitnick and Simon (2005) argue that, since social engineering attacks bypass technology, 
effective security awareness programmes should place the focus beyond the correct usage 
of security mechanisms by including related behaviour such as verifying callers. 
Changing user behaviour is a multifaceted task that inherently needs to take a number of 
aspects into consideration. These include human memory capabilities, user perceptions, 
organisational and personal goals, and HCI design principles. Therefore, the design of 
usable InfoSec systems is a task that needs the effort of people from disparate disciplines 
(Weirich & Sasse 2001). 
 
Computer security is complex enough, and adding users makes it even more problematic 
(Schneier 2000). An InfoSec system that is not user-friendly fails in the marketplace, or 
users evade the security features or, worse, avoid using the whole system altogether. 
Unfortunately, usability problems with InfoSec systems go beyond just user interfaces 
and require a wider application of HCI concepts and design approaches (Flechais, 
Mascolo & Sasse 2007). The inherent human problem in information security gave rise 
to the notion of usable security, which strive to make information security mechanisms 
usable to the intended users. 
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3.8 USABLE SECURITY 
InfoSec is challenging to the usability community, mainly because of the principle of 
security through obscurity that has existed in the security environment for far too long. It 
dates back to the early days of encryption algorithms, where secret keys were the norm. 
The use of secret keys has since proven to be ineffective in solving InfoSec problems, 
especially in this networked environment that relies on remote authentication for granting 
access to services. Regardless, security is often complex, making it difficult to understand 
and easy to misconfigure and misuse. This is aggravated by the fact that users are usually 
not motivated to apply more effort to security when completing production tasks (Payne 
et al. 2007). Consequently, HCI and human factor aspects of InfoSec have come to the 
fore, with great interest in design principles that allow users to use InfoSec mechanisms 
effectively in applications. 
 
There have been usable security studies in a number of areas, including ehealth 
(Yeratziotis et al. 2012), email encryption (Hof 2013), smart buildings (Bo, Zhang, Hong, 
Sun & Huang 2014), and online banking authentication (Althobaiti & Mayhew 2014). 
Within the same area, different usable security studies may concentrate on a specific issue 
of the systems such as design principles, system authentication, and the user interface. 
All of these approaches have a single goal of designing and developing systems that 
exhibit usable security characteristics that provide effective security to the user, while 
being usable. Therefore, this research proposed a socio-technical framework for the 
development of secure and usable online banking systems. 
 
Generally, computer users expect computers to perform certain ‘magical’ actions. Thus, 
it is essential that security and usability be complementary rather than have contradictory 
goals. Secure systems are more manageable, more dependable, and, ultimately, more 
usable. Basically, both security and usability require that the computer should satisfy the 
user’s needs and wants, no more and no less (Yee 2004a). One of the earliest landmark 
studies on usable security was the work of Whitten and Tygar (1999), which evaluated 
the usability of PGP 5.0 in email encryption. The authors define usable security based on 
a set of four priorities: 
“Security software is usable if the people who are expected to use it: (1) are reliably 
made aware of the security tasks they need to perform; (2) are able to figure out 
how to successfully perform those tasks; (3) don’t make dangerous errors; and (4) 
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are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it” (Whitten & 
Tygar 1999:170). 
 
The integration of security properties in the user interface design has inherent problems 
that design strategies need to address. Whitten and Tygar (1999) identify the following 
five such problematic properties: 
 
1. The unmotivated user property 
Users are generally unmotivated to perform security tasks, as these are viewed as being 
in the way of achieving production tasks. Security is usually a secondary goal; therefore, 
security tasks need to be seamless. For example, for a user whose primary goal is to make 
a payment using online banking, it is natural to put off learning about a secure connection 
or to just be optimistic and assume that his/her security is working. InfoSec designers of 
user interfaces should come up with security designs that are seamless and unobtrusive, 
as users will avoid security mechanisms if they find them too difficult or annoying. 
 
2. The abstraction property 
InfoSec management often involves security policies that provides access control rules to 
resources. The creation and management of such rules need careful attention to avoid 
alienating users from a wider population and the design of user interfaces need to consider 
this property. 
 
3. The lack of feedback property 
Applications need to provide good feedback to the user to prevent dangerous errors but it 
is difficult to provide good feedback for security applications. Given the complex nature 
of security configuration, any attempts to summarise are usually inadequate. Moreover, 
only users really know what they want, making it difficult for InfoSec software to perform 
adequate error checking. To make matters worse, too much feedback to the user can be 
exploited by attackers to learn system properties that enable successful attacks. For 
instance, informing the user exactly which of the supplied credentials (between a 
username and a password) is incorrect assists the brute-force attacker. 
 
4. The barn door property 
This property states that once information assets are left unprotected, even for short period 
of time, there is no way to know if it has not yet been compromised. Hence, it is important 
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for user interface design to place high priority in assisting users to avoid making high risk 
mistakes. 
 
5. The weakest link property 
Security in a networked environment is as strong as the weakest link in the security chain. 
Hence, attackers only need to exploit a single component and the security of the whole 
system is compromised. As such, users need to be assisted throughout all steps of securing 
the system and avoid random exploration. 
 
These properties are still relevant, as shown by recent personal information records 
breaches, which are often discovered years after the breach has taken place. A good 
example is the security breach at Yahoo that compromised all three billion user accounts 
in 2013, but was only discovered and reported on in 2016 (Fiegerman 2017, Perlroth 
2017). Hackers often access computer systems and steal and sell personal information 
without detection for long periods of time. The STInfoSec framework, by using the socio-
technical approach, was essentially aimed at mitigating the threats of humans (users) as 
potentially the weakest link. This was achieved by developing design principles accom-
panied with checklist items that exhibited usable security properties in the STInfoSec 
framework. 
 
3.8.1 Usable security principles 
A great deal of research has been conducted on the design guidelines that are meant to 
improve security-oriented design. Generally, there is no consensus on exactly what makes 
one design better than another from a usable security perspective. Since security and 
usability are often traded off against each other, the intricacy and overheads of security 
solutions are often obstacles to their effective and efficient deployment (Dourish & 
Redmiles 2002). In addition, despite the technological advances that have created impres-
sive technical InfoSec systems (Choo 2011b), technology does not solve all security 
problems (Schneier 2000). Achieving this balance has been a challenge, and while much 
research on both usability and security has been conducted, there is little on the topic of 
usable security. The need to address not only functional aspects of InfoSec systems, but 
also system usability, makes such systems effectively socio-technical systems (STS), as 
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they bring together ideas from different areas to address a common problem. Usable secu-
rity draws from the fields of InfoSec, usability, and user behaviour in interaction with 
computer systems.  
 
This section discusses design guidelines and principles meant to improve the design of 
InfoSec systems. There is an overlap with some of the usability principles already 
mentioned in section 3.3 those already mentioned are not repeated here. Several 
researchers have developed and proposed usable security design guidelines and princi-
ples. Only the guidelines and principles most relevant to the system currently under 
investigation are discussed here. 
 
Studies by Yee (2004b; 2002) are among the earliest that have gained significant recogni-
tion in the design of usable security. Yee proposes addressing valid and non-trivial issues 
specific to usable security design by developing a list of 10 principles: 
Path of least resistance – provide the most comfortable way to complete tasks by 
granting the least authority. 
Explicit authorisation – a user’s authorities should only be provided to other actors after 
obtaining explicit authority for such granting. 
Revocability – users should be able to revoke serious errors, and the system should give 
prior warning and confirmation for irreversible actions. Provide support for ‘undo’ and 
‘redo’ functions. 
Visibility – keep users informed about the system security status, using appropriate 
feedback within a reasonable time. 
Expected ability – the interface must not give the user the impression of having author-
ities that the user does not actually have. 
Trusted path – protect the user’s communication channels against man-in-the-middle 
attacks that manipulate authority on the user’s behalf. 
Expressiveness – enable the user to express safe security policies in terms that fit the 
user’s task. Guide users through security features, and allow freedom of expression. 
Appropriate boundaries – draw distinctions among objects and actions along bounda-
ries relevant to the task. 
Identifiability – present objects and actions using distinguishable, truthful appearances. 
Clarity – clearly indicate the consequences of actions and decisions that the user is 
expected to make. 
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In addition to the above, other authors have proposed a number of usable security princi-
ples that address both InfoSec and usability in ISs. These are discussed below and include 
only those under investigation in this research: 
Availability – system services must be available all the time, with minimum downtime. 
Help and documentation – these must provide user assistance, with searchable help and 
documentation for both security and non-security tasks that is actionable with concrete 
steps. 
User suitability – the system should provide options suitable for users with diverse levels 
of skill and experience in security. 
User language – the system should speak the users’ language, with words, phrases, and 
concepts familiar to users, rather than system-oriented terms. 
Security – ensure end-to-end protection of the communication channel between the end-
user device and trusted servers. 
Privacy – protect the information provided by users against access by unauthorised 
parties, and use it only for the purposes for which it was collected. 
 
Based on Yee (2004b), the STInfoSec framework (the product of this research) suggests 
usable security design principles, accompanied by checklist items for each principle. The 
principles satisfy usable security properties for online InfoSec applications, and to ensure 
validity, the framework principles were evaluated using a heuristic evaluation method. 
 
3.8.2 Online banking authentication 
Online banking websites and applications, like any other online and offline information 
systems, rely heavily on passwords and PINs for authentication. There are numerous 
weaknesses in this kind of authentication, such as the password requirement of precise 
character recall, especially given that precise recall is not a strong point of the human 
intellect. Cyberattacks attempt to obtain users’ login credentials through sophisticated 
malware and keylogging. There is usually a trade-off between having a complex password 
that is difficult to crack, on the one hand, but easy enough to remember, on the other. 
Password-cracking is easy, given a determined attacker, especially now that computing 
power is easily available to perform brute-force attacks. Banks worldwide use a multitude 
of credential combinations for online banking login, all with the aim of improving system 
security. 
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South African banks require credential information consisting of either a username, email 
address, profile number (user ID), or account number/card number, and any combination 
of these pieces of information. The next piece of authentication information is the verifi-
cation of either the password or PIN, or both. Some banks provide partial password 
characters that the user has to complete by supplying the missing characters to complete 
the authentication process. Such a mechanism improves the usability of the system with 
regard to password memory, but might expose the system to attacks by an assailant 
collecting password characters on different attempts. Other protections exist, which 
include locking the user out after a number of failed attempts. Users are usually allowed 
to change passwords and PINs online at any time, but there is no policy to force periodic 
password changes. 
 
Internationally, the Bank of America, Credit Suisse, and Citibank are among those banks 
that use a combination of user ID and password for online banking. Some banks such as 
the HSBC (UK and USA) and Barclays Bank UK improve the security of the system 
slightly by not providing the details of all the required login credentials needed on the 
online banking login webpage. That is, the user needs to provide a valid user ID first 
before revealing exactly what the next piece of login information is. This provides an 
added level of security, especially against brute-force attacks. 
 
For a more advanced online banking system, numerous international banks use various 
security token devices that generate regular token codes to be entered online. These 
include JPMorgan Chase, which gives users the option of improving security by 
requesting a token device. BNP Paribas uses a more complex process, with multiple 
stages and credentials that include a hardware token device to access online banking. 
Initially, the user provides the user number/customer number and the card number. Then, 
the user inserts a bank card into the token device and enters a website-generated eight-
digit number, followed by the bank card PIN. Finally, an electronic signature is generated 
by the token, and this is entered on the website to complete the login process. 
 
It is interesting to note that banks worldwide have not agreed on a single secure online 
banking login process. The existence of these different online banking login processes 
highlights the lack of consensus on a single universal login process that is regarded as 
secure by banking organisations. A variety of online banking login systems exist world-
wide that offer different levels of security. Banks are still experimenting with different 
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systems and often use the level of security provided as a competitive advantage in the 
industry. This leaves users of certain banks vulnerable to a variety of sophisticated online 
attacks. Nevertheless, there is some cooperation in combating cybercrime, with consorti-
ums that share information on the latest security risks and ways to avoid security breaches. 
The consortiums also run client awareness programmes to educate users on InfoSec risks. 
 
There are numerous online InfoSec threats faced by organisations and individuals that 
conduct daily online activities. As such, technical solutions alone are not sufficient to 
protect information assets at risk from adversaries. Hence, this research proposes the 
STInfoSec framework that encourage equal treatment of social and technical aspects in 
online InfoSec application design and development. 
 
3.9 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section explains the concepts relevant to this research as presented in the theoretical 
framework, giving insight into how data was collected on the relevant concepts and their 
subsequent analysis. It also identifies significant factors, variables, and relationships 
among items to provide a theoretical overview for the design of secure and usable online 
InfoSec applications. The conceptualisation helped to identify key InfoSec design princi-
ples applicable to online InfoSec applications as provided in section 3.10 that outlines the 
preliminary framework. The conceptualised principles, in turn, guided the data collection 
and assisted in answering the research questions posed in this research. Many factors 
influence the adoption and continued use of online banking, ranging from users’ mental 
models of the system to intrinsic design nuances. 
 
The synergy of these building blocks is important in delivering online banking that is 
secure and gives the user an overall satisfactory experience. Therefore, it was critical to 
consider all aspects of the process, from user attitude and behaviour towards InfoSec 
systems to design approaches that are user-centred. To recap, the main objective of this 
research was to develop a socio-technical framework that assist in the development 
of secure and usable sensitive online applications. The following sections 
conceptualise the survey items for quantitative data collection constructs based on 
UTAUT2 and usable security that consists of the intersection of usability and security. 
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3.9.1 Unified theory of acceptance and use of technology 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the main theoretical foundation of this research was 
UTAUT2, especially with regard to how security and usability aspects affected 
acceptance and continued use of technology, using online banking as a case study. 
UTAUT2 unifies eight disparate theories or models of user information technology 
acceptance and use, thereby streamlining the determinants of information technology 
adoption and continued use. Hence, UTAUT2 covers a wide range of constructs to model 
user interaction with information systems. Section 3.9.3 further on in this chapter outlines 
the hypotheses based on the constructs. 
 
The current version, UTAUT2, incorporates additional constructs that influence 
behavioural intention and use behaviour. In this research, use behaviour was measured by 
use frequency. The researcher investigated key constructs, namely, performance 
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, hedonic motivation, facilitating 
conditions, price value, and habit as direct or indirect determinants of acceptance, 
adoption, and continued use of online banking. Gender, age, experience, income, 
education, ethnicity, device, and use frequency were hypothesised to moderate the effect 
of the constructs on adoption and behavioural intention. 
 
3.9.2 Usable security 
The investigation of usable security incorporated both security and usability principles. 
For quantitative data collection from online banking users, six usability constructs were 
considered, while security consisted of 13 survey items that covered both security and 
privacy issues. The concepts under investigation pertaining to usability included learna-
bility, user suitability, satisfaction, availability, errors, and help and documentation. 
These were again moderated by the same moderating factors mentioned under the 
UTAUT section above. Also included in usability assessment were the 10 items of the 
system usability scale (SUS) measurement tool. Of the 13 survey items concerning secu-
rity and privacy, six items related to security and seven to privacy. The survey is provided 
as Appendix E. 
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3.9.3 Development of hypotheses 
This section outlines the hypotheses developed and tested through the survey data based 
on the underlying constructs of the theoretical framework. The constructs of the model 
are first explained briefly, and the main research hypotheses associated with the 
constructs are listed. The broader research hypothesis postulated that ‘socio-technical 
aspects of system design enhance the adoption and continued use of information 
security applications’. Therefore, the research hypothesised that constructs from 
UTAUT2, usability, and security had an effect on the adoption and intention to use online 
banking. The definitions of some of the UTAUT2 constructs were first provided in the 
original UTAUT and the eight unified models; these definitions are still relevant in the 
second version of the model. The effect of the constructs on adoption and continued use 
of online banking was moderated by a number of factors, which included gender, age, 
experience, education, employment, income, ethnicity, and device. The data analysis 
determined which of these moderating factors had a statistically significant impact on the 
constructs under investigation. 
 
Performance expectancy 
Performance expectancy (PE) is the degree to which an individual believes that using the 
system enhances activity performance (Venkatesh et al. 2003). PE was first defined in 
UTAUT and is a derivative of five constructs from the different models unified in 
UTAUT. It is the strongest predictor of intention and remains significant at all points of 
measurement in both voluntary and mandatory settings (Venkatesh et al. 2003). 
H1: Performance expectancy has a positive and significant impact on individual 
behavioural intention to use online banking services. 
 
Effort expectancy 
Effort expectancy (EE) is the degree of ease associated with the use of the system and is 
a derivative of three constructs from the unified models, namely, perceived ease of use, 
complexity, and ease of use (Venkatesh et al. 2003). 
H2: Effort expectancy has a positive and significant impact on behavioural inten-
tion to use online banking services. 
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Social influence 
Social influence (SI) is the degree to which an individual perceives that other people 
believe he or she should use an information system, as it determines behavioural intention, 
and is a derivative of subjective norms, social factors, and image (Venkatesh et al. 2003). 
H3: Social influences have a positive and significant impact on an individual’s behav-
ioural intention to use online banking services. 
Facilitating conditions 
Facilitating conditions (FC) refers to the degree an individual believes that organisational 
and technical infrastructure exists to support the use of the system (Venkatesh et al. 2003). 
The researcher investigated the effects on intention to use online banking based on access 
to resources such as internet connection to, and assistance in, using the service. 
H4: Facilitating conditions have a positive and significant influence on behavioural 
intention to use online banking services. 
 
Hedonic motivation 
Hedonic motivation (HM) is the enjoyment of using a system, which plays a significant 
part in influencing technology acceptance and continued use (Brown & Venkatesh 2005). 
HM complements UTAUT’s strongest predictor, that is, performance expectancy, which 
emphasises usefulness (Venkatesh et al. 2012). 
H5: Hedonic motivation has a positive and significant impact on an individual’s 
behavioural intention to use online banking services. 
 
Price value 
Price value (PV) is the consumer’s awareness of the trade-off between the perceived bene-
fits of the application and the monetary cost of using the application (Dodds, Monroe & 
Grewal 1991). The cost of using a system is significant in a consumer context compared 
to an organisational context where employees do not bear such costs. Hence, the introduc-
tion of PV in UTAUT2 has a significant influence on the adoption and continued use of 
the system from an individual perspective (Venkatesh et al. 2012). 
H6: Price value has a positive and significant impact on behavioural intention to use 
online banking services. 
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Habit 
Habit (H) is the extent to which people tend to perform behaviours spontaneously due to 
learning (Limayem, Hirt & Cheung 2007). As an additional construct in UTAUT2, habit 
is related to experience in system use based on the duration from first use (Venkatesh et 
al. 2012). 




Behavioural intention (BI) is an individual’s perceived likelihood to engage in a given 
behaviour (Ajzen 1991). Venkatesh et al. (2003) theorise that behavioural intention has a 
significant positive influence on technology usage. In addition, the researcher theorised 
that user intention to use technology depended on the effort involved in using the technol-
ogy. 
H8: Behavioural intention has a positive and significant impact on effort 
expectancy. 




Security (S) and, specifically, perceived security risk have been found to have a signifi-
cant impact on online consumer behaviour. Given the potential of financial loss, the secu-
rity risk does not have to be real for the behaviour of consumers to be affected negatively 
regarding intentions to use an online service (Chiu, Wang, Fang & Huang 2014). 
H10: Security has a negative and significant impact on behavioural intention to use 
online banking service. 
 
Privacy 
Privacy (P), in the context of an online environment, has to do with protection of 
consumers’ personal information against unauthorised access and subsequent use. Given 
the prevalence of attacks that rely on personal information, such as identity theft, the 
system should be able to protect users’ personal information. 
H11: System privacy has a negative and significant impact on behavioural intention 
to use online banking services. 
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Usability 
Usability is measured by six constructs: learnability, user suitability, satisfaction, availa-
bility, errors, and help and documentation. In addition, the survey instrument included a 
10-item SUS measurement tool. The overall usability hypothesis is as follows: 
H12: System usability has a positive and significant impact on behavioural intention 
to use online banking services. 
 
Moderating factors 
UTAUT2 has three moderators, namely, age, gender, and experience. In addition to these, 
this research postulated six additional moderators: income, education, ethnicity, device, 
use frequency, and bank. Although data was collected on all these moderating factors, the 
analysis did not include or mention bank names for ethical reasons and avoid prejudice. 
The moderating factors were not mentioned explicitly in the hypotheses, but their effects 
on model constructs were investigated and reported separately and incorporated in the 
final structural model. 
 
3.10 PRELIMINARY STINFOSEC FRAMEWORK 
This section outlines the proposed STInfoSec framework that drew from the literature on 
usable security design principles and best practices. The end result was a set of critically 
informed design guidelines for online InfoSec applications such as online banking. In the 
final framework, the design principles were validated through a heuristic evaluation 
method. The four STS components are first explained in the context of online banking, 
describing what constitutes each component. The framework proposed in this research 
integrated UTAUT2, usability, and security in a socio-technical system in the design and 
development of online applications. 
 
Until recently, InfoSec practitioners were only skilled in technical aspects of protecting 
information assets, with usability and human factors being an afterthought. This created 
a gap between InfoSec and usability – hence, the need for integration in addressing the 
InfoSec problem, given that users have since been identified as the weakest link in the 
InfoSec chain. Combined with UTAUT, STS can be used to investigate user acceptance 
and continued use of technology. UTAUT essentially predicts users’ behaviour in 
deciding to adopt or reject a technology artefact. Thus, aiding the development of such 
artefacts through improving aspects that significantly make users reject a technology, 
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such as lack of usability and security, while optimising positive aspects, helps improve 
the adoption and continued use of such technology. 
 
3.10.1 STInfoSec components 
This section outlines the building blocks of the STInfoSec framework drawn from the 
literature on usable security design principles and best practices. The end result was 
critically informed design guidelines for online InfoSec applications such as online 
banking. In the final framework, the design principles were validated through a heuristic 
evaluation method. 
 
In this part, the researcher first explains the four STS components in the context of online 
banking, describing what constituted each component. The following section discusses 
individual framework components. The STInfoSec framework looked at improving the 
development of online applications that relied on effective InfoSec to provide services to 
the user. The idea was to make these applications meet both usability and security require-
ments, thereby creating an environment that would foster adoption and continued use of 
the applications by a diverse set of users. The framework specifically applies to online 
banking systems, but can be applied to any other online security IS application, with mini-
mum adaptation. Figure 3-4 illustrates the framework components, including external 
elements that contribute to the framework. 
 
Secondly, usability and security requirements are presented that are necessary for secure 
and usable InfoSec applications. These are design principles that developers need to 
address in developing applications that meet usable security properties. In the third place, 
using UTAUT2, the investigation into users’ perceptions of the current online banking 




Usability plays an important role in facilitating effective and efficient use of the system, 
and it has a significant impact on potential users’ adoption and use of the system. 
Therefore, it is essential that information systems implement usability principles from the 
outset when design decisions are made, as usability cannot be an add-on component at a 
later stage. There is significant research on the usability principles that need to be 
addressed in developing IS applications, as explained in previous sections. Some of these 
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are general guidelines, while others have been developed for specific types of 
applications. In this study, the interest was usability principles intended for InfoSec 
applications, that is, principles for usable security. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: STInfoSec framework components 
 
Security 
Information system applications need to protect confidential and sensitive information 
provided by users for the system to be trusted. This protection of information requirement 
is particularly important when the risk includes potential financial loss and leaking of 
private information that can lead to identity theft. One such system is the online banking 
system. The security or perceived security of an online banking system, as viewed by 
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users, needs to be trustworthy for them to adopt or continue to use the service. Hence, the 
design of the system needs to address security mechanisms to protect users’ personal 




Sensitive online applications such as online banking need more than just usefulness and 
ease of use to encourage potential users to adopt them. Usability, security, privacy, and 
trust, be these perceived or real, need to be addressed for users to be comfortable with 
adopting and continuing to use the systems. With the advent of more pervasive mobile 
and portable devices, the emphasis has moved to addressing UX when users interact with 
these devices. In this research, it was found that users and developers of online banking 
applications raised both social and technical issues regarding InfoSec. Therefore, the 
design of such applications needs to address both aspects as well. 
 
Socio-technical components 
Studies of the socio-technical approach to InfoSec are mainly based on technical and 
organisational aspects of system design, which are the main foundation of the socio-
technical model. This research addressed socio-technical aspects based on individual 
context, rather than an organisational setting. The main objective of the STInfoSec 
framework was to gain a better understanding of how socio-technical aspects that affected 
InfoSec usage could assist in the development of online applications in the context of 
online banking. The specific technical and social dynamics at play in users’ interaction 
with InfoSec mechanisms have been widely researched separately. This research intended 
to bring these dynamics together in the context of usable security. 
 
Theoretically, InfoSec elements in an IS can be classified according to three categories: 
social, technical, and socio-technical (Iivari & Hirschheim 1996). Social and technical 
views place emphasis on either social or technical aspects, respectively, while a socio-
technical view appreciates social and technical aspects of information system develop-
ment equally. As a system, socio-technical systems strive to encourage a systems 
approach, with a holistic approach to IS development that addresses InfoSec problems 
brought about by the interrelationship between users and technology. Rather than 
approaching the two aspects separately, the emphasis is on approaching the social and 
technical components of the system simultaneously. Ropohl (1999) argues that a socio-
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technical systems model is useful in explaining the impact of technology on society, 
making technical development equivalent to social change. The following subsections 
discuss the four components of STS in the context of online banking. 
 
Structure 
The structure component deals with policy and legal elements that ensure a code of 
conduct among different groups of people involved in the system. Financial institutions 
are governed by a country’s rules and regulations regarding the provision of financial 
services to its citizens, usually through the country’s central bank and other financial 
regulatory bodies. The banks, in turn, create banking and online banking terms and condi-
tions that set recommended behaviour for users, including responsibilities and liabilities 
that accompany registration and continued use of the services provided. These terms and 
conditions include dispute resolution procedures in case of security breaches or other 
related disputes, which are usually referred to the banking ombudsman when the parties 
(the user and the bank) fail to resolve the issue. 
 
Structure also includes design approaches used in developing the system, including local 
and international standards and best practices that are compulsory or recommended in 
application (or product) design and development. Such standards might include those 
prescribed by international bodies such as the ISO and national bodies such as the South 
African Bureau of Standards (SABS), as well as other InfoSec recommendations from 
local and international banking consortiums. Most South African banks are members of 
SABRIC, a non-profit company formed by the four major South African banks to assist 
banking and cash-in-transit companies in combating organised bank-related crimes 
(SABRIC 2018). SABRIC provides a platform for financial institutions to share infor-
mation on InfoSec and security threats. Communication strategies are part of this compo-
nent. These include the preferred means of communication as selected by the user during 
registration for services such as online banking. 
 
People 
The people involved in an online banking system include users, developers, management, 
and any other stakeholders such as vendors, contractors, etc. Users are the bank’s clientele 
– a diverse group of people with different ages, educational qualifications, computer liter-
acy levels, incomes, languages, and cultures. ‘Developers’ is an all-encompassing term 
that includes designers, programmers, testers, usability evaluators, vendors of outsourced 
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products, and any other people directly involved in the development of online banking 
applications. Management includes top management of the financial institution and the 
supervisors of the development teams. Those in top management have direct influence on 
the development of the system, as they make decisions that directly affect the end product, 
such as controlling the budget and hiring personnel with relevant and needed expertise to 
improve the final product. 
 
Technology 
The technology component involves a wide range of technologies that form part of the 
online banking system – from the bank’s hardware and users’ devices to the software 
applications that provide the services. From the bank’s side, the technology covers hard-
ware servers, operating systems, networking technologies among data centres, middle-
ware platforms, back-end applications, and the user interfaces that allow employees and 
users to access information remotely. The bank also provides InfoSec technologies and 
mechanisms to protect users and company information assets by providing access to 
authorised users based on predefined access control policies. Such technologies include 
encryption, firewalls, and intrusion detection and prevention systems. User interfaces for 
both the web and mobile devices need to incorporate current best practices to enhance 
user-friendly properties, which include acceptable usability, and to enhance UX. Given 
the wide range of activities currently accessible through the internet, including games and 
entertainment, online applications must be competitive for users to embrace and use them. 
 
Tasks 
The structure and technology in a socio-technical system provide the means for people to 
accomplish certain tasks. An online banking system provides a convenient way for the 
bank to offer banking activities to its clients 24 hours a day. Apart from an array of online 
banking transactions, the system must also fulfil the organisational business goals to 
provide the shareholders with a return on their investment. Users perform banking-related 
tasks, and the development team, thus, ensures that the online banking system is readily 
available to users and that it is usable and secure to meet users’ expectations and fulfil 
business goals. 
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3.10.2 Usable security principles 
A large volume of research has been done on design guidelines that are intended to 
improve security-oriented design. Generally, there is no consensus on exactly what makes 
one design better than another from a usable security perspective. This section discusses 
design guidelines that are meant to improve user interface design of IS applications, 
particularly those that require InfoSec mechanisms. Several researchers have investigated 
usable security design strategies. Among the earliest studies are those done by 
Shneiderman et al. (2016), Yee (2004b), (Johnston et al. 2003), and Nielsen (1995). These 
researchers identified a gap between usability and security, and to bridge this gap, they 
came up with numerous design principles, some of which were generic for any kind of 
application, while others were application-specific. In this regard and for this research, 
the researcher maps themes from qualitative interview data and usable security principles 
from literature, survey, and interview. The section below describes the principles and 
outlines the source of each principle as well as the motivation for its inclusion in the 
research framework. 
 
Principle 1: Visibility 
Visibility of the system status to let users know exactly what the capabilities of the system 
are, is one of the most important principles addressed by both usability and usable security 
scholars. Nielsen (1995) mentions it as a criterion for usability evaluation of the user 
interface, while Katsabas, Furnell, and Dowland (2005), Yee (2004b), and Yeratziotis et 
al. (2012) emphasise the principle in the context of usable security in order to let users 
know whether an application or user interface is using any protection mechanisms. Hence, 
applications such as web browsers now display the ‘lock’ icon on ‘https’-protected web-
sites. The importance of visibility is implicit in usable security. Therefore, the researcher 
did not deem it necessary to directly investigate its significance; as such, the principle 
was included indirectly from the literature and as part of the security principles. 
 
Principle 2: Learnability 
The ability of users to efficiently and effectively use an application or user interface for 
the first time, as well as subsequent reuse, depends on the ease of learning the system 
(Preece et al. 2015). As such, learnability has been identified as an essential component 
in the definition of usability (Nielsen 2010). The importance of users’ ability to consist-
ently use InfoSec mechanisms all the time cannot be overemphasised. Hence, learnability 
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is an essential part of creating a secure environment, and applications need to address this 
principle to assist users to remember how to use the system on their return (Yeratziotis et 
al. 2012). The principle was addressed in both the user survey and interviews with devel-
opers under the section on training and education. 
 
Principle 3: Satisfaction 
Satisfaction was included as a principle under the usability section of the survey and the 
hedonic motivation construct in UTAUT2. Satisfaction is one of the five characteristics 
of usability identified by Nielsen (2010). Essentially, satisfaction in the use of a system 
extends beyond usability and into the realm of UX (Bevan 2008). User satisfaction is 
influenced by UX (Deng, Turner, Gehling & Prince 2010) through such aspects as social 
presence (Ogara, Koh & Prybutok 2014). Hedonic motivations encourage users to engage 
with a system, influencing the overall UX, which is a direct enabler of user satisfaction 
(Zahidi, Lim & Woods 2014, O’Brien 2010). 
 
Principle 4: Errors 
The principle of errors, be it for their prevention in the first place or recovery after they 
have occurred, is a critical design principle in all systems. Therefore, this principle is 
important in both usability and InfoSec design strategies. Nielsen (1995) includes two 
usability principles that address error-related usability problems, namely, error preven-
tion and help users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors, while Shneiderman et 
al. (2016) suggest that user interface design should offer simple error handling to users as 
one of the 10 golden rules. Error handling is important in usable security to avoid critical 
mistakes and disclosure of sensitive and confidential digital information assets (Katsabas 
et al. 2005). This principle was addressed in the user survey to ascertain the prevalence 
of errors and the effectiveness of error recovery mechanisms. 
 
Principle 5: Availability 
Availability is essential for online applications, which are often marketed as providing 
convenience by allowing users to access a service 24 hours a day. In the real world, a 
certain period of system downtime is expected for reasons such as system upgrades and 
maintenance, but these activities should be scheduled during off-peak times and kept to a 
minimum in terms of the frequency and duration of downtime. Yeratziotis et al. (2012), 
for example, suggest that usable security design should make sure that system services 
are available all the time, with minimum downtime. In this research, the principle of 
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availability was addressed in the user survey as a construct under usability, and users also 
raised availability as a concern in the qualitative section of the survey. (See section 6.3.3.) 
 
Principle 6: Revocability 
Users should be able to undo actions and errors, and a secure and usable system should 
give prior warning and confirmation of actions that are irreversible. Although some 
actions cannot be reversed after a certain stage of processing, developers need to try, by 
all means possible, to provide support for ‘undo’ and ‘redo’ functions. This principle is 
one of the 10 golden rules of user interface design identified by Shneiderman et al. (2016) 
and Yeratziotis et al. (2012) as necessary in usable security design. 
 
Principle 7: Expressiveness 
The system should inform and guide users through security features and yet allow 
freedom of expression. The system’s InfoSec policy must not be too rigid and difficult 
for users to comply with; it should, for example, prescribe safe passwords, but still allow 
users the freedom to create passwords they can easily remember (Yee 2004b). This, in 
turn, eliminates the need for writing down passwords, which might be necessary if the 
system has password requirements that are too complex. Security features of integrity and 
confidentiality are available on most e-commerce web sites. One of the ways in which 
these features are implemented is through SSL. Johnston et al. (2003) refer to this princi-
ple as conveying security features, where the system needs to inform the user in a clear 
manner of the available security features. 
 
Principle 8: User language  
User language is another principle that is relevant in both the usability and usable security 
contexts. The principle requires the system to speak the users’ language, using terms and 
concepts familiar to users, while avoiding the use of technical terms (Nielsen 1995). This 
decreases the chances of users making mistakes or misunderstanding system commands. 
The principle was investigated in the survey. 
 
Principle 9: User suitability 
User suitability ensures that the system provides options suitable for users with diverse 
levels of skill and experience in security (Yeratziotis et al. 2012). Personalisation and 
customisation of the system are essential for user suitability and allow users to set up 
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preferences that make it comfortable for them to use the system effectively. Although 
user suitability did not pass the model of fitness test for inclusion in the final structural 
model, as a principle it was included based on its significance in the literature in the 
context of usable security. 
 
Principle 10: Help and documentation 
Users may need assistance, especially for applications that have been developed for a 
diverse group of users with different levels of skill. Support material that helps new users 
and system documentation for reference during usage are critical. Such material must be 
complete, consistent, correct, and usable for it to meet its intended goals. The principle 
of help and documentation is generic and is essential for all kinds of systems, products, 
or services. For online applications, the system needs to provide searchable help and 
documentation for both security and non-security tasks that are actionable with concrete 
steps (Shneiderman et al. 2016). This principle was included in both the survey and 
interviews. 
 
Principle 11: Security 
The system should ensure a trusted path through the communication channel (usually the 
internet) between the end-user device and trusted servers, addressing fundamental 
InfoSec principles such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability, to avoid disclosure 
and unauthorised access of information assets in storage and in transit. Ensuring the 
usability of an InfoSec system should not mean a compromise in the technical function-
alities of the system to protect information assets. The security principle was addressed 
in the survey as a construct and was raised by respondents in the qualitative part of the 
survey, while it also came up on numerous occasions during interview sessions. 
 
Principle 12: Privacy 
Organisations collect personal information about their customers, some of which is sensi-
tive, such as credit card numbers. Hence, the system should protect information provided 
by users against access by unauthorised parties, and it should be used only for the 
purposes for which it was collected in the first place. Unfortunately, organisations still 
have some way to go in improving protection of personal information, with an increasing 
number of high-profile privacy breaches. The researcher investigated the principle in both 
the survey and interviews. 
 
93 | P a g e  
 
3.11 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The chapter presented the second part of the literature review, with the objective of 
providing a detailed critical discussion of usability and design principles. The chapter 
outlined the social component of the socio-technical approach to information security. 
HCI has come a long way, and several studies have been conducted on different aspects 
of HCI, which include human factors, ergonomics, and usability. Usability in the context 
of usable security enables the development of applications that have security mechanisms 
that users can effectively use. Researchers have developed numerous design principles; 
some are meant for general applications, while others have been developed for specific 
applications. Furthermore, certain usable security design principles have been developed 
for general applications and others for specific applications. 
 
Website usability is critical to achieving usable security in online InfoSec applications, 
as it forms part of the delivery channel of these applications. Consequently, any in-roads 
made in designing these applications can be eroded by poor website usability that might 
frustrate the end-users and have a negative impact on the adoption of the services offered. 
Online banking authentication forms an integral part of protecting sensitive personal user 
information. Hence, any design approach to address online InfoSec problems needs to 
take possible challenges pertinent to the authentication process into account. The goal is 
to provide remote authentication mechanisms that are usable, so that users do not attempt 
to bypass them. The theoretical framework includes three aspects: UTAUT2, usability, 
and security. These informed the design principles included in the preliminary STInfoSec 
framework. The 12 usable security design principles forming part of the STInfoSec 
framework are discussed next.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of the research design and methodology that the 
research applied in answering research questions and in pursuit of research objectives. 
The chapter essentially outlines the roadmap of the entire research project. 
 
-- ooo -- 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Figure 4-1: The research roadmap 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this research was to develop a socio-technical framework 
(STInfoSec) for the design of online InfoSec applications. The proposed framework 
brought various InfoSec application design principles, guidelines, and concepts together 
in a comprehensible framework that was envisaged as being useful for the development 
of secure and usable IS applications. The framework consisted of socio-technical issues 
that needed to be addressed in developing secure and usable IS applications, thereby 
providing a usable security property to these applications. The framework was developed 
from data collected from two sources in mixed methods research. This chapter discusses 
the research design and methodology of the study by outlining decisions made at every 
stage of the research process based on the ‘research onion’. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design is the roadmap of the entire research project that outlines choices to be 
made, from the paradigm (philosophical assumptions) to the intricacies of data collection 
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deals with issues such as the research paradigm that guides the selection of the research 
approach, research strategy, and research methods. The choices made at the paradigm 
level, in turn, provide guidance in the selection of research strategies and data collection 
and analysis techniques used in finding solutions to the research problem. The definitions 
assigned to research design and methodology terminology differ from one scholar to the 
next. In this research, the researcher defined these terms based on the ‘research onion’ by 
Saunders et al. (2016). (See Figure 4-2.) 
 
 
Figure 4-2: The ‘research onion’1 (Saunders et al. 2016) 
 
Figure 4-2 highlights the selected choices at every layer of the research onion with a red 
rectangle. The chapter gives detailed discussions of the chosen options and motivations 
for the selections from the outer layer inwards, with limited contextual background on 
some of the options available at every layer. Research onion layers to be covered in this 
chapter include philosophy, approach, methodology, strategy, and time zone. The data 
collection and analysis layer is briefly introduced, with a detailed discussion to follow in 
chapters 5 and 6. The following sections expand on, and discuss, each choice made at 
each layer, starting with the research paradigm. 
                                                          
1 The ‘research onion’ is reproduced with permission from the author. 
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4.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
A research paradigm (also known as a research philosophy or philosophical assumptions) 
is essentially a basic set of beliefs that guides research, consisting of four aspects, namely, 
ethics (axiology), ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Denzin & Lincoln 2013). It 
is the beliefs and assumptions with regard to how knowledge is developed (Saunders et 
al. 2016). The basic underlying philosophical assumptions concerning what constitutes 
knowledge and the approaches used to unearth that knowledge are at the heart of a 
research paradigm (Greene & Hall 2010). Ethics, as Denzin and Lincoln (2013) note, 
deals with moral issues in the course of conducting research. They describe epistemology 
as questions about how one knows the world, while ontology is concerned with questions 
about the nature of reality, specifically what we perceive to be real (Denzin & Lincoln 
2013). The authors state that methodology refers to the best procedures for acquiring 
knowledge about the world. A number of paradigms are applicable to information systems 
and social science research. The research problem or research question(s) will guide the 
selection of an appropriate paradigm. With regard to the paradigms discussed below, there 
are also different variations found in the literature. The three paradigms discussed are 
those with direct links to the chosen paradigm of this research – pragmatism. The para-




Positivism subscribes to the philosophical stance of the natural sciences, with observable 
and measurable reality (Saunders et al. 2016). Ontologically, positivism embraces 
realism; that is, reality exists independent of how social actors label or think about it 
(Saunders et al. 2016). Positivists believe that reality is objective and can be measured, 
which leads to an epistemological stance that seeks to discover the objective truth about 
the real world through measurable metrics that allow universal law-like generalisations 
(Saunders et al. 2016). This measurement is achieved with properties that are autonomous 
of the researcher and tools used (Myers 2013). Realism leads positivists to an axiological 
belief that strives to avoid research values, as these bring bias into their research 
(Saunders et al. 2016). Because of the objective nature of positivist enquiry, it often uses 
methodological choices that are typically deductive and highly structured and that include 
measurement metrics that rely on high samples; it uses predominantly quantitative tech-
niques of data analysis (Saunders et al. 2016). 
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Positivism is mainly associated with quantitative research that is focused on collecting 
quantitative data for theory testing to increase the predictive nature of understanding the 
phenomenon under investigation (Myers 2013). Naturally, positivists adopt an empirical 
realist ontology that favours empirical evidence, thereby aligning perfectly with scien-
tific-oriented analysis (Fleetwood & Ackroyd 2004). The survey strategy in this research 
followed the positivism paradigm by objectively investigating the respondents’ percep-
tions of online banking services as provided by South African banks. The survey data was 
analysed using inferential statistical analysis based on postulated developed hypotheses. 
 
4.3.2 Interpretivism 
Interpretivism advocates the need for the researcher to understand humans in their role as 
social players and sees the difference in doing research among people compared to objects 
as significant (Saunders et al. 2016). Ontologically, interpretivists believe that the social 
phenomena we study are constructed by researchers and the researched. Since social 
actors are unique, it follows that there are multiple realities for each of us (Saunders et al. 
2016). Epistemologically, interpretivists believe that research findings are the creation of 
the process of interaction between the researcher and the researched (Lincoln, Lynham & 
Guba 2013). Hence, reality can only be accessed through social constructions that include 
consciousness, language, shared meanings, and tools (Myers 2013). Axiologically, inter-
pretivists are value-bound. Since the researcher is part of the researched, the process is 
highly subjective, and the researcher’s interpretations are key to research contributions. 
Interpretivism often uses methodological choices that are typically inductive, with in-
depth investigations using small samples, typically qualitative methods of data analysis 
(Saunders et al. 2016). 
 
These meanings can only be obtained by interacting with the participants and looking 
from the inside, not the outside. As part of the qualitative component of this research, 
interpretivism was applied through the case study research strategy, which interviewed 
online banking designers to understand the problem of usable security from the perspec-
tive of these participants. This enquiry investigated the challenges financial institutions 
encountered in the provision of usable security to online digital channels. 
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4.3.3 Pragmatism 
Pragmatism as a paradigm places more emphasis on the research problem and allows the 
researcher to select the most appropriate approach(es) that can achieve research goals and 
objectives (Creswell & Creswell 2017). As paradigm, pragmatism is located in the middle 
of the opposing forces of positivism and interpretivism, giving the researcher the freedom 
to use aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research methods (Creswell & Clark 
2017, Doyle et al. 2009). Pragmatism acknowledges the ontological tenets of both posi-
tivism and interpretivism, which are the existence of a single objective reality and that 
reality is subjective views wedged in the mind, respectively (Creswell & Clark 2017). 
Epistemologically, pragmatism focuses on practicality; that is, data collection is based on 
‘what works’ to address the research problem (Creswell & Clark 2017). The axiological 
aspects follow multiple stances; for example, both biased and unbiased perspectives are 
included (Creswell & Clark 2017), and it is value-driven, with the researcher’s doubts 
and beliefs initiating and sustaining the research (Saunders et al. 2016). Pragmatism is 
problem-centred; hence, methodological choices are also based on ‘what works’ in 
addressing the research problem. This leads to pragmatism using a range of methods in 
the form of mixed or multiple methods from both quantitative and qualitative research 
(Saunders et al. 2016). 
 
The pragmatic philosophy asserts that human action cannot be separated from 
experiences and behaviour that has arisen from those experiences; thus, the meaning of 
actions and beliefs is found in their consequences (Levin & Greenwood 2013). The 
researcher agrees with this assertion and believes that, in the context of the often-complex 
InfoSec problem, user behaviour in interaction with IS applications is unique to experi-
ences and understanding of InfoSec problems and awareness. Hence, for solutions that 
are meant for a wide variety of users, a number of aspects that aid users of different 
InfoSec awareness levels are critical to providing effective solutions. As such, pragmatic 
solutions that are not limited by specific philosophical assumptions and methodological 
choices are necessary to generate new ideas on tackling InfoSec problems. 
 
Morgan (2014) succinctly summarises the relevance of pragmatism by stating that 
individuals will have different worldviews, as previous experiences are unique, making 
worldviews both individually unique at the most detailed level and socially shared at 
broader levels. Hence, pragmatism, unlike other worldviews that emphasise the nature of 
reality, is more about the nature of experiences. This allows pragmatism to provide a 
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direct connection between theory and praxis (Levin & Greenwood 2013). Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) clearly sum up the relationship between pragmatism, on the one 
hand, and positivism and interpretivism, on the other: 
“Its logic of inquiry includes the use of induction (or discovery of patterns), deduc-
tion (testing of theories and hypotheses), and abduction (uncovering and relying on 
the best of a set of explanations for understanding one’s results).” 
 
Pragmatism focuses on the research consequences, with primary importance given to (1) 
the research questions asked rather than the methods and (2) the use of multiple methods 
of data collection to solve research problems (Creswell & Clark 2017). 
 
4.3.4 Motivation for pragmatism in this study 
This research argued that the intersection of human behaviour and security, the subject of 
this usable security study, is an area that is not straightforward and that conventional 
solutions have failed to understand the problem and suggest effective solutions. There-
fore, applying a pragmatic philosophy that does not view the world through a single lens 
is likely to contribute significantly to, firstly, understanding the problem and, secondly, 
proposing solutions. Pragmatism, combined with an MMR design, allows researchers to 
gain richer and reliable research results in understanding the problem under investigation, 
as much as research methods are traditionally bound to specific paradigms. 
 
Therefore, to investigate and propose solutions to this complex socio-technical problem 
of usable security, which has traditionally required a compromise between security and 
usability goals, the use of pragmatic assumptions was suggested. Pragmatism is seen as 
providing a different worldview, compared to the extremes catered for in interpretivism 
and positivism, by focusing on the problem to be researched and the research results 
(Creswell & Clark 2017, Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010). This paradigm allowed the 
researcher to answer a research problem that fell in neither the ‘traditional’ qualitative 
nor quantitative realms. Pragmatism was also chosen because the research design of 
choice was MMR, and previous studies have shown that pragmatism is the more appro-
priate paradigm to accommodate MMR design goals. 
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4.4 RESEARCH APPROACH 
There are mainly three approaches of reasoning to theory development in research: deduc-
tive, inductive, and abductive (Saunders et al. 2016). Deductive reasoning typically 
involves theory and hypothesis testing, evaluated through empirical observations (Gray 
2014). Deduction states that if the evidence is true, then the conclusions based on that 
evidence must also be true (Saunders et al. 2016). This approach is aligned with research 
that tests a theory by collecting data to make conclusions on an extant theory. Conversely, 
an inductive approach starts research by collecting data to reach conclusions by gener-
ating or building a theory (Saunders et al. 2016). Induction is typically used in qualitative 
research that uses data collection to explore a phenomenon that is, reasoning from given 
data to a hypothesis that explains the data (Walton 2014). Abductive reasoning essentially 
moves back and forth between being deductive and inductive (Saunders et al. 2016); that 
is, known premises (extant theory) are used to generate testable conclusions to get to the 
best explanation (Johnson & Gray 2010). Abduction is used to generate or modify theory 
by incorporating existing theory to build new or modify existing theory (Saunders et al. 
2016). Abductive reasoning is mainly associated with pragmatism; deductive reasoning 
and inductive reasoning are often aligned with positivism and interpretivism, respectively 
(Venkatesh, Brown & Bala 2013). 
 
In this study, the researcher used the abductive approach that moves back and forth 
between deductive and inductive reasoning, as this fitted in with the pragmatic MMR 
design that considers extant theory (UTAUT2) in explaining user behaviour in interaction 
with InfoSec applications. In this research, quantitative survey data was used to apply the 
UTAUT2 in the context of online banking as a case study. The objective of using 
UTAUT2 was to establish the factors that affected service adoption and to later incorpo-
rate these findings in the framework. Using interview data, the researcher applied the 
inductive approach to establish usable security design principles pertinent to online 
InfoSec applications, as deemed necessary by online banking system custodians. The 
design principles were drawn from the literature and survey data and then reinforced 
through interview data open coding. The final set of identified principles from both the 
deductive and inductive approaches formed part of the final evaluated STInfoSec frame-
work, which was the product of this research. 
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4.5 METHODOLOGICAL CHOICE 
Methodological choice is the third layer in the research onion. Here the choices include 
three main options, namely, quantitative research, qualitative research, and mixed 
methods research. These options have further options within each choice. The choice of 
a design at this layer guides the selection of a research strategy (research method) at the 
next layer. Quantitative research is often associated with positivism that predominately 
relies on numerical data (for example, survey data) analysed through quantitative analysis 
techniques (Saunders et al. 2016). Inversely, qualitative research is suitable for studying 
a particular phenomenon in depth, especially for exploratory research on a topic that is 
relatively new, with limited literature (Myers 2013). Quantitative research and qualitative 
research draw assumptions from opposite ends of the scale of various aspects, some of 
which have already been discussed in this chapter. In the purest of forms, quantitative 
research and qualitative research subscribe to objectivism and subjectivism, aligned with 
positivism and interpretivism, respectively. Quantitative and qualitative research designs 
consist of variations such as the mono-method and multi-method. The mono-method uses 
one research method in a study, while the multi-method uses two or more methods that 
are either quantitative or qualitative, but not both (Saunders et al. 2016). Based on this 
definition of multi-method research design, an example of such a design is method 
triangulation, which is discussed below. MMR, however, is a design that uses both quanti-
tative and qualitative research methods in a single study. MMR is discussed in detail later 
in this section. 
 
4.5.1 Mixed methods research 
MMR is a research design that involves philosophical assumptions that allow a mixture 
of quantitative and qualitative data in a single research study (Creswell & Clark 2017). 
The emergence of MMR approaches has brought about debate in the general research 
design discourse. There have been different views, from both ‘purist’ qualitative and 
quantitative scholars, on exactly which research paradigm MMR fits into. This has led to 
the leading qualitative research scholars and advocates (Denzin & Lincoln 2013) 
discussing the paradigm wars, noting the resistance to mixing methodologies due to 
different underlying assumptions. 
 
Creswell (2010) and Greene and Hall (2010) note the main argument for resistance to 
mixing paradigms as the uniqueness of paradigms, while other scholars such as Denzin 
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and Lincoln (2013) contend that paradigms are independent and cannot be combined. 
Creswell (2010) acknowledges the differences in paradigms – hence, the need to keep 
them separate in MMR designs. This essentially implies the use of two paradigms in 
MMR, but the introduction of the pragmatism paradigm provides a paradigm that best 
suits MMR. In the ongoing discussion of the location of mixed methods in the context of 
paradigms, Mingers (2001) argues that research methods can be separated from para-
digms and can be used critically and knowledgeably to address social problems that are 
laden with societal and individual self-understandings. 
 
Some scholars advocate the use of pragmatism as the ‘more’ appropriate paradigm of 
choice in MMR designs (Creswell & Poth 2017, Morgan 2014, Tashakkori & Teddlie 
2010), although others are still sceptical whether it is fit for purpose, as noted in Denzin 
(2012). Another contentious issue is the exact definition of MMR, which is not surprising, 
given the different views noted above. Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007:113) 
provide a broadly phrased definition of MMR as: 
“[a]n approach to knowledge (theory and practice) that attempts to consider multi-
ple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints (always including the 
standpoints of qualitative and quantitative research)”. 
 
Regardless of the conflicting arguments, there have been a number of research studies 
that have aligned MMR with the underlying philosophical assumptions of pragmatism. 
At the heart of MMR design is the notion noted by Creswell and Clark (2017) that the use 
of both quantitative and qualitative procedures allows for a deeper understanding of the 
research problem under investigation compared to the use of one method on its own. The 
data collection instruments and analysis techniques of these two approaches can either be 
used in parallel or sequentially, based on the exact MMR design chosen from a number 
of possible designs. As early as the 1980s, Kaplan and Duchon (1988) began advocating 
the productive mixture of both qualitative and quantitative research methods to yield 
richer research findings for a deeper understanding of the research problem. This 
problem-centred approach of MMR makes the design suitable for adopting pragmatism 
as a paradigm. 
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4.5.2 Triangulation 
MMR initially began as triangulation, which involves the use of multiple methods in the 
same quantitative or qualitative approach (Creswell & Clark 2017). This interpretation 
means that triangulation seeks convergence of findings through validation by using multi-
ple methods to get to the same result (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010) by showing that the 
same findings can be reached using different data sets from different methods. At a 
general level, triangulation is essentially a mixed methods design, although these methods 
belong to a single research design – quantitative or qualitative (Greene, Caracelli & 
Graham 1989). As scholars began scrutinising the definition of MMR and the maturity of 
the design through an increasing number of studies, the definition evolved to specifically 
imply mixing of quantitative and qualitative research methods in a single study. 
Triangulation, in the context of positivist research (with the belief that there is a single 
reality), means that the use of multiple methods leads to a consistent set of results (Oates 
2006). 
 
Inversely, in interpretivist research (with multiple realities), the author postulates that 
triangulation is likely to yield different findings. Denzin (2012) contends that triangula-
tion was originally meant to use multiple forms of qualitative research methods in a single 
research study, not a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. Therefore, the major 
difference between triangulation and MMR is that MMR collects different sets of data 
using multiple methods from both quantitative and qualitative approaches and uses the 
combined results to reach final interpretation. Triangulation uses multiple methods in 
either qualitative or quantitative research where the findings of one method are reinforced 
by the findings of the other method. Given the above description of triangulation, it 
follows that this research did not apply triangulation, since the different data sets in this 
MMR were not intended for validation of different findings, but to complement each other 
in answering the research questions. 
 
4.5.3 Motivations for mixed methods research 
Morgan (2014) identifies three motivations for using an MMR design: convergent 
findings, additional coverage, and sequential contributions. He describes these motiva-
tions as follows: convergent findings use quantitative and qualitative research methods to 
answer the same research question, mainly to show that both methods arrive at the same 
conclusion, thereby reinforcing the results with greater certainty. Sequential contributions 
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apply research strategies in specific order to enhance the effectiveness of one another in 
the pursuit of achieving research objectives. Additional coverage uses certain strengths 
of different strategies to achieve different objectives of the same research project. From 
the above typology, the researcher used additional coverage that sought to use different 
strengths of survey (quantitative) and exploratory case study (qualitative) strategies, with 
the main objective of identifying appropriate usable design principles to be included in 
the final framework. The insight of online banking designers, coupled with users’ percep-
tions of the service, achieved the goal of identifying design principles for final evaluation 
in the framework. 
 
4.5.4 Mixed methods research designs 
Numerous authors in the literature advocate different MMR designs. This research 
considered those methods identified by Creswell and Creswell (2017) to inform the selec-
tion. A brief discussion of each of these follows. Convergent parallel design is 
implemented by running two strands separately and integrating the results in the final 
interpretation. The embedded design has either a qualitative or a quantitative design as 
the main research design, with the other in a secondary role to enrich the overall design. 
Explanatory sequential design uses the quantitative component first, the results of which 
are used to build up on further examination with a qualitative component, before final 
interpretation. The exploratory sequential design reverses the sequence of explanatory 
design by applying qualitative research first, followed by quantitative research, before 
final interpretation. The transformative design uses both quantitative and qualitative 
research in a ‘transformative framework’ that controls the overall research project 
(Creswell & Clark 2017). The transformative framework is a mixed methods design that 
recognises that realities are constructed by various aspects such as social, cultural, 
economic, political, and ethnic values, and power determines which reality will be privi-
leged (Mertens 2007). Lastly, multiphase design consists of more than one MMR study 
that contributes to a common goal for multiple research projects. According to Creswell 
and Clark (2017), the convergent design is used to understand the topic, and it primarily 
follows the philosophy of pragmatism, with both methods having equal emphasis. 
 
Creswell and Clark (2017) specifically identify the convergent parallel MMR design as 
suitable for pragmatic philosophy, with the other designs aligned with various other para-
digms. This research used the convergent parallel MMR design, illustrated in Figure 4-3, 
with both quantitative research and qualitative research in equal standing, denoted by the 
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QUAN + QUAL notation based on Morse (2010). The quantitative and qualitative 
research strands collected different types of data that were analysed separately, and these 
analyses were then combined to feed into the overall final interpretation. The convergent 
parallel MMR design collects both quantitative and qualitative data because each 
provides a partial view of the research phenomenon (Creswell & Clark 2017). 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Convergent parallel mixed methods design 
 
The design has parallel parts, since each method collects and analyses data independently 
of the other (Creswell & Clark 2017). The actual data collection can either be sequential 
or concurrent due to logistical reasons (for example, one researcher collecting both sets 
of data), but still qualify as a parallel design – since one method does not rely on, or feed 
its findings into, the other method. In this study, the two sets of data were analysed sepa-
rately, followed by the final interpretation that combined the findings from the QUAN 
and QUAL components. Figure 4-3 includes qualitative survey data in the QUAL compo-
nent. This data was based on the open-ended questions that were part of the survey. The 
final interpretation fed into the proposed STInfoSec framework for the development of 
secure and usable online InfoSec applications. Chapter 7 presents the framework in detail. 
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4.5.5 Motivation for mixed methods in this study 
As noted in this section, MMR was used for a number of reasons. The convergent parallel 
MMR design is mainly suitable when one needs complementarity and completeness, 
which were this researcher’s motivations for applying this design in this research. The 
rationale of complementarity, as Greene et al. (1989:259) note, is “to increase the 
interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of constructs and inquiry results by both 
capitalising on inherent method strengths and counteracting inherent biases in methods 
and other sources”. The completeness of MMR allows the researcher to address the 
phenomenon under study comprehensively, through collection and analysis of data from 
both strategies in the same study (Bryman 2006). STInfoSec framework development 
based on both survey and case study interview data meant that the findings of one method 
complemented those of the other, thereby providing input from multiple perspectives. 
 
MMR design has advantages, such as bringing the best from both methods. The research 
methods used in this research allowed users and developers of online applications (using 
the case study of online banking) to raise aspects pertinent from their perspective, thus 
giving the researcher a complete picture of the research phenomenon. Through data analy-
sis, the researcher looked to see whether certain issues were raised by both groups of 
subjects (users and developers), and this provided credibility to the findings. The compre-
hensive and rich evidence gathered from both sources contributed to the development of 
a framework for secure and usable online banking user interfaces. 
 
This research, thus, followed an MMR design under the pragmatism paradigm that 
acknowledged both positivist and interpretivist assumptions to answer the research 
questions and to achieve the research objectives. The researcher adopted and applied 
simple interpretation of research choices based on the following MMR design: in the 
realm of pragmatism, the quantitative strand followed the deductive approach based on a 
quantitative survey; the qualitative strand adopted a purely inductive approach that 
collected interview data through an exploratory case study. Although there are numerous 
ways of using research choices such as paradigms, approaches, and strategies, the 
researcher adopted the simplistic and conventional meanings of the choices mentioned 
and motivated earlier, based on the ‘research onion’. Hence, the research was aligned 
strictly with either a quantitative or a qualitative method in the application of each strand. 
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4.6 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
A research strategy is a general plan that helps the researcher to investigate the research 
problem, answer research questions, and achieve research objectives in a systematic way 
(Saunders et al. 2016). Effectively, a research strategy is concerned with choosing 
research methods to be used in a study, with some scholars using the terms ‘research 
strategy’ and ‘research method’ interchangeably. Among the main research strategies to 
choose from are case study, survey, experiment, ethnography, grounded theory, and 
action research. Research strategies can be employed for exploratory, explanatory, and 
descriptive research, and each research method can be used for each of these types of 
research (Yin 2014). 
 
This research used a combination of two research strategies in an MMR design, namely, 
a survey and an exploratory case study. Yin (2014) suggests that the use of survey and 
case study strategies is more suited to research that focuses on contemporary events, that 
is, events occurring in the present. Online InfoSec is an evolving problem, with many 
facets, including socio-technical aspects. Essentially, this research took the form of a 
survey within a case study, where online banking was the case study of online applica-
tions and the survey collected responses from online banking users. The combination of 
survey and case study strategies was used to examine an explanatory causal argument of 
the many facets of usable security design in the context of online applications. As 
mentioned earlier, these facets were security and usability, which often exhibited 
conflicting goals, thus calling for striking a balance in IS design. Next in this chapter, the 
two strategies chosen for this research are discussed in detail. 
 
The time horizon of this research was cross-sectional, with data collected during a partic-
ular time (between June 2015 and September 2016). In contrast, a research study can also 
be longitudinal and follow a ‘diary’ perspective, which collects data at more than one 
point in time (Saunders et al. 2016). 
 
4.7 SURVEY RESEARCH 
A survey is a set of questions that respondents, usually individuals, are requested to 
answer (Lazar, Feng & Hochheiser 2010). This set of questions is generally referred to as 
a questionnaire; hence, a questionnaire is a data collection instrument used in a survey 
(Oxford Dictionary 2018). As a research strategy, survey research is a systematic strategy 
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for collecting data from a sample of individuals using a data collection instrument. The 
survey research strategy is not limited to only a questionnaire as a data collection instru-
ment; other acceptable instruments include observations or interviews. 
 
The survey strategy allows a researcher to gather quantitative data that is analysed 
quantitatively based on some descriptive and inferential statistical metrics. The analysis 
allows for suggestions on possible reasons for the existence of relationships between 
variables and creation of models of these relationships (Saunders et al. 2016). The survey 
strategy is mostly aligned with the deductive approach and explanatory research. Surveys 
allow a researcher to investigate more variables contiguously by collecting real-world 
data from respondents. When measuring a social phenomenon, a major drawback of the 
survey is the difficulty in unearthing the ‘deep’ causal effects of the phenomenon under 
study, as there is no room for asking follow-up questions (Lazar et al. 2010). This draw-
back can be mitigated by complementing a survey strategy with another data collection 
instrument such as interviews to ask follow-up questions. 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, compared to other developing economies and the world at large, 
the online banking adoption rate in South Africa is very low. In this research, the survey 
strategy was used to investigate the factors contributing to the lack of adoption and to 
understand the behaviour of online banking users. There are many factors influencing the 
adoption of online banking and its subsequent continued use after adoption. Hence, it was 
important to take these factors into consideration when investigating customer attitude 
and behaviour towards online banking. The questionnaire solicited users’ perceptions of 
the usability of online banking user interfaces. These perceptions allowed the researcher 
to gain insight into the online banking users’ mental models and a better understanding 
of the users’ security behaviour. The questionnaire also asked for the evaluation of online 
banking service as offered by South African banks. 
 
4.7.1 Sampling 
Given (2008) defines a sample as the portion of the target population that is chosen as 
potential data sources in research. Sampling is the process of selecting possible data 
sources from a defined larger target population, resulting in a sample size (Given 2008). 
Sampling decisions followed in a research study have a direct impact on the validity of 
the findings. Such decisions include the sampling procedure, sample size adequacy, and 
sample representativeness (Antonius 2013). Data collection that involves samples is 
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usually done with the intention of generalising the findings to the whole population. For 
generalisation to be valid, the sample must be representative of the population through 
the use of the appropriate sampling methods and other sampling decisions. 
 
Broadly, there are two types of samples: probabilistic and non-probabilistic. Probabilistic 
sampling gives each target population unit an equal opportunity for inclusion in the 
sample. Probabilistic sampling methods include simple random, systematic, cluster, and 
stratified random. Non-probabilistic sampling does not give each unit of the target popu-
lation an equal chance of selection. Non-probabilistic sampling methods include a quota, 
convenience, judgement, and samples of volunteers. 
 
Simple random sampling is the main probabilistic sampling technique that gives each unit 
in the target population an equal chance of selection. This makes simple random sampling 
the most reliable sampling method, giving a higher degree of sample representativeness, 
and this is achieved by inviting each unit in the population to participate in the research. 
Unfortunately, the simple random sampling method and other probabilistic methods are 
often impractical, as the population grows, making it difficult and costly to reach and 
invite each population unit to participate. 
 
This was true in this research; due to the large size of the target population and the diffi-
culty in accessing this population, simple random sampling was impractical and unfeasi-
ble. Access to bank clients through banks is always a challenge, even more so when such 
surveys ask about security and usability of systems. Given the geographical difficulty of 
accessing all online banking users in South Africa, as banks cannot provide such infor-
mation due to privacy policies, non-probabilistic sampling was used. As a result of the 
diverse demographics of the South African population and to ensure a more representative 
sample, the aim of the survey strategy was to collect demographic information that 
included the location of respondents, income, home language, and educational qualifica-
tions. Based on the analysis of this information, it could be guaranteed, with a certain 
level of assurance, that the sample was representative of the target population. 
 
Regardless of the drawbacks, non-probability sampling methods are useful in social 
science research when the population targets are very specific and not readily available 
(Kitchenham & Pfleeger 2002). Non-probability sampling is also acceptable when the 
population characteristics are evenly distributed, which makes any sample size large 
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enough to be representative and to generalise the findings to the larger population. This 
study used mainly non-probabilistic sampling by sending invitations to participate to 
qualifying respondents through online tools such as email and social media. Efforts to 
obtain representative samples from all nine South African provinces were made by 
distributing the survey to potential respondents who resided in all provinces. Based on 
the characteristics of the online banking users under investigation, the researcher believes 
that the sampling methods discussed below yielded an accurate and representative sample 
of the population. 
 
4.7.2 Quota sampling 
Quota sampling groups the population based on certain criteria such as gender, income, 
place of residence, or age (Antonius 2013). In this research, to obtain a representative 
sample of South African online banking users, the target population was divided into 
groups based on geographical location (provinces). The respondents were selected using 
the quota sampling method based on grouping the population by provincial location. In 
order to generalise the findings to the greater population, the intention was to collect a 
sizeable number of responses from each province. Table 4-1 provides the contributions 
of the population of the provinces to the total population and the respective contributions 
to the GDP of South Africa. 
 
Table 4-1: Mid-year population estimates 2016 
Province Population Percentage of population Percentage of GDP 
Eastern Cape 7 061 700 12.6 7.7 
Free State 2 861 600 5.1 5.1 
Gauteng 13 498 200 24.1 33.8 
KwaZulu-Natal 11 079 700 19.8 16.0 
Limpopo 5 803 900 10.4 7.3 
Mpumalanga 4 328 300 7.7 7.6 
Northern Cape 1 191 700 2.1 2.0 
North West 3 790 600 6.8 6.8 
Western Cape 6 293 200 11.3 13.7 
Total 55 908 900 100 100 
(Stats SA 2016) 
 
It has to be noted that statistics on the location of online banking users were not available, 
making it difficult to collect proportional responses in all provinces based on the provin-
cial population. Given that Gauteng province accounts for the highest percentage of the 
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population and that it is essentially the economic heart of the nation, the researcher envis-
aged collecting the majority of responses in this province, allowing for generalisation. 
The final sample size, therefore, needed to be big enough for valid analysis and to allow 
for generalisation, since the characteristics of online banking users did not necessarily 
depend on location. 
 
4.7.3 Sample size 
The target population for this research consisted of online banking users from South 
African banks. Although the exact number of unique online banking users is difficult to 
calculate, as this number varies based on the source, there are approximately three million 
online banking users in South Africa across all banks that provide digital banking 
channels based on figures released by the banks. This number includes a sizeable number 
of bank account holders who have accounts at multiple banks and have multiple online 
banking profiles. To make matters worse, banks sometimes also fail to adjust online 
banking figures to exclude business accounts. 
 
Numerous ways of calculating the sample size can be found in the literature. Based on a 
95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error, the required number of responses is 384 
for a target population above one million. A sample is a collection of representative 
research units selected from the target population. The sample size must be big enough 
and properly constituted to embody all the characteristics of the target population. 
Regarding sample size for factor analysis in quantitative data analysis, Hair Jr., Black, 
Babin, and Anderson (2014) recommend a minimum of 100 responses. Chapter 5 
provides a detailed analysis of the final sample sizes in this research. 
 
4.7.4 Questionnaire development 
The Oxford Dictionary (2018) defines a questionnaire as “[a] set of printed or written 
questions with a choice of answers, devised for the purposes of a survey or statistical 
study”. It is, therefore, an important instrument in collecting deductive data for statistical 
analysis. Questionnaires are mostly used as a survey strategy for descriptive or explana-
tory research. The questionnaire in this research consisted of mostly closed-ended ques-
tions, with three open-ended questions that asked respondents to provide any additional 
information they might deem necessary. The questionnaire consisted of six sections, as 
shown in Table 4-2, together with a detailed breakdown containing the section description 
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and number of questions in each section. The full questionnaire is included as Appendix 
E. 
 
Table 4-2: Questionnaire description 
Section Description Items 
A: Demographic details Users’ demographic information, e.g. gender & age 8 
B: General questions General banking and online banking questions, e.g. 
bank name and period of online banking usage 
4 
C: Acceptance & use Online banking acceptance and usage constructs 34 
D: Usability Online banking usability evaluation constructs 39 
E: Security & privacy Online banking security and privacy constructs 13 
F: Overall assessment Qualitative overall assessment of online banking 2 
 
The following sections provide detailed information on how the questions were 
developed based on the theoretical discussions of the constructs provided in Chapter 3. 
 
Section A: Demographic details 
The research required the collection of information about respondents to allow for 
analysis based on a number of moderating factors. Section A collected general personal 
information about the respondents. The section consisted of eight compulsory questions, 
asking for the following information that constituted the moderating factors: gender, age, 
home language, highest educational qualification, employment status, monthly income, 
location (South African province), and ethnic group. 
 
Section B: General questions 
This section asked general banking and online banking questions, which included bank, 
duration of online banking usage (experience), frequency of online banking login, and 
device(s) used to connect to online banking. These constituted additional moderating 
factors for analysis of the results. However, to avoid prejudice and for ethical reasons no 
analysis was conducted based on the bank names collected in the survey. 
 
Section C: Acceptance and use 
Section C consisted of UTAUT2 constructs. The model has been validated by numerous 
studies to measure the acceptance and continued use of online banking. UTAUT is a 
unified model of eight individual technology acceptance models. The section consisted 
of 34 items spread across eight constructs. 
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Section D: Usability 
This research postulates that usability has an effect on adoption, acceptance, and 
continued use of online InfoSec applications. The questions in this section were based on 
numerous principles identified in usability studies and, specifically, those related to 
usable security design principles. The section consisted of 39 items. These included 10 
standardised items of the system usability scale (SUS) developed by Brooke (1996) and 
assessment of six usability constructs with 29 items.  
 
Section E: Security and privacy 
Studies on usable security (discussed in Chapter 3) identified a number of design 
principles to be considered for development of secure and usable applications. This 
section had 13 items that measured security and privacy constructs. 
 
Sections C through E used an ordinal five-point Likert scale, with values as defined in 
Table 4-3. 
 
Table 4-3: The Likert scale 
Value Description 
1 Strongly disagree: the respondent definitely does not agree with the statement. 
2 Disagree: the respondent possibly does not agree with the statement. 
3 Neutral: the respondent does not have an opinion about the statement. This can 
mean that the statement is not applicable. 
4 Agree: the respondent does agree with the statement. 
5 Strongly agree: the respondent definitely does agree with the statement. 
 
Lastly, Section F solicited any additional perceptions that respondents might want to add 
by asking for the overall assessment of the online banking service based on what they 
liked and disliked most. 
 
4.7.5 Questionnaire distribution 
In an effort to reach a representative sample, the questionnaire was distributed both online 
and physically in different regions of South Africa. Respondents were invited to partici-
pate using invitations sent through email and social media that had a link to the Google 
Forms survey. Questionnaire administration was mainly done online using Google Forms, 
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and the responses were received anonymously, with additional responses obtained 
through printed questionnaires distributed physically to respondents. 
 
The survey was available online for completion for one year, with regular reminders to 
encourage participation. Invitations to participate, together with the survey link, were sent 
to University of South Africa School of Computing and College of Science, Engineering, 
and Technology staff members. Invitations were also sent to email contacts at the 
University of Fort Hare, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Central University of 
Technology, Cape Peninsula University, and University of Limpopo. Requests to partici-
pate were sent to information technology mailing groups and online discussion forums, 
which included AISSAC, SAICSIT, SACLA, MyBroadband, and the SA Forum. Ethical 
consideration for the research were discussed in section 1.6 of Chapter 1. 
 
4.7.6 Research model and hypotheses 
Section C of the survey covered UTAUT2 constructs and moderators. The research model 
was an adaptation of the latest UTAUT2 by Venkatesh et al. (2012), which explains the 
general adoption and use of information systems based on various constructs and their 
relationships. UTAUT2 is an improvement of the original UTAUT by Venkatesh et al. 
(2003), with three additional constructs, namely, hedonic motivation, price value, and 
habit, while voluntariness of use was dropped as a moderator. The proposed research 
model retained UTAUT2 constructs and provided additional moderators that were 
specific to InfoSec systems in a South African online banking context. Literature review 
in the area of user acceptance and continued use of information technology yielded a 
number of constructs that were measured by checklist items. After a thorough analysis of 
this literature, the research selected the constructs to be examined. The details of the 
research model, research hypotheses, and constructs under investigation are outlined in 
Chapter 5. The instrument intended to gather and analyse online banking users’ percep-
tions of the current online banking service. The research model included constructs that 
were identified to be pertinent to investigate the usability of online banking interfaces in 
the South African context, a context that included users with a diverse cultural and 
language background. 
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4.7.7 Instrument validity and reliability 
Validity of a survey instrument simply means that the instrument measures what it is 
supposed to measure, while reliability is the ability of an instrument to measure the same 
phenomenon consistently, assuming that what is being measured remains constant 
(Antonius 2013). It addresses both the content and detail of the research issues under 
investigation. This can be achieved by conducting an extensive literature review during 
the development of the instrument items and using standardised survey items from 
previous research studies. The scale of reliability ranges from 0.00 to 1.00, denoting very 
unreliable and perfectly reliable, respectively (Gray 2014). Cronbach’s alpha is an objec-
tive measure of instrument reliability that IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) is capable of computing. Reliability and validity are closely related, as 
an instrument can only be reliable if it is valid, but its validity does not depend on its 
reliability. 
 
4.7.8 Quantitative data analysis 
The quantitative survey data was analysed using IBM SPSS and Amos software packages. 
These packages are capable of performing a number of descriptive and other advanced 
statistical analyses, including factor analysis and regression and correlation analyses of 
model variables. These techniques allow for the investigation of relationships among 
independent and dependent variables in a research model. Amos comes as an additional 
module to SPSS and provides graphics features to draw network diagrams depicting 
relationships among variables as analysed by various structural equation modelling tech-
niques. Chapter 5 provides details of quantitative data analysis techniques applied in this 
study. 
 
4.8 CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
A case study is appropriate in explaining some present circumstance and understanding 
some social phenomenon. Lazar et al. (2010) define ‘case study’ as “an in-depth study of 
a specific instance (or small number of instances) within a specific real-life context”. It 
helps in understanding complex social phenomena (Yin 2014). According to Creswell 
and Poth (2017), there are mainly three kinds of case studies: an intrinsic case study, an 
instrumental case study, and a collective case study. An intrinsic case study is a case study 
chosen for its uniqueness, irrespective of its applicability in other situations, while an 
instrumental case study is one that studies a phenomenon that can be applied to other 
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similar situations (Creswell & Poth 2017). A collective case study studies one issue of 
concern in multiple cases (Creswell & Poth 2017). The case study in this research could 
be classified as an instrumental case study because the resulting framework was envis-
aged to be applied, with minimum adaptation, to similar situations to develop secure and 
usable online InfoSec applications. 
 
Research case studies can be applied for discovery in exploratory research or for testing, 
for explanation, or for comparison in explanatory research (Myers 2013). The above 
implies that case studies can be applied in traditionally quantitative studies that attempt 
to test theory and traditional qualitative studies that generate theory. This research used 
exploratory case study research to complement the overall findings of the research study. 
The case study assisted in investigating the perceptions of online banking custodians with 
regard to taking user behaviour into account in the development of online InfoSec applica-
tions. 
 
Online banking was chosen as the case study for online information system security 
applications. The researcher envisaged that the proposed framework would be applicable 
to other online information system security applications that had the same characteristics 
as online banking. These characteristics included the need for security and privacy and 
user interfaces that were both usable and catered for UX, while providing core function-
alities. These characteristics foster adoption and continued use of such applications. 
Given the arrival of numerous online applications that convey confidential and sensitive 
personal information for both individuals and organisations through the internet, designs 
that cater for security and privacy are vital. At the same time, these applications need to 
provide users with additional non-functional aspects of the systems such as satisfaction 
and user experiences that make users want to continue using them. An investigation that 
includes obtaining users’ perceptions of the current state of affairs, as well as the 
challenges developers of these systems face, can help provide a complete picture of the 
problem. 
 
This research, therefore, investigated human behaviour in interaction with InfoSec appli-
cations, specifically the effect of usability and UX attributes during design, to enable users 
with diverse backgrounds to effectively and efficiently use InfoSec applications. To 
understand this phenomenon, the researcher selected online banking service as a single 
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instrumental case study, and the findings could be applicable to other InfoSec applications 
with the same characteristics. 
 
There are numerous sources of data in case study research, which include observation, 
interviews, digital media, and documentary analysis. This research collected data using 
interviews with online banking service personnel as participants selected from South 
African financial institutions. The target participants were practitioners in InfoSec 
application design, including usability and UX practitioners in InfoSec applications 
development. These participants were selected because they had knowledge of decisions 
made in the process of developing these applications, and such knowledge would assist 
in achieving the main objective of this research. 
 
4.8.1 Interviews 
Interviews in research are one of the main sources of data for qualitative research 
methods. An interview mainly involves the human interaction between an interviewee 
(usually the research participant) and the interviewer (usually the researcher). The 
interviewer asks the interviewee predetermined questions. Unlike in a self-administered 
survey, in an interview, the researcher can ask follow-up questions to obtain more insight 
into a particular issue. Interviews can either be quantitative (structured) or qualitative, 
where qualitative interviewing includes unstructured, semi-structured, and in-depth 
interviewing (Yin 2016). 
 
Structured interviews are similar to the questionnaires often applied in quantitative data 
collection, where all participants are asked a set of predetermined and standardised 
questions by the interviewer (Gray 2014). Structured interviews usually use closed-ended 
questions that have predefined responses, and they are mainly used to ask interviewees 
the same set of questions in the same order (Yin 2016). 
 
Semi-structured interviews do not use a standardised set of questions; instead, the 
interviewer prepares an interview schedule, with a list of questions and themes to be 
addressed in an interview (Gray 2014). In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer may 
decide not to ask all the questions during an interview and may also ask additional probing 
questions that are not on the interview schedule. This allows the researcher to probe for 
additional information that was not originally planned for before the interview session, 
giving additional insights into the research problem. Interview questions are asked in any 
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order from one interview to the next based on the flow of the conversation. This requires 
audio recording for transcription into text before analysis in order to capture all the inter-
view data. 
 
Unstructured interviews have no predetermined interview questions, and usually, no time 
limit is set, allowing the interviewee to freely say anything he or she wants (Myers 2013). 
During breaks in conversation, the interviewer improvises to come up with the next 
question to ask the interviewee. The lack of a predetermined list of questions means that 
the interviewer needs a deep and clear understanding of the aspects explored in an inter-
view session (Saunders et al. 2016). 
 
This research used semi-structured interviews to solicit views from InfoSec design 
experts in online banking applications. The specific target participants were InfoSec 
technicians for online banking applications, InfoSec mid-level management from finan-
cial institutions, and general usability and UX practitioners. The interviews sought to 
gather information about the standards and best practices employed by financial institu-
tions in addressing usability and UX issues in information systems. Interviews enable 
qualitative researchers to get closer to research subjects and get deeper insight from the 
participants’ perspective into the research problem under investigation (Denzin & Lincoln 
2013). 
 
4.8.2 Purposive sampling 
Purposive sampling allows the researcher to choose a sample based on some features of 
the study, mostly useful in selecting participants in interviews or focus groups (Silverman 
2014). It is virtually synonymous with qualitative research, and numerous sampling 
strategies are classified as purposive sampling, including stakeholder sampling, typical 
case sampling, and criterion sampling, to mention but a few (Given 2008). Stakeholder 
sampling involves identifying specific stakeholders in a study that, for instance, evaluates 
a specific policy development programme. Typical case sampling sets out to identify a 
case study because it is not unusual to study the simplest case for the phenomenon under 
investigation (Given 2008). 
 
This research used criterion sampling to select interview participants in this case study, 
which allowed the researcher to choose participants who fit a specific criterion that 
contributed to attaining the research objectives (Given 2008). Interview participants were 
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selected based on their InfoSec employment in financial institutions, especially those 
involved in the design and development of online banking systems. The sample came 
from the major banks in South Africa. These participants were chosen because they had 
knowledge of how online banking systems were developed and could give insight into 
the decision-making process involved with regard to InfoSec, usability, and UX. 
 
4.8.3 Development of interview questions 
The interview questions used for qualitative data collection are provided as Appendix F. 
The questions were developed based on the literature on information system development 
and usable security design best practices. The questions solicited the current practices 
based on local and international standards and local legislation governing the financial 
industry. Also included in the questions were aspects of legacy information technology 
(IT) systems, InfoSec, usability, UX design considerations, and user awareness and 
training initiatives as they apply to online information system development. 
 
4.8.4 Qualitative data analysis 
Qualitative data is analysed using, for example, the ATLAS.ti software package that 
performs content analysis to uncover categories by counting the number of occurrences 
of these in text such as transcribed interview data. ATLAS.ti generates unique codes from 
text, which the researcher can categorise into themes for interpretation. Chapter 6 gives 
details of the qualitative data analysis techniques applied in this study – framework 
analysis. 
 
4.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This research involved collecting both quantitative and qualitative data to obtain the 
views and perceptions of users and developers of online banking. As such, the chosen 
paradigm was pragmatic to accommodate both quantitative and qualitative philosophical 
assumptions. Using the research onion, the chapter outlined choices made in each stage 
of the research process. Given the MMR design in this study, the researcher chose the 
abductive reasoning research approach, which moved back and forth between deductive 
and inductive reasoning. The two research strategies in this research fell in both the 
quantitative (survey) and qualitative (case study) research methodologies, thereby 
advancing the application of the research paradigm of pragmatism. Using a convergent 
parallel mixed methods design, the two strands collected and analysed the data separately 
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for an integrated interpretation. Structural equation modelling and framework analysis 
were the data analysis techniques used on the quantitative and qualitative data, 
respectively. These are covered individually in Chapters 5 and 6. 
-- ooo -- 
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CHAPTER 5 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 5-1: The research roadmap 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4 outlined the blueprint for how the research was conducted, including data 
sources and collection techniques in an MMR design. This chapter is the first of the two 
data collection and analysis chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to present the 
quantitative part of the MMR design, highlighting all decisions pertaining to data collec-
tion and analysis from the tools and techniques used. The chapter first provides the 
theoretical framework that guided the data collection and outlines the postulated research 
hypotheses to be tested. The data collection section begins with determining the type of 
data required, followed by the selection of the data collection tools and determination of 
the sample from the population. This is followed by a discussion of research validity and 
reliability, including reliability analysis of the quantitative data collection instrument. 
Descriptive analysis is furnished that provides an overview of the respondents, followed 
by inferential analysis that presents a structural model of the theoretical framework of the 
research. Lastly, the chapter outlines the final interpretation of the results and discusses 
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5.2 DATA COLLECTION 
Quantitative data was collected using survey research, with a questionnaire as the data 
collection instrument. (See Appendix E.) The instrument was distributed through the 
Google Forms online survey tool. The landing page of the survey tool contained a short 
description of the research and the consent form, where respondents were required to tick 
a mandatory checkbox to accept and agree to participate in the research. For ethical 
reasons, respondents were informed of the anonymous nature of their participation in the 
research and their right to withdraw from participation at any time before submitting 
responses. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of the following sections: demographic details of respond-
ents, general online banking questions, online banking acceptance and use construct state-
ments, usability constructs (including a 10-item system usability scale), security and 
privacy statements, and qualitative overall assessment questions. Current online banking 
users with any of the South African banks were eligible survey respondents. The raw data 
exported to a Google spreadsheet was transferred to an IBM SPSS Statistics 24 data file 
for data cleaning and preparation for statistical analysis. (See Appendix G for a sample 
of responses.) 
 
There were 540 valid and usable responses. This chapter provides details of the statistical 
analysis techniques implemented and their respective findings. In terms of sample size, 
there are significantly different opinions on the appropriate sample size in factor analysis 
and other advanced statistical analyses, which give rise to varying guidelines and rules of 
thumb on sample size. Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2014) rule of thumb suggests at least 300 
responses, while Hair Jr. et al. (2014) recommend at least 100 responses. A more detailed 
guideline is given by Comrey and Lee (1992): 100 (poor), 200 (fair), 300 (good), 500 
(very good), and 1 000 or more (excellent). This research reports on a sample of 540 
responses, which is regarded as a very good sample size based on these guidelines. 
 
5.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
The theoretical model considered three aspects of online banking, namely, adoption and 
continued use, usability, and security. Online banking adoption was evaluated using the 
unified model of IT adoption, UTAUT2. Usability was measured using two methods: first 
the system usability scale with 10 standardised survey items and then six usability 
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constructs consisting of 29 survey items. Security and privacy were evaluated using 13 
survey items divided into two constructs. Data analysis was conducted using the IBM 
SPSS, also known just as SPSS, which is a software package that provides tools for statis-
tical analysis of quantitative data. IBM SPSS Statistics 24 was used, in conjunction with 
the IBM SPSS Amos 24 software package, which allows for modelling of network 
diagrams depicting relationships among variables. 
 
5.3.1 Validity 
The validity of a survey instrument is about accuracy (Nardi 2014), which simply means 
that the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure (Antonius 2013). Validity 
mainly depends on what is being measured, since a tool might not be valid for a certain 
measure, but perfectly valid in another study. Validity can be achieved by using a tool 
that has been accepted as a standard in assessing a phenomenon. There are three main 
types of validity: content validity, construct validity, and criterion (concurrent) validity. 
Content validity is usually consensus developed among researchers on whether a tool 
measures what it is supposed to measure (Nardi 2014). Construct validity is the accuracy 
of a set of items or questions measuring a construct, usually only achieved during data 
analysis (Nardi 2014). Criterion validity compares findings of construct measurement 
with similar external criteria or standards (Nardi 2014). Statistically, criterion validity can 
be measured using Pearson’s r in IBM SPSS. 
 
5.3.2 Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with two aspects, namely, consistency and replicability (Antonius 
2013). Consistency is the ability of an instrument to measure the same phenomenon 
consistently, assuming that what is being measured remains constant (Nardi 2014). 
Replicability means that if another measurement is made by a different researcher in 
different, but similar, circumstances, roughly the same results will be obtained (Antonius 
2013), that is to say, the instrument addresses both the content and detail of the research 
issues under investigation. This can be achieved by conducting an extensive literature 
review during the development of the research instrument items and using standardised 
survey items from previous research studies. 
 
Reliability and validity are closely related, as an instrument can only be reliable if it is 
valid, but its reliability does not depend on its validity. As Hair Jr. et al. (2014:94) put it, 
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“[r]eliability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for validity”. The scale of reliabil-
ity ranges from 0.00 to 1.00, denoting totally unreliable and perfectly reliable, respec-
tively (Gray 2014). The reliability of instrument items measures the degree to which a set 
of items that predict a construct is internally consistent based on how highly interrelated 
the items are to one another (Hair Jr. et al. 2014). 
 
The survey instrument was tested for reliability to ensure that the instrument measured 
correct, relevant, and related data before conducting more advanced statistical analyses. 
In this research, Cronbach’s alpha (α), also known as the alpha coefficient, was used to 
test the reliability of the overall instrument as well as that of all the constructs. Cronbach’s 
alpha was extracted from SPSS, and the results showed that the reliability of the whole 
measuring instrument was 0.895, as indicated in Table 5-1. Thus, the questionnaire was 
deemed reliable and could be used. 
 
Table 5-1: Research instrument reliability statistics 
Cronbach’s alpha 
Cronbach’s alpha based 
on standardised items 
Items 
0.895 0.920 102 
 
Cronbach’s alpha obtained for the whole instrument showed that the instrument used in 
this research was reliable, as it was above the threshold value of 0.70 suggested by other 
researchers (Pallant 2013). The research, furthermore, investigated the reliability of each 
construct independently. Table 5-2 shows the results of Cronbach’s alpha of each 
construct as extracted from SPSS, ranging from 0.196 to 0.929. The theory suggests the 
deletion of construct items that cause the reliability of the construct to be low and below 
the threshold value of 0.70 (Pallant 2013); the constructs with values below 0.70 are high-
lighted in Table 5-2. However, in this research, the decision was made not to delete, but 
to carry over, each construct for further analysis. It is important to note that this decision 
was based on the fact that, when measuring model fitness in structural equation modelling 
(SEM) using Amos, one or more construct items and latent variables are highly likely to 
be deleted. This is in order to achieve model fitness; hence, in such scenarios, deletion 
priority would be given to construct items, followed by latent variables, as suggested 
during reliability testing, in that order. However, based on model fitness tests conducted 
later (See section 5.6.1), the need to delete any construct was avoided as the individual 
measurement models passed goodness of fit. 
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Cronbach’s alpha based 





0.764 0.811 5 
Effort expectancy (EE) 0.870 0.872 6 
Social influence (SI) 0.876 0.881 4 
Facilitating conditions (FC) 0.578 0.679 4 
Hedonic motivation (HM) 0.880 0.882 4 
Price value (PV) 0.929 0.930 3 
Habit (H) 0.715 0.735 5 
Behavioural intention (BI) 0.704 0.711 3 
Usability 
System usability scale 
(SUS) 
0.555 0.536 10 
Learnability (UL) 0.877 0.886 5 
User suitability (UUS) 0.518 0.600 3 
Satisfaction (US) 0.843 0.855 5 
Availability (UA) 0.196 0.196 5 
Errors (UE) 0.632 0.636 5 
Help and documentation 
(UHD) 
0.676 0.676 6 
Security and privacy 
Security (S) 0.734 0.737 6 
Privacy (P) 0.911 0.913 7 
 
Based on the results of reliability in Table 5-2, the latent variables to be considered first 
for deletion were availability (usability), user suitability (usability), system usability 
scale, facilitating conditions, behavioural intention, errors (usability), and help and 
documentation (usability), respectively. 
 
Table 5-2 shows that the Cronbach’s alpha values for UTAUT2 constructs were mostly 
above the threshold except for FC and BI. This is so because UTAUT2 is a validated 
model with constructs that have been refined over a period of time through numerous 
studies. Inversely, the subjective nature of usability makes the construct reliability fluctu-
ate based on the exact system being evaluated by generic constructs. As such, the 
constructs are not validated across different systems. Therefore, the current study evalu-
ated online banking using generic construct items that were not intended for online 
banking specifically, resulting in reliability scores below the threshold. This study was 
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the first to develop construct items for online banking, and these can be refined in subse-
quent studies towards a validated set of constructs for online banking evaluation. 
 
5.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics allow a large quantity of data to be summarised in limited numerical 
values, highlighting the most important data features, for example, the percentage of male 
versus female respondents. Frequency tables are the basic form of descriptive statistics. 
The metrics in descriptive statistics include mean, median, standard deviation, percen-
tiles, variance, and correlation coefficient. This section outlines the most basic frequency 
statistics from the sample of the population as extracted from valid survey responses. 
 
The research considered those demographic factors that were predicted to have an 
explanatory value for the research and to show differences in behaviour and perceptions 
among groups. Demographic variables served the purpose of providing a means to explain 
the difference in adoption or use of information and communications technology (ICT) 
among different groups. Other researchers such as Venkatesh et al. (2012) view demo-
graphic factors as having a moderating effect on certain hypothesised relations – 
therefore, terming them moderating factors. 
 
The UTAUT2 model that informed this research investigated age, gender, and experience 
as leading factors moderating various relationships in the model. Based on the literature 
and in the context of online banking, additional moderating factors were considered. 
These moderating variables included education, employment, ethnicity, and device. 
Moderating factors allow for an enhanced analysis that separates respondents into differ-
ent groups and reports on significant differences in behaviour. Table 5-3 shows an extract 
of the frequencies (the complete table with all factors measured is presented as Appendix 
H) from the survey based on the demographic factors and general online banking sections 
of the total sample size of 540. 
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Table 5-3: Sample frequencies (n=540) 




Male 314 58.1 58.1 
Female 226 41.9 100.0 
Age 
Below 20 years 26 4.8 4.8 
20-29 years 122 22.6 27.4 
30-39 years 195 36.1 63.5 
40-49 years 88 16.3 79.8 




3 0.6 0.6 
Matric 58 10.7 11.3 
Post-matric 
certificate/diploma 
124 23.0 34.3 
Degree 104 19.3 53.5 
Postgraduate 
degree 
239 44.3 97.8 
Other 12 2.2 100.0 
Experience 
Below 1 year 39 7.2 7.2 
1-2 years 46 8.5 15.7 
3-4 years 96 17.8 33.5 
5-6 years 97 18.0 51.5 
7 years and above 262 48.5 100.0 
Use frequency 
Every day 185 34.3 34.3 
Once a week 214 39.6 73.9 
Once in two weeks 71 13.2 87.1 
Once a month 65 12.0 99.1 
Other 5 0.9 100.0 
 
More than half of the 540 respondents (58.1%) were males, while 41.9% were females. 
The largest proportion (36.1%) of respondents came from the 30-to-39-year-old age 
group, followed by those aged between 20 and 29 years (with 22.6%). Thus, in this 
research, 75.4% of respondents were aged below 40 years, with 20.2% aged 50 years and 
above. 
 
In terms of education, 63.5% of respondents had a degree or higher qualification, with a 
significant portion of 44.3% holding a postgraduate degree. Only three respondents indi-
cated that they had no formal qualification, while 12 respondents selected ‘other’ under 
qualification. 
 
The results, furthermore, showed that the majority of respondents (66.5%) had five years 
or more experience of using online banking, while 48.5% had more than seven years’ 
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experience. McLellan, Muddimer, and Peres (2012) found that users with more extensive 
experience of a product tended to provide more favourable system usability scale scores 
than novice users. This finding was regardless of the domain product type. Hertzum, 
Molich, and Jacobsen (2014) investigated the evaluator effect on system usability using 
19 experienced participants. Their findings showed that evaluators picked up different 
sets of positive and negative usability aspects of the system. The implication of this result 
was that experience acquired in the use of online banking would play an influential role 
in the perceptions of users towards the technology and that such respondents would 
provide valuable perceptions compared to those of novice users. 
 
Use frequency results showed that a good number of participants (39.6%) used online 
banking once a week, followed by 34.3% of respondents who used it daily. In total, close 
to three-quarters (73.9%) of respondents used online banking at least once a week. Few 
participants in this research (12.0%) used online banking once a month. These were likely 
to include formally employed individuals who used online banking to do major transac-
tions that occurred probably once a month after payday, such as monthly household bill 
payments. Further analysis of use frequency revealed that the majority of 185 daily users 
(83.8%) mainly used a mobile device to access online banking, while almost half (49.7%) 
used all three devices and only 23.2% used a single device. 
 
The following frequencies are excluded from Table 5-3 but provided as part of Appendix 
H. The results showed that English was well represented, with 44.6% of the participants 
having English as their home language, followed by Afrikaans with 21.6%. It is important 
to note that 6.9% of the respondents did not indicate their home language; these could be 
foreign language speakers who opted not mention their home language. 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate their employment status based on five categories. The 
overwhelming majority were formally employed at 79.8%, followed by 9.8% who were 
self-employed. Regrouping of employment status created two distinct groups – employed 
(89.6%) or unemployed (10.4%), with unemployed consisting of retired and other. 
 
The research also investigated the income of the respondents. The results indicated that 
most respondents (23.7%) earned between R30 000 and R39 999 per month, followed by 
22.8% of the respondents who earned more than R50 000. When treated as a binomial 
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variable with the lower-income group earning less than R30 000 and the high earners 
earning R30 000 and more, the results showed that the majority (55%) were high earners. 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the province of their current location, and the research 
indicated that all South African provinces were represented. Gauteng had the highest 
representation with 46.3% of the respondents, followed by the Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal, which had 25.7% and 10.9%, respectively. North West and Mpumalanga 
had the fewest respondents with only 0.9% and 0.6%, respectively. White ethnicity was 
the largest group with 43.3%, followed by black with 36.7% of respondents, while 15.7% 
and 4.3% belonged to the Indian/Asian and coloured ethnic groupings, respectively. 
 
The survey asked respondents to identify the bank on which they based their responses. 
A total of 97.8% of respondents were clients from South Africa’s five major banks. Due 
to ethical concerns, no analysis beyond frequencies is reported on bank names. Generally, 
the number of respondents for all banks was widely spaced, which showed that the 
research tried to balance the number of respondents for each bank. Therefore, the modera-
tion results obtained by this research were likely to be representative of the population of 
South African banks represented in this sample. 
 
The research also asked respondents to list the devices they frequently used to access 
online banking. The results showed that mobile devices were the most frequently used 
device (73.7%) to access online banking, followed closely by personal computers with 
72.2%, while laptops/portable computers had a percentage of 61.3%. Furthermore, 70% 
of respondents used more than one device to access online banking, with 37.4% using all 
three devices, and 30% used a single device. Regrouping device combinations according 
to respondents who used one device as opposed to those who used more than one device, 
the results showed that 75.2% of respondents used more than one device to access online 
banking, while only 24.8% used only one device for all their online banking activities. 
 
5.5 INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 
Inferential statistics consists of two main techniques, namely, estimation and hypothesis 
testing, which are used to draw conclusions about the population based on sample data. 
This section outlines the estimation parameters applied in this research to generalise the 
findings to the general population of online banking users in South Africa. 
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Firstly, estimation is concerned with the margin of error, which acknowledges the lack of 
precision in the measurements and conclusions of this research, as a sample is likely to 
differ from the population (Hair Jr. et al. 2014). Specifically, probability of error measures 
the risk that research estimates are wrong; this is complementary to the level of confi-
dence, as added together they are equal to 100%. All analyses and estimates in this 
research were based on a 5% probability of error and 95% level of confidence. 
 
Secondly, hypothesis testing provides a means to make propositions about the population 
based on sample findings and to test for acceptance or rejection of such statements. 
Hypothesis testing is described in the structural equation modelling (SEM) section of this 
chapter – all based on the above-mentioned estimation parameters. Before going into 
SEM analysis, the building blocks of SEM, which include principal component analysis 
and factor analysis, are outlined. 
 
Quantitative data analysis often involves the investigation of the relationships among 
multiple variables to postulate a research phenomenon. This gives rise to the need for 
multivariate analysis, which refers to any statistical technique that analyses data involving 
more than one variable (Rencher & Christensen 2012). Multivariate data analysis is made 
easy through an array of statistical packages that utilise the inexpensive computing power 
of today. Factor analysis is one such multivariate data analysis technique. Hair Jr. et al. 
(2014) define factor analysis as “an interdependence technique whose primary purpose 
is to define the underlying structure among the variables in the analysis”. Factor analysis 
essentially provides tools for analysing the structure of the correlations among many 
variables by identifying sets of variables (also known as factors) that are significantly 
interrelated (Hair Jr. et al. 2014). Strictly speaking, there are two types of factor analysis, 
namely, exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis, both of which use 
principal component analysis as factor extraction technique. 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a method for extracting constructs from a given 
set of variables (survey items) based on the correlation among items (Williams, Onsman 
& Brown 2010). In essence, a principal component is a linear combination of observed 
variables that are optimally weighted (O’Rourke & Hatcher 2013). PCA differs from 
factor analysis in that, while principal components are linear combinations of the 
observed variables, factor analysis factors are the observed variables viewed as linear 
combinations of the underlying factors (O’Rourke & Hatcher 2013). In factor analysis, 
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PCA is essentially used for factor extraction. The difference between PCA and factor 
analysis is that factor analysis assumes the existence of an underlying causal model, while 
PCA is simply a variable reduction technique (Hair Jr., Hult, Ringle & Sarstedt 2016). 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is a part of factor analysis that extracts the underlying 
factor structure from a large set of data (O’Rourke & Hatcher 2013). Factors in EFA are 
derived from analysis of data, not before analysis or from existing theory (Brown 2015). 
EFA is a technique in factor analysis whose overarching goal is to identify the underlying 
relationships among measured variables. The most common type of factor analysis is R 
factor analysis, which analyses a set of variables to identify the dimensions that are latent 
(or concealed) (Hair Jr. et al. 2014). This research was based on an existing theoretical 
framework with known variables; hence, confirmatory factor analysis was the most 
appropriate technique. 
 
In confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the researcher specifies both the number of factors 
and the set of variables for each factor loading before computing the analysis (Brown 
2015). CFA is, therefore, appropriate to testing a proposed model as part of structural 
equation modelling. As such, CFA has hypotheses based on extant theory with regard to 
the factors that describe the proposed model and needs to be based on a strong conceptual 
model (Brown 2015). Essentially, CFA is a component in SEM that provides the measure-
ment part of SEM, which shows relationships among latent variables and their indicators. 
SEM, furthermore, provides the structural (path analysis) component part, which shows 
how the latent variables of interest are related (Hair Jr. et al. 2016). 
 
5.6 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING 
SEM is a popular multivariate analysis technique, as it can simultaneously estimate multi-
ple dependence relationships and incorporate multiple measures for each concept (Hair 
Jr. et al. 2014). The ability to simultaneously estimate multiple dependence relationships 
makes SEM more powerful than other tools such as multiple regression, factor analysis, 
and discriminant analysis. SEM is an extension of several other multivariate techniques, 
including multiple regression analysis and factor analysis (Hair Jr. et al. 2014), which are 
building blocks to the more advanced SEM analysis. Hence, before going into the details 
of the SEM technique, brief descriptions of the other analysis techniques that are building 
blocks of SEM are given. 
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SEM depicts relationships among constructs, which are dependent and independent varia-
bles, involved in the analysis. SEM consists of two models: the measurement model that 
shows how measured variables represent constructs and the structural model that shows 
how constructs are related to one another (Hair Jr. et al. 2014). The measurement model 
is also referred to as confirmatory factor analysis. Constructs are unobservable or latent 
factors that are represented by multiple variables (Hair Jr. et al. 2016). SEM depicts the 
relationships in a model, which is essentially a representation of a theory. The SEM model 
depicts constructs as ovals or circles and measured variables as squares or rectangles. A 
dependence relationship is shown by means of a solid straight arrow from an independent 
variable to a dependent variable, while a correlational relationship is depicted through a 
curved double arrow. Selim (2005) posits that the measurement model is assessed for 
fitness and fixed first before the structural equation model is examined. 
 
SEM is a model that specifies interdependent relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables. The hypothesised relationships between latent variables, also called 
constructs, are called structural models. Ho (2006) advocates that SEM has the advantage 
of taking into consideration the strength of multiple regression analysis, factor analysis, 
and multivariate ANOVA in a single model that can be evaluated statistically. In the same 
regard, SEM has the advantage of testing both the hypothesised paths and possible 
relationships among the model constructs (Selim 2003). Furthermore, SEM has the ability 
to test for mediating relationships between predictors and an outcome (Blanthorne, Jones-
Fraser & Almer 2006). 
 
SEM has many uses. In this research, SEM was used for theory testing based on theorised 
concepts on online banking acceptance and multigroup analysis based on moderating 
factors. Other SEM uses that did not form part of this investigation include 
mediation/tests of indirect effects, longitudinal models, and multilevel nested modelling. 
A number of goodness-of-fit measurement models generated from Amos were extracted 
and reported on. Where maximum goodness of fit was not achieved, the measurement 
models were modified by means of covarying different parameters, treating other param-
eters as free parameters, and deleting relationships that had low regression weights as 
suggested by Amos. The research reported on chi-squared (2), root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), goodness-of-fit index (GFI) statis-
tics, and standardised root mean square residual (SRMR). According to Kline (2015), 
there are a number of fit indices that one can use; however, since there is no agreed 
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standard number of fit indices to be used, studies should use at least three, provided the 
following mandatory ones are included: chi-squared (2), CFI, and RMSEA. In addition 
to the mandatory ones, the research also incorporated GFI and SRMR. Therefore, this 
research reported on five fit indices. Table 5-4 shows a summary of each of the five fit 
indices and their threshold values as extracted from Arbuckle (2014).  
 
Table 5-4: Fit indices threshold values 




2 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is too large and out of the range of 




CFI CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this shows good fit. 
RMSEA 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this suggests that the 
model needs modification. 
SRMR RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this shows 
good fit. 
GFI GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this shows good fit. 
 
It is important to note that each fit index has its own threshold that should be met for the 
measurement model to be classified as of good fit. Appendix I gives detailed information 
about each of the measurement models and the results of fit indices. 
 
5.6.1 Summary of measurement models 
In SEM, the first step was the measurement of individual constructs (latent variables) 
using measured variables (survey questions), which yielded measurement models for 
each construct (Hair Jr. et al. 2014). This section summarises these measurement models, 
with details of each presented in Appendix I. The second step incorporated the measure-
ment models in a single structural model with path analysis that illustrated the relationship 
between constructs. This is provided in Section 5.6.2. The figures and tables for each 
construct and measurement model are provided in Appendix I. The measurement models 
of the latent variables consisted of observable variables that were measured by means of 
a five-point Likert scale. The sections below give a discussion of each measurement 
model based on fit indices, with reference to figures and tables in Appendix I, including 
the verdict on goodness-of-fit for inclusion in the final SEM model. The abbreviations 
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assigned to the constructs are used throughout this chapter, including in figures and tables 
that illustrate the SEM model. 
 
Testing of performance expectancy (PE) model 
The results in Table I-1 showed that the fit indices CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the only 
indices that showed good fit of the model, while model modification would be 
recommended for the rest of the fit indices (2 and RMSEA). Taken together, the fit 
indices indicated that the model was not a good fit and needed improvement. In order to 
modify the measurement model so that it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had 
the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. After a 
rerun, the modified measurement model showed a good model fit for all five indices. 
 
Testing of effort expectancy (EE) model 
Table I-4 shows that the fit indices CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the only indices that 
showed good fit of the model, while model modification would be recommended for the 
rest of the fit indices (2 and RMSEA). Even though more than half of the fitness test 
showed a good fit, a better model could be achieved by modifying the models that 
suggested modification. Table I-6 shows the extracted fit indices, and taken together, the 
fit indices indicated a good model fit. 
 
Testing of social influence (SI) model 
The results in Table I-7 showed that the fit indices CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the only 
indices that showed good fit of the model, while model modification would be recom-
mended for the rest of the fit indices (2 and RMSEA). Taken together, the fit indices 
indicated that the model was not a good fit and needed improvement. After a rerun, the 
modified model became poorer than it had been before modification; therefore, the 
researcher reverted to the original model, as three out of five indices showed good fit. 
 
Testing of facilitating conditions (FC) model 
The results in Table I-8 showed that SRMR and GFI were the only fit indices that showed 
good fit of the model, while model modification would be recommended for the rest of 
the fit indices (2, CFI, and RMSEA). Taken together, the fit indices indicated that the 
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model was not a good fit and needed improvement. The measurement model was rerun, 
and the fit indices taken together showed a good model fit for the modified model. 
 
Testing of hedonic motivation (HM) model 
The results in Table I-11 showed that three out of five indices showed good fit, while two 
indices suggested model modification. CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the indices that showed 
good fit, while 2 and RMSEA suggested model modification. After modification of the 
model, the fit indices indicated a good model fit. 
 
Testing of price value (PV) model 
The results in Table I-14 showed that only two models had a good fit, that is, SRMR and 
GFI; the rest suggested model modification. The 2 value showed degrees of freedom of 
zero. According to Kline (2015), when the degrees of freedom are zero, it means that 
there is no way to affirm or reject the model; it means that the data have no ‘freedom’ to 
vary, and there is no ‘freedom’ to conduct research with this data set. Therefore, this 
measurement model was not used in the structural model. 
 
Testing of habit (H) model 
The results in Table I-15 showed that none of the fit indices showed a good fit – hence, 
suggesting modification. In order to modify the measurement model so that it could fit, 
pairs of residual covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and 
treated as free parameters. The measurement model was rerun, with the resulting modified 
model showing a good model fit. 
 
Testing of behavioural intention (BI) model 
The results in Table I-18 showed that three models had a good fit, that is, CFI, SRMR, 
and GFI, while the other two suggested model modification. The 2 value showed degrees 
of freedom of zero. As mentioned earlier, when the degrees of freedom are zero, it means 
that there is no way to affirm or reject the model (Kline 2015). It means that the data have 
no ‘freedom’ to vary and that there is no ‘freedom’ to conduct research with this data set. 
However, because the construct BI was a mediator of several variables from the original 
UTAUT model, this model could not be rejected; therefore, the research used it as is in 
the structural model. 
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Testing of usability-learnability (UL) model 
The results in Table I-19 showed that two fit indices – SRMR and GFI – out of the five 
measure-fit indices showed a good fit. Three of the fit indices, namely, CFI, RMSEA, and 
2, suggested model modification. After treating the identified modification indices as 
free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and the fit indices indicated a good 
model fit. 
 
Testing of usability-user suitability (UUS) model 
The results in Table I-22 showed that only two models had a good fit, that is, SRMR and 
GFI; the rest suggested model modification. The 2 value showed degrees of freedom of 
zero. When the degrees of freedom are zero, it means that there is no way to affirm or 
reject the model. Therefore, the measurement model for UUS was not used in the 
structural model. 
 
Testing of usability-satisfaction (US) model 
The results in Table I-23 showed that two fit indices – SRMR and GFI – out of the five 
measure-fit indices showed a good fit. Three of the fit indices, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, 
suggested model modification. In order to modify the measurement model so that it could 
fit, pairs of residual covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified 
and treated as free parameters. After a rerun, four out of five indices showed a good model 
fit. RMSEA was the only model fit that was slightly below the minimum of the threshold 
required. Considering the complexity of SEM, achieving four models of fitness out of the 
five required was acceptable; hence, no further modification was done. 
 
Testing of usability-availability (UA) model 
The results in Table I-26 showed that only GFI out of the five measure-fit indices showed 
a good fit. Four of the fit indices, namely, CFI, SRMR, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model 
modification. The measurement model was rerun, and three out of five indices showed a 
good model fit. RMSEA and 2 were the two model fit indices that were out of range – 
hence, suggesting further modification. It is important to note that, after accepting such 
model fit, when the measurement models are put together to form the structural model, if 
the structural model does not fit and requires further modification by deleting some 
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constructs or construct items, then measurement models such as that of UA will be the 
first to be considered for deletion. 
 
Testing of usability-errors (UE) model 
The results in Table I-29 showed that GFI and SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices 
showed a good fit. The CFI, RMSEA, and 2 fit indices suggested model modification. 
In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual covariances 
that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. 
After treating the identified modification indices as free parameters, the measurement 
model was rerun, and four out of five indices showed a good model fit. Only RMSEA 
suggested model modification. However, when the measurement model of RMSEA was 
rounded off to the nearest two decimal places, as it was in the threshold, its value became 
0.05, which was equal to the minimum of the RMSEA threshold; hence, the RMSEA was 
accepted as showing good fit. 
 
Testing of usability-help and documentation (UHD) model 
The results in Table I-32 showed that GFI and SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices 
showed a good fit. The CFI, RMSEA, and 2 fit indices suggested model modification. 
The measurement model was rerun, and four out of five indices showed a good model fit, 
with the exception of 2, which suggested model modification. The researcher decided 
against modifying the model for 2, as that could result in both 2 and RMSEA not fitting. 
Therefore, in order to achieve maximum fit, the researcher accepted the modified model. 
 
Testing of security (S) model 
The results in Table I-35 showed that GFI and SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices 
showed a good fit. Three of the fit indices, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model 
modification. After treating the identified modification indices as free parameters, the 
measurement model was rerun, and the modified model showed a good fit. 
 
Testing of privacy (P) model 
The results in Table I-38 showed that only SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices 
showed a good fit. Four of the fit indices, GFI, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model 
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modification. The measurement model was rerun, and the modified model showed a good 
fit. 
 
Testing of system usability scale (SUS) model 
The results in Table I-41 showed that none of the fit indices showed a good fit – hence, 
suggesting modification. In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs 
of residual covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and 
treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification indices as free param-
eters, the measurement model was rerun, and all indices showed a good model fit. 
 
5.6.2 The online banking adoption and use structural model 
Overall, the research drew 17 measurement models based on the constructs that were 
investigated, and 15 measurement models out of the 17 showed good fit, except for the 
price value (PV) and usability-satisfaction (US) models. Therefore, the online banking 
adoption and use structural model consisted of the 15 measurement models discussed 
earlier. The overall SEM is presented in Figure 5-2, which is essentially a path diagram 
that includes not only the observed variables, but also the latent variables. In the figure, 
latent variables (shown as a circle, with the variable abbreviation in capital letters – PE) 
were measured by means of the observable variables (shown by a rectangle, with the 
latent variable abbreviation in capital letters and lower-case letter numbering – PEa). 
Thus, the SEM diagram incorporated all the measurement models presented earlier, 
except PV and US. These measurement models consisted of all the initial theoretical 
framework concepts identified earlier from UTAUT2, usability, and security. 
 
Figure 5-2 presents the overall SEM structural model, which includes 15 out of the 17 
measurement models that were found to be a good fit in the previous section. The 
measurement models that showed good fit implied that those variables contributed to the 
overall model to explain the users’ behavioural intention towards adoption and continued 
use of online banking. A simplified explanation and final structural model are provided 
in Figure 5-3. After the structural model was found to fit, the relationships that existed 
among constructs, between constructs and indicators, and among indicators themselves 
were analysed. Table 5-5 shows a summary extract from the Amos output for the 
standardised significance levels obtained after running the structural model. These levels 
showed the hypothesised relationships among the latent variables forming the 
underpinning effects on online banking adoption and acceptance. In order to determine 
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the significance of the hypothesised relationship, Hair Jr. et al. (2014) recommend that a 
threshold of ± 1.96 be obtained for the values of the critical ratio (CR). This means that, 
for a hypothesis to be significant or supported, its constructs should have a critical ratio 
value that is greater than ± 1.96. 
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Figure 5-2: Structural model of online banking adoption and use 
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A conclusion on the hypothesis regarding the path of the structural model with a value 
above the threshold can then be reached, being either supported or else not supported. In 
traditional regression analysis, the critical ratio is tested as a t-value used to give 
predicting power. The results of the hypotheses tests are illustrated in Table 5-5. 
 
Table 5-5: Summary of the standardised significance levels of constructs 
Hypothesis Path Estimate SE CR P Comment 
H1 BI  PE 0.046 0.039 1.167 0.243 Not 
supported 
H2 BI  SI -0.018 0.023 -0.771 0.441 Not 
supported 
H3 BI  H 0.649 0.045 14.570 *** Supported 
H4 BI  EE 0.087 0.024 3.584 *** Supported 
H5 BI  HM 0.136 0.025 5.479 *** Supported 
H6 BI  FC -0.043 0.072 -0.594 0.552 Not 
supported 
H7 Adoption  UE -0.408 0.189 -2.163 0.031 Supported 
H8 Adoption  US -0.011 0.079 -0.141 0.888 Not 
supported 
H9 Adoption  UHD 0.276 0.051 5.457 *** Supported 
H10 Adoption  P -0.080 0.037 -2.163 0.031 Supported 
H11 Adoption  UA -0.520 0.298 -1.747 0.081 Not 
supported 
H12 Adoption  S -0.018 0.056 -0.322 0.748 Not 
supported 
H13 Adoption  UL 0.169 0.072 2.338 0.019 Supported 
H14 Adoption  SUS -1.041 0.279 -3.737 *** Supported 
H15 Adoption  BI 1.733 0.364 4.760 *** Supported 
H16 Adoption  FC 0.218 0.188 1.161 0.246 Not 
supported 
H17 Adoption  H -1.001 0.256 -3.916 *** Supported 
 
Table 5-5 indicates that 10 out of 17 of the suggested hypotheses were supported. This is 
so because their CR values were above ± 1.96. Effort expectancy, hedonic motivation, 
and habit were found to have an impact on users’ behavioural intention to use online 
banking, while performance expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions, 
contrary to UTAUT2, were not supported. In addition, habit, errors, learnability, help and 
documentation, SUS, privacy, and behavioural intention showed a direct influence on 
online banking adoption. These findings were presented in the final model, which 
included only the supported relationships, as illustrated in Figure 5-2. 
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Initially, there were 17 constructs, but two were dropped, as their measurement models 
did not pass goodness of fit, namely, price value and usability-user suitability. The 
remaining 15 constructs were included in the overall SEM structural model (Figure 5-2). 
The hypothesis testing of the remaining 15 constructs yielded the results as summarised 
in Table 5-5. These results further eliminated six constructs as having an explanatory 
impact on users’ behavioural intention to use online banking and adoption of the service. 
The constructs not supported in the context of online banking adoption were performance 
expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions from the UTAUT2 model and 
satisfaction, availability, and security constructs. 
 
5.6.3 Multigroup analysis with chi-squared difference test in Amos 
In order to investigate the effect of moderating factors, the researcher conducted a 
multigroup analysis using Amos. Multigroup analysis in SEM is a method that allows one 
to compare multiple samples across the same measurement instrument or multiple 
population groups (for example, males versus females) for any identified structural 
equation model. Multigroup analysis in Amos also allows a researcher to test whether 
one’s groups meet the assumption that they are equal by examining whether different sets 
of path coefficients are invariant. A number of methods can be used in multigroup 
analysis. This research used a chi-squared (χ2) difference test in order to determine signifi-
cant moderating factors regarding the hypothesised relationships. 
 
According to Werner and Schermelleh-Engel (2009), frequent differences in model fit are 
subtler, and an objective criterion for a decision among competing models may be desired. 
Therefore, for this purpose, different models can be compared with regard to their model 
fit by performing a χ2 difference test. Werner and Schermelleh-Engel (2009) postulate 
that a χ2 test allows one to decide whether a given model fits significantly better or worse 
than a competing model. 
 
A χ2 difference test is meaningful and applicable only if the models in question are nested 
models; that is, one of the models could be obtained simply by fixing or eliminating 
parameters in the other model. This is supported by Arbuckle (2014), who says that, for 
nested pairs of models, Amos provides tables of model comparisons, complete with χ2 
difference tests and their associated p-values, when comparing models in those situations 
where one model just contains: 
 an additional path in the structural model; 
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 an additional loading in a measurement model; or 
 an additional correlation or covariance between latent variables, which the other 
model does not contain (where the parameter in question is fixed to zero). 
 
In exploring the moderating effects, the researcher followed the following procedure: 
1. The research made sure that all moderating variables were converted to dichotomous 
variables. Dichotomous variables are variables that are binary in nature; they only 
have two value possibilities, for example, gender, which has either male or female. 
Hence, variables such as age, experience, education, employment, ethnicity, and 
devices that were not naturally dichotomous variables were converted to dichotomous 
variables by means of recoding in SPSS. For example, the age of participants was 
grouped into two, the middle age-category being the cut-off point. Those with an age 
below the middle age-category were coded as a ‘1’, and those aged above the middle 
were coded as a ‘2’. The procedure was followed for all the aforementioned variables. 
Table 5-6 provides an extract of the recoding performed on moderating variables; for 
a complete list, refer to Appendix J, Table J-1. 
 
Table 5-6: Dichotomous recoding of moderator variables 
# Variable Original coding New coding 
1 Gender 1 = Male 
2 = Female 
Used as is 
2 Age 1 = Below 20 years 
2 = 20-29 years 
3 = 30-39 years 
4 = 40-49 years 
5 = Above 50 years 
1 = Below 30 years (1-2) 
2 = 30 and above years (3-5) 
3 Experience 1 = Below 1 year 
2 = 1-2 years 
3 = 3-4 years 
4 = 5-6 years 
5 = Above 7 years 
1 = 4 years and below 
2 = Above 4 years 
4 Education 1 = No formal education 
2 = Matric 
3 = Post-matric/diploma 
4 = Degree 
5 = Postgraduate degree 
6 = Other 
1 = No tertiary education (1-
2) 
2 = Tertiary education (3-6) 
 
2. The research tested one variable at a time, by creating groups in Amos and assigning 
each group a subsequent group value. 
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3. The multigroup analysis feature was used, which would create different parameters 
automatically, including unconstrained and structural weights as well as structural 
covariances. 
4. The research was only interested in unconstrained and structural weights; therefore, 
structural covariances were deleted. 
5. The structural weights contained different structural weights for each relationship as 
in the model, which were given unique names. However, relationship b2_1 for Group 
1 was forced to be equal to b2_2 for Group 2. 
6. Next, the estimates were executed, and the output results were read under model 
comparison. 
7. The model comparison gave results for the χ2 test, and the focus statistics were the p-
value, which ought to have a value less than 0.05 to show that there was a difference 
between the two groups. When the p-value was greater than 0.05, it meant that there 
was no difference among groups. It is important to note that this kind of moderation 
takes place at model level. However, this research hypothesised a moderation effect 
on specific relationships. 
8. To test for moderation on a specific relationship, it was necessary to constrain the 
hypothesised relationship, while the rest of the relationships were treated as free 
parameters. To do this, all other relationships from structural weights were removed, 
except for those hypothesised. 
9. After constraining the identified relationship, the estimates were calculated, and 
model comparison results were interpreted, looking at the p-value. 
10.  If the p-value was below 0.05, it showed that there was a difference among groups; 
in that case, further analysis of the moderating effects that had more groups was 
conducted. If the p-value was above 0.05, there was no difference among groups and, 
hence, no moderating effects. 
11. If the model comparison results showed that the p-value was less than 0.05, the 
research looked at the standardised estimates for each group and obtained the regres-
sion weights for each group. A higher value meant that it had a stronger moderating 
effect than the others did. 
 
After applying the above-mentioned procedure up to Step 5, the analysis resulted in two 
models, one of which is given in Figure 5-3, which represents Group 1 based on Table 
5-6 ‘New coding’ column. The Group 2 model, which is identical to the Group 1 model, 
145 | P a g e  
 
is given in Appendix J. Path b2_1 is for Group 1 as shown in Figure 5-3, while path b2_2 
is for Group 2. (See Appendix J.) 
 
Group 1 (b2_1) 
 
Figure 5-3: Dichotomous model: Group 1 
 
The research repeated the above-mentioned procedure for all hypothesised relationships 
and moderating factors. Chi-squared comparison results and regression weights for each 
relationship and the moderating factors that were collected in the survey are presented in 
Appendix J, Table J-2. The results showed that only two moderating factors (experience 
and ethnicity) were significant and had moderating effects on three hypothesised relation-
ships. Experience was found to have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
‘adoption’ and ‘habit’, such that the effects were greater for less experienced users than 
for those with more experience. Furthermore, ethnicity was found to have moderating 
effects on the relationship between ‘behavioural intention’ and ‘hedonic motivation’, so 
that the moderating effects were greater for the non-African race than the African race. 
On the same note, ethnicity was found to have moderating effects on the relationship 
between ‘adoption’ and ‘habit’, as the effects were greater for the non-African race than 
the African race. The rest of the moderating factors (gender, age, education, employment, 
and device) were found to be insignificant. 
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5.6.4 Final structural model 
The final SEM structural model based on all the analyses presented above resulted in the 
overall research model shown in Figure 5-4. The model showed the factors that influenced 
online banking adoption and behavioural intention to use the service. Habit exhibited an 
influence on both adoption and behavioural intention, while effort expectancy and 
hedonic motivation had an impact on behavioural intention. SUS, errors, learnability, 





Figure 5-4: Final research model 
 
Errors, learnability, privacy, and help and documentation were constructs that are also 
part of the STInfoSec framework (details provided in Chapter 7). 
 
5.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The chapter provided details of the quantitative method of the MMR design. The findings 
of SEM showed that 15 of the total of 17 measurement models had good fit for inclusion 
in the structural model. The excluded constructs were price value and user suitability, 
which were found to not have an effect on online banking adoption and continued use, 
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values rejected facilitating conditions, satisfaction, user suitability, and social influence 
as relevant constructs in the adoption and continued use of online banking. The resulting 
supported research model (Figure 5-4) consisted of eight constructs that had an effect on 
the adoption and behavioural intention to use online banking. 
 
Three constructs, namely, habit, effort expectancy, and hedonic motivation were included 
in the final SEM model, as they were found to have an influence on user behavioural 
intention to use online banking. The SUS scale was found to be relevant in testing the 
usability of online banking applications. The STInfoSec framework included the 
following constructs from the structural model as principles: errors, learnability, privacy, 
and help and documentation. Chapter 6 provides details on qualitative data collection and 
analysis from the custodians of online banking to give a different perspective. 
 
-- ooo -- 
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CHAPTER 6 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 6-1: The research roadmap 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present information on the qualitative data collection and 
analysis, explaining all decisions made in choosing data collection and analysis tools and 
techniques. The chapter first discusses the main sources of qualitative data and how the 
data were collected. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the chosen data analysis 
techniques (framework analysis), detailing how these were applied in this research based 
on the five stages of the method. The final stage of the framework analysis method linked 
the themes to in vivo coding, using participants’ own words. Lastly, the chapter provides 
a final interpretation of the results based on the two data sets, linking the findings to the 
identified design principles and the STInfoSec framework. The combined findings of 
quantitative research (Chapter 5) and qualitative research (this chapter) formed the basis 
of the final design principles included in the STInfoSec framework presented and 
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6.2 DATA COLLECTION 
The qualitative data for this research originated mainly from two sources: interviews with 
banking personnel working in security and digital channels and open-ended qualitative 
survey questions from an online banking users’ survey. The sections that follow describe 
the sources of data analysed in this chapter. 
 
6.2.1 Interview data 
The objective of the interview data was to capture aspects considered pertinent by the 
custodians of digital channels in the design and development of online banking systems. 
Table 6-1 outlines the profiles of interview participants. The participants came from two 
of the four major banks in South Africa working with digital channels involving retail 
and corporate banking divisions. 
 
Table 6-1: Interview participants’ profiles 
Participant Gender Position Experience 
P1 Male Head: Enterprise Risk Management 10+ 
P2 Male Chief Information Security Officer 1 
P3 Male Manager: Information Security 6 
P4 Female Head: On-boarding Self-Service Banking 10 
P5 Male General Manager: Electronic Payments 6 
P6 Male Performance and Security Testing 5 
 
Participants came from different levels of management and had experience in different 
areas of InfoSec and digital channels in the banking industry. Semi-structured interview 
sessions were conducted at participants’ workplaces between August and September 
2016, each with an average duration of one hour. The questions covered a wide range of 
aspects, from general online banking service to legislation governing banking and online 
banking service. (See Appendix F.) Recorded interview audio data were transcribed by a 
qualified transcriber, yielding 30 pages of transcription text. 
 
6.2.2 Survey data 
The survey answered by online banking users included three open-ended qualitative 
questions that solicited additional information from respondents with regard to their 
experience with online banking systems. The first question asked what they liked most 
150 | P a g e  
 
about the service; the objective of this question was to investigate the benefits of the 
service. Secondly, respondents were asked about their overall concerns regarding using 
online banking service, mainly to solicit drawbacks as perceived by current online 
banking users. This question attempted to gain insight into possible reservations about 
why adoption was lagging. Given that respondents were current online banking users, an 
in-depth investigation could only be obtained from respondents who had not yet enrolled 
for the service altogether (this was beyond the scope of this research). Hence, responses 
to this question only gave possible barriers based on current users. The third and last 
question asked for any additional comments, but this did not yield any further information 
that could not be classified into the first two questions. 
 
6.3 FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
There are a number of qualitative data analysis methods to choose from, and a researcher 
can select the one that best suits the research problem under investigation. The choices 
include ethnography, grounded theory, narrative analysis, content analysis, framework 
analysis, and historical research, to mention just a few (Schutt 2015). Ethnography is the 
recording and analysis of a culture or society, usually based on participant observation 
(Oates 2006); however, this was not the objective of this research. Grounded theory is a 
qualitative research method that seeks to develop a theory that is grounded in data (Turban 
et al. 2015), while narrative analysis is a qualitative data analysis approach that involves 
the interpretation and analysis of written or spoken words involving a story plot (Turban 
et al. 2015). Neither of these methods was suitable for this research, as the research was 
not either developing a theory or narrating a story. 
 
Content analysis is a technique that looks for structures and pattern inferences in the text 
(Turban et al. 2015). Braun and Clarke (2006:79) define thematic analysis as “a method 
for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data”. Content analysis 
and thematic analysis are in the same group of qualitative analysis approaches, which also 
includes framework analysis, which seeks to identify commonalities and differences in 
qualitative data before drawing relationships between themes (Gale, Heath, Cameron, 
Rashid & Redwood 2013). Framework analysis was chosen mainly because it was aligned 
with the guidelines provided by Srivastava and Thomson (2009) on which research 
questions the technique helped to answer. A detailed motivation for, and description of, 
framework analysis use are outlined in this section. 
151 | P a g e  
 
Framework analysis is a qualitative data analysis approach that falls within the realms of 
thematic analysis or content analysis approaches. It focuses on commonalities and 
differences in qualitative data before zooming in on relationships between identified 
themes (Gale et al. 2013). Framework analysis was developed specifically for applied 
qualitative research. Srivastava and Thomson (2009:73) state that framework analysis is 
suited to “research that has specific questions, a limited time frame, a pre-designed 
sample (e.g. professional participants) and a priori issues (e.g. organisational and 
integration issues) that need to be dealt with”. Ritchie and Spencer (2002:307) give 
guidelines on four types of research questions that framework analysis can help answer: 
“Contextual: identifying the form and nature of what exists, Diagnostic: examining 
the reasons for, or causes of, what exists, Evaluative: appraising the effectiveness 
of what exists, and Strategic: identifying new theories, policies, plans, or actions”. 
 
This research used framework analysis as the primary qualitative data analysis approach. 
Framework analysis was chosen for this research because it could help answer the 
following qualitative research questions: 
Q3: What are the security designers’ perceptions of users’ security behaviour? 
Q4: How can a socio-technical design approach be applied to improve the security 
and usability of online banking websites? 
 
These questions fit into both the ‘contextual’ and ‘diagnostic’ categories as described 
above. The contextual aspect applied in that the questions investigated the existing 
perceptions of system designers regarding issues that might affect user behaviour during 
design decisions. The diagnostic aspect examined InfoSec environmental issues that 
existed that contributed to InfoSec problems and could help find solutions. 
 
Framework analysis involves five key stages: familiarisation, identifying a thematic 
framework, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretation (Ritchie & Spencer 
2002). The five stages of framework analysis can be undertaken in a linear fashion either 
after all data collection or concurrently with data collection and analysis. A linear 
approach was chosen for this research, as qualitative data came from two different 
sources, namely, a survey and interviews; hence, analysis began after both sets of data 
were available for analysis. 
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Briefly, Ritchie and Spencer (2002) describe these stages as follows. Familiarisation 
requires the researcher to go through data by listening to audio tapes and reading 
transcripts to get the feel of the data as a whole. The second stage involves identifying key 
issues, concepts, and themes raised by research participants that form the basis of a 
thematic framework. This is followed by indexing, which refers to the linking of the 
identified themes to the transcription documents of interviews, commonly called coding 
in other qualitative data analysis approaches (Ritchie & Spencer 2002). Qualitative data 
analysis software packages such as ATLAS.ti make it easier to perform coding. Charting 
refers to the streamlining of the identified themes from all transcriptions. This process 
might include joining themes or eliminating certain themes. Finally, mapping and 
interpretation take place when all data has been charted according to key themes, thereby 
pulling together key characteristics for final interpretation of the whole data set (Ritchie 
& Spencer 2002). 
 
Other scholars have developed a different number of stages of framework analysis; for 
instance, Gale et al. (2013) list seven stages: transcription, familiarisation with the inter-
view, coding, developing a working analytical framework, applying the analytical frame-
work, charting data into the framework matrix, and interpreting the data. Regardless of 
the number of stages one decides to apply, it is important to note that all activities of 
framework analysis are addressed in both approaches. The researcher decided to apply 
the original five stages as described by Ritchie and Spencer (2002). Framework analysis 
can be employed inductively, where themes are predominantly generated from partici-
pants’ accounts, or deductively using a priori concepts from literature, or a combination 
of both (Gale et al. 2013). Given the MMR design of this research, a combination of both 
the inductive and deductive approaches was used to generate final themes for analysis. 
The details of these two approaches are provided in the stages sections. Figure 6-2 
presents a diagrammatic representation of the framework analysis stages adapted to 
specific qualitative activities relevant to the current research and how the stages were 
applied in this study. 
  




The sections that follow outline the activities carried out by the researcher in each of the 
stages of framework analysis. 
 
6.3.1 Stage 1: Familiarisation 
For interview data, this stage involves word-for-word transcription of the interview audio 
files. Appendix K provides an excerpt of the interview transcript of one participant. The 
complete list of interview transcripts is available on a CD on request from the researcher. 
The researcher then reads these transcriptions and familiarises himself/herself with the 
content as provided by participants. Some scholars split transcription and familiarisation 
into two separate stages (Gale et al. 2013). In this research, both transcription and 
familiarisation constituted the first stage, based on the original framework analysis by 
Ritchie and Spencer (2002). 
 
The transcription of interview audio files was performed by a professional language 
translator, yielding 101 pages with 30 000 words’ worth of textual data. The researcher 
then listened to all interviews to verify the accuracy of interview transcripts, making 
corrections in instances where the transcriber had misunderstood the research field 
terminology, and verifying entries recorded as inaudible. Qualitative survey responses 
were extracted from the Google Forms responses spreadsheet into a Microsoft Word 
document. The researcher prepared both sets of qualitative data for computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). The ATLAS.ti software package was used. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Application framework analysis (adapted from Georgsson & Staggers 2016) 
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6.3.2 Stage 2: Identifying a thematic framework 
The familiarisation stage not only allows the researcher to gain an overview of the depth 
and richness of the data set, but also marks the beginning of the process of abstraction 
and conceptualisation (Ritchie & Spencer 2002). After going through the whole data set, 
the researcher had a holistic view and noted recurring themes, concepts, and key issues 
raised by participants. This process marked the second stage of identifying a thematic 
framework in framework analysis. Drawn from prior issues, this process raised themes 
on the basis of the framework, guided by the material giving rise to the interview 
questions and research aims. 
 
This research investigated issues that security and digital channel designers of online 
banking systems perceived to be pertinent to a secure online environment. The issues 
addressed covered a plethora of areas from both designers’ and users’ perspectives. Using 
a semi-structured interview schedule, participants were free to address any specific areas 
during the interview sessions. These included online banking, legal aspects, system 
development, technology, user behaviour, as well as user training and awareness. The 
resulting insight helped identify areas of improvement in developing a service that would 
be both secure and usable. 
 
The predefined thematic framework deductively identified concepts for investigation 
from the literature using thematic coding, while open coding after data collection consti-
tuted inductive theme generation based on participants’ accounts (Gale et al. 2013). Table 
6-2 provides the four themes that formed the predefined thematic framework based on 
semi-structured interview questions and a short description of each theme. These formed 
the basis of the interview schedule, as each theme was covered by an individual section 
in the interview schedule. 
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This covers general information about online banking, for example, costs, 
adoption incentives for users, and problem reporting channels. 
System develop-
ment 
This theme involves system development decisions, including software develop-




The theme covers terms and conditions for the use of the service, including 
legally binding rules and regulations in the banking industry. 
User training 
and awareness 
The section covers initiatives for training and educating users about online 
banking functionalities and InfoSec awareness. 
 
Indexing used thematic coding and open coding to generate the complete list of codes 
identified in framework analysis. In vivo coding was used for assigning pieces of text to 
the thematic framework, while new themes were also created from the data sets. This 
process is explained in detail under the indexing stage. Qualitative data interpretation 
inevitably includes coder bias (Cabrera & Reiner 2018). In this research, coder bias was 
mitigated by using the in vivo coding technique, which creates codes based on 
participants’ own words (Belgrave & Seide 2018), and cross-referencing codes with 
quantitative data analysis in a mixed methods design (Cabrera & Reiner 2018). 
 
6.3.3 Stage 3: Indexing 
Indexing maps data sections from the transcripts to the identified thematic framework. 
This process involves coding when using CAQDAS, which does not analyse the data, but 
simply stores and organises it for easy access during analysis (Gale et al. 2013). Coding 
is the process of identifying these themes, concepts, or key issues and assists the 
researcher in organising and interpreting a data set (Given 2008). The identified codes are 
further differentiated or integrated into a smaller set of themes, relationships, and patterns 
to allow conclusions to be drawn from the data set. A code is a descriptive or conceptual 
label that is assigned to excerpts of raw data (Gale et al. 2013). 
 
Thematic coding uses the identified thematic framework by assigning passages of text 
that are linked by a common theme or idea to the thematic framework concepts (Gibbs 
2007). Open coding is a theme generation technique from qualitative data that allows the 
researcher to identify underlying concepts through data examination; in other words, there 
are no predefined themes for which the researcher looks in the data (Wolfswinkel, 
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Furtmueller & Wilderom 2011). In this study, thematic and open coding both used in vivo 
coding to assign passages of text to the thematic framework codes (in thematic coding), 
and new codes missing from the thematic framework were created (in open coding). 
 
In vivo coding is a coding technique that assigns a label to sections of data using a word 
or phrase from the participants’ own words (Saldaña 2016). The code names essentially 
come from the text being coded, and the technique can be used in any type of coding of 
text data. In vivo codes allow the researcher to remain true to the data (Ritchie & Spencer 
2002). Table 6-3 shows a detailed view of codes generated from both interview and 
survey data sets through in vivo coding. The code names are phrases extracted from 
participants’ responses to either the interview questions or open-ended questions from the 
survey. 
 
Table 6-3: Generated codes 
 Interview codes Survey codes 
No. Code F 1. Likes F 2. Concerns F 
1 legislation and standards 75 convenience 310 security issues 285 
2 security awareness 58 saving time 115 availability issues 44 
3 system development 54 ease of use 83 trust and privacy issues 41 
4 legacy systems 25 availability 55 limited functionality 36 
5 security 25 satisfaction 36 UI changes 19 
6 SABRIC 24 cost-effective 28 lack of awareness 12 
7 breaches info-sharing 22 useful 18 technical limitations 11 
8 client reporting channels 14 safety 15 not user-friendly 10 
9 communication strategies 13   customer service 8 
10 online banking training 13   costly 7 
11 costs 13   inter-bank transactions 7 
12 scaling down on branches 13   system design issues 6 
13 security assistance 11   unclear error messages 5 
14 terms and conditions 9   miscellaneous 17 
15 digital channel awareness 8     
16 adoption incentives 8     
17 24-hour call centre 7     
18 competitiveness 7     
19 security breaches liability 6     
 TOTAL 405  660  508 
 
The frequency (denoted by F) of each code in the data sets is also provided in the table. 
The coding was performed using ATLAS.ti, which allowed the researcher to assign 
varying sizes of words, phrases, sentences, or paragraphs to a code. The process of coding 
yielded 1 565 quotations across 40 unique codes from both sets of data. Themes aligned 
to the in vivo codes are provided in the next stage. 
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6.3.4 Stage 4: Charting 
In this research, charting involved arranging specific data pieces that were indexed into a 
chart of themes (Srivastava & Thomson 2009). A mapping of predefined themes and 
generated codes from both interview and survey data sets through open coding resulted 
in the need to create additional themes, as some codes did not fit into any of the predefined 
themes. The process involved in the charting stage also provided a detailed analysis of 
themes. New themes were generated that combined interview data codes and survey data 
codes for common issues raised by both sets of participants. 
 
The chart mapped themes to solicited codes generated from interview participants based 
on interview questions and unsolicited codes from survey respondents’ general percep-
tions of the service. There was an overlap between areas of concern of both online banking 
users and custodians of the service. Table 6-4 provides the revised themes and comments 
based on the changes from the initial predefined themes given in Table 6-2. 
 




The same as the initial theme. 
Information 
security 
A new theme developed based on issues raised by online banking users and inter-
view participants. It covers InfoSec- and privacy-related issues and general infor-
mation about online banking, for example, costs, adoption incentives for users, 
and problem reporting channels. 
Usability A new theme based on the identified issues from interviews and survey 
responses. 
Communication Communication covers two-way communication strategies between the organisa-
tion and users for a variety of purposes, which include problem reporting, aware-
ness initiatives, feedback, advertisements, etc. These issues were identified in 
interviews. 
Regulations The same as the initial theme. 
Training and 
education 
The same as the initial theme. 
Benefits These are benefits of the service as identified by online banking users through 
open-ended survey questions. 
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The revised thematic framework represented the final set of themes applicable in this 
research. Benefits were included to highlight the current views of online banking users, 
which, the researcher posited, financial institutions would need to take into account in 
providing digital solutions to their clientele. Table 6-5 presents the theme chart, with the 
respective codes provided in Table 6-3 for each theme.
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Table 6-5: Theme chart 
System development Information security Usability Communication Regulations Training and education Benefits 
system development security issues user interface client reporting channels legislation online banking training convenience 
legacy systems trust and privacy issues user experience communication strategies SABRIC digital channel awareness saves time 
availability issues security awareness satisfaction branch scale-down terms and conditions lack of awareness ease of use 
limited functionality security UI changes 24-hour call centre   availability 
scalability breach info-sharing  customer service issues   satisfaction 
technical limitations security assistance     cost-effective 
not user-friendly breach liability     useful 
inter-bank transactions      safety 
system design issues       
unclear error messages       
 
The researcher went through each code generated through open coding in Stage 3, assigning the codes to a specific theme based on the revised thematic 
framework. 
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6.3.5 Stage 5: Mapping and interpretation 
Using a schematic diagram, Stage 5 involves the analysis of the main characteristics as 
outlined in the charts (Srivastava & Thomson 2009). The objective of the fifth stage in 
framework analysis does not involve issues that were raised by individual participants, 
but the collective perceptions from a group’s perspective, capturing what the researcher 
has learnt (Lincoln & Guba 1985). This stage brings out the objectives of qualitative 
analysis, outlined by Ritchie and Spencer (2002) as “defining concepts, mapping range 
and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, providing explana-
tions, and developing strategies”. Supported by quotations from participants, the 
researcher provided data interpretations, also in conjunction with previous findings in the 
literature and extant theories (Creswell & Creswell 2017). A more detailed presentation 
of this stage follows. 
 
6.4 MAPPING AND INTERPRETATION 
The main objective of qualitative findings in this research was to assist in developing a 
framework for secure and usable InfoSec applications, particularly the identification of 
usable security design principles for an online banking system. The themes were a set of 
key areas of online banking that needed to be addressed in development of the service, as 
identified by the research participants (both from the survey and interviews). The princi-
ples included concepts identified from the literature and included for investigation in the 
survey, as well as others raised by interview participants. These were evaluated in the 
final STInfoSec framework presented in Chapter 7. They were included in Figure 6-3 for 
illustration purposes and for their relationship to the identified themes in order to give an 
idea of the theme under which they could be addressed. 
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The themes are in rectangles with solid lines (derived from Table 6-5), while the princi-
ples are in dotted-line rectangles. The mapping of themes provided the foundation for the 
principles and checklist items included in the STInfoSec framework presented in Chapter 
7. The sections that follow provide details of participants’ accounts with regard to each 
theme. 
 
6.4.1 Information security 
Security, in general, and InfoSec, in particular, came through as the main concerns of 
both users and online banking custodians. Online banking users were worried about 
potential financial loss due to a compromised online banking profile through hacking, 
identity theft, phishing, fraud, and loss of personal information (privacy). Designers were 
worried about the same threats. Their main concerns related mainly to finding ways to 
make users more vigilant when performing online activities; hence, the banks already 
provide awareness information to users through multiple channels. 
 
Regardless of these efforts, the success of these initiatives is determined by the total buy-
in of the users, as they are at the entry point of the system and are generally regarded as 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Mapping of themes and principles 
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the weakest link in the security chain. The main problem faced by banks, as highlighted 
by all participants, is that users already exhibit unsecure behaviour from a very young age 
through other aspects of life such as social media. Hence, it is generally too late and diffi-
cult to expect banks to change their clients’ behaviour. Participant P3 suggested a solution 
to this problem: “I think it is more of a general awareness problem and government 
structures must roll out awareness in general to uplift the whole country’s online aware-
ness, little pieces [sic] that can be played by different role players.” 
 
Complicated cyberattacks and risky user behaviour make banks hesitant to market (or 
claim) their systems as the most secure, since a compromise can occur through zero-day 
attacks or user negligence. Participant P2 pointed this out: “Even though we may be 
adopting all of the latest security mechanisms in our applications, you are always at risk 
because hackers are always clever and will come up with new ways. Sometimes it is not 
the inherent security within the system that is compromised, but it is the users’ behaviour 
that they compromise like for instance through phishing.” 
 
In developing systems, banks employ local and international best practices as prescribed 
by numerous boards. Although these recommendations are not compulsory, it is in the 
best interests of financial organisations to conduct risk assessments and comply, where 
necessary. Participant P1 pointed out the need to collaborate with industry leaders in the 
areas of organisational risk and InfoSec: “We don’t have formal arrangements with any 
third party that advise [sic] us on security. We have a close relationship with people like 
KPMG2 and Deloitte and with people like the Credit Bureau and FICO (Fair, Isaac and 
Company) who actually have a lot of insight in these [sic].” 
 
6.4.2 Usability 
Usability of information systems is critical for attracting and maintaining customer 
loyalty to online applications. On the issue of addressing security, usability, and UX, 
banks do performance testing and incorporate feedback from focus groups, clients, and 
other stakeholders during the development stages before rolling out a system to users. 
There are dedicated usability and UX members in development teams, as mentioned by 
participant P5: “To ensure that is it [sic] consistent we apply the [sic] standards. 
                                                          
2 This was before the problems engulfing the accounting firm with regard to state capture. 
163 | P a g e  
 
Therefore, we have a centre of excellence for the organisation. It used to be in different 
areas, but we wanted to make sure that UX is consistent and standard; hence, there is a 
division that looks after that.” Participant P2 also alluded to the importance of penetration 
security tests before launching applications: “Before we launch it, to test the security of 
the system. So any client facing online application [sic] will go through that process.” 
 
The recurring problem in system development has been, and continues to be, that usability 
is considered a secondary goal. This was supported by participant P5, who emphasised 
the importance of first addressing security and then considering usability afterwards: “We 
are dealing with such large amounts of money that you have to make sure that first and 
foremost you are secured on behalf of your clients and shareholders. So that is the first 
priority, then obviously the debate about usability, competitive advantage comes into 
play.” 
 
Participant P5 admitted that security practitioners were faced with a trade-off between 
security and usability goals: “Security is one of those things … so security is a trade-off. 
We can make security possible but not usable.” Fortunately, the situation is improving, 
as the participant proceeded to point out: “Look what’s good, what’s nice is that, you 
know, and as technology evolves there are better security systems that are more usable.” 
 
Online banking users, however, raised concerns that pertained to usability and UX, with 
a number of codes, which included system user-friendliness, frequent user interface 
changes, and unclear error messages. Users also raised problems such as system 
downtime, limited functionality online, and the delay in inter-bank transactions. 
 
6.4.3 Training and education 
Participants interviewed highlighted initiatives provided by banks to train and educate 
users. These included in-branch pamphlets, online security centre portals, billboards, and 
radio and television advertisements. Banks also provided in-house training sessions for 
corporate online banking clients, although this initiative was not available to retail clients. 
On the provision of training programmes for retail online banking clients, participant P1 
said the following: “We don’t give a formal set of training documentation or offer them 
[sic] to come for training. However, we do put certain statements on the system where 
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they can view Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), which can help them with certain 
things.” 
 
For corporate clients, one bank provided detailed training material, as outlined by partici-
pant P4: “When you use the wholesale channels, there is an operational manual, context 
sensitive help, FAQs, and demos are available when the sales people go out to take the 
clients through it.” Most importantly, the look-and-feel of both retail and corporate digital 
channels needs to be consistent. This makes it easier for users to learn the user interface, 
as pointed out by participant P4: “The logic there is if you use it in your personal capacity, 
if you later log on as a corporate user you kind of like know how to locate functions. 
Therefore, we believe that there is a large portion of learning and training that takes 
place through the actual front end. So, it needs to be learnable.” 
 
The awareness programmes are meant to educate and assist users by fostering secure user 
behaviour. Among other things, these include recommendations on system requirements 
that include up-to-date patching of operating systems, up-to-date antivirus software, free 
downloads of anti-phishing software, and information on the risks of sharing login 
credentials. These solutions still require users’ actions for them to be effective. Participant 
P1 summarised this requirement: “Anyway, we do have a lot of awareness on security 
especially with our customers as far as possible. It is not training them but it is creating 
awareness at every contact point where we believe we can, in some form or format. But 
it’s never enough.” For example, users still wrote passwords on sticky notes attached to 
PC screens, which participants P3 and P4 witnessed during their client site visits. The 
participants also shared the concern that clients still shared passwords, both in the retail 
and corporate environments. 
 
SABRIC, in conjunction with banks and cash-in-transit companies, strives to create a 
secure environment, as highlighted in its mission statement (SABRIC 2018):  
“To deliver measurable value to our clients through a team of specialists who 
consistently provide high quality support services and products, and to contribute 
to the reduction of bank related crime through effective public private partnerships. 
Together with our clients and public private partners we view crime reduction as a 
shared responsibility and collective priority.” 
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The Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) is another organisation that provides 
awareness information to both financial institutions and their clients. BASA is a 
representative of the banking sector, mandated to engage in lobbying and influence policy 
for the sector. Compared to SABRIC, the association covers a wide range of areas, which 
include financial sector legislation, client complaint procedures, and fraud awareness, to 
name but a few (BASA 2018). 
 
Training and education are not only limited to the security aspects of the system, but also 
involve system functionality. It turns out that bank clients conduct in-branch banking 
transactions that are available through online channels due to a lack of awareness 
regarding the capabilities of the online banking service. To this end, banks inform clients 
through awareness information inserted in electronic and monthly printed statements sent 
to them and through using mainstream advertising. Training and education address some 
of the fundamental aspects of system usability, which include learnability and memora-
bility, to allow users to be able to use the system consistently the first time and on subse-
quent occasions. Hence, developers need to create applications that are easy to learn and 
provide detailed and accurate reference material in case users face challenges. 
 
6.4.4 Communication 
Another aspect closely linked to awareness initiatives is that of communication strategies. 
The interview participants highlighted a number of strategies used by banks to communi-
cate with their clients, either to disseminate information or get feedback and queries from 
clients. For example, clients can report fraudulent activities in their accounts through 
online live messaging tools, feedback forms, email, and 24-hour-operated call centres. 
South African banks mainly provide 24-hour call centres for critical security-related inci-
dents such as lost credit cards and ongoing phishing attacks. 
 
Participants alluded to it being a huge challenge to make sure that clients read the infor-
mation provided and made available, be it instructions, awareness messages, or legally 
binding documents. This is a challenge not only in online banking, but also in other 
applications that require user attention to the fine print. To improve this aspect, banks 
strive to make these documents as concise as possible. In most cases, accepting the terms 
and conditions is compulsory before proceeding to one’s online banking profile, as 
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Participant P6 stated: “People do not read them. However, when you sign up for the first 
time, you cannot go through unless you have read and understood and clicked on it.” 
There are, however, no guarantees that clients actually read these documents before 
clicking on ‘Accept’ to proceed. 
 
6.4.5 System development 
One area that security and usability practitioners of online applications can address 
directly is that of system development strategies that take the inherent flaws in user behav-
iour into account. Interview participants mentioned that they followed standard software 
development strategies, which applied approved life-cycle stages. Business decisions 
such as availability of personnel skills, cost, and duration of delivering the product dictate 
the final decision on product development. Options include off-the-shelf solutions, versus 
in-house development, versus outsourcing to third parties. In some cases, a combination 
of the three options can be employed to resolve a system requirement, as long as the 
business case is made for that decision. 
 
Participants alluded to the limitations imposed on financial institutions by the problem of 
legacy systems, mainly because most banks were formed through amalgamation of small 
banks, and these brought their own systems that needed to be patched to work as a whole. 
This created an integration problem among these disparate systems, as noted by partici-
pant P1: “… the bank’s philosophy has always been to be a fast follower rather than 
creating new things from scratch but integration has been a problem. We have too many 
systems and also a strategy to decommission duplicate systems that do the same thing 
and you have 1 rather than 10 and that the longer-term project [sic].” 
 
The need to replace legacy systems can arise from a couple of issues, namely, shortage 
of skills to manage the systems that run on ‘obsolete’ platforms and lack of scalability to 
provide new technologies. Unfortunately, owing to cost implications, banks have taken a 
measured and long-term approach to solving legacy system problem, with concurrent 
migration projects running to reduce the impact on business processes and budget alloca-
tions. Participant P1 stated the following: “Each project is worth somewhere over and 
above R10 million+, so these are big projects that are all running concurrently to migrate 
to what we need and where we want to be doing business in the future.” 
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Banks also consider feedback from clients on system functionality through suggestion 
boxes and other reporting tools online. A business case is evaluated for any suggestions 
to decide whether it is a viable and feasible suggestion or functionality to add to the 
system. One bank had a system that collected ideas on how to improve business processes 
from personnel and clients for consideration during system improvement decision-
making. In this regard, participant P6 made this remark: “So if you have an idea of how 
things can be changed or expedited. You are welcome to log that idea to [sic] the system; 
at the end of the year they will have to review all those ideas.” 
 
6.4.6 Regulations 
Online banking, just as any other service in the country, does not operate in a vacuum. 
There is legislation that regulates the financial industry to ensure that industry players 
abide by the rules and regulations to protect all stakeholders against intentional or 
unintentional malicious activity. The participants were of the view that South African 
banks were doing a great job self-regulating to international standards in the absence of 
binding legislation in the cybersphere, although any shortcomings would be addressed 
through the incoming Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (Cybercrime Bill 2017), as the 
current Protection of Personal Information (PoPI) Act was insufficient to govern the ever-
expanding cybersphere. 
 
Participant P1 expressed the following view: “There are still difficult legislative issues 
and then obviously with the privacy laws with PoPI and then the execution and 
implementation of that bill probably is still a challenge on [sic] everything. Is the legisla-
tion effective? I think probably not at this moment.” The PoPI Act serves the purpose of 
ensuring that all South African institutions that collect, process, store, and share another 
entity’s personal information conduct themselves in a responsible manner by holding 
them accountable (PoPI 2013). Participant P1 thought that the weaknesses of PoPI were 
not regarding the material of the Act, but were on the implementation side; it still did not 
cover all aspects in the cybersphere: “Yeah, I think the gaps are more in [sic] the 
implementation practical implementation side. In addition, I think, I am not sure if there 
is legislative capability to legislate for [sic] new technology at this moment. I think there 
are definitely gaps.” 
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Participant P3 pointed out that “[y]our identity can be hacked from social media like by 
Facebook, now the user will always try to transfer the blame on to other people”. Hence, 
the client blames the bank for not protecting his/her account, while his/her personal infor-
mation has been compromised elsewhere. Therefore, the regulations need to also put in 
place sufficient investigative capacity to ascertain the exact cause of security breaches. 
 
Overall, the new Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill is a step in the right direction, given 
the increasing sophistication in cybercrime, which is now operated by organised crime 
groups. Among other aspects, there is the issue of dispute resolution for online banking 
security breaches. Currently, with the prevalence of SIM-swap fraud, no one is taking 
responsibility, with cases ending up in court (Ismail 2017). A dedicated legal framework 
can assist in giving direction to policing and prosecuting cybercrime, which has gone 
digital and international. 
 
6.4.7 Benefits 
Regardless of all the issues raised by both the interviewees and survey respondents, there 
was an overwhelming appreciation of the benefits online banking offered to users. Among 
the most popular benefits were convenience and time-saving, followed by ease of use and 
system availability to conduct banking transactions at any time of the day. Other cited 
benefits included satisfaction with the service, cost-effectiveness, usefulness, and safety, 
compared to visiting a branch. 
 
Banking personnel alluded to the need for banks to reduce the number of in-branch client 
visits by encouraging clients to use digital channels, as this decreased operational costs. 
South Africa is an emerging economy; hence, branch operations are still critical in main-
taining visibility in a competitive banking environment. As such, the aim is to increase 
branches, contrary to developing economies where digital channels are mature and well 
received, to the extent of scaling down branch operations. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that the South African economy is still a monetary economy, where cash continues to be 
the main medium of exchange. Participant P5 summarised this point: “No we won’t move 
away from branches in the short term near future, will we prefer our clients use electronic 
channels? Absolutely. Because it is more convenient for them and for us at the end of the 
day, but South Africa is a cash-based economy.” 
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Additionally, clients have unique queries that sometimes need face-to-face interaction or 
at least a telephonic conversation. Therefore, branches now provide telephone terminals 
for direct access to call centres for specialised advice that might not be provided by branch 
staff. Branches also provide free online banking terminals to assist clients at the branch 
with services available through online channels. 
 
6.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The qualitative data analysis gathered input from the custodians of online banking 
systems, which provided insight into the challenges faced in developing online 
applications in a socio-technical environment. The findings showed that a secure 
environment depended heavily on user behaviour for effective achievement of system 
InfoSec goals. 
 
System development that provides the functionalities for users to accomplish tasks 
depends on a number of other aspects represented by the identified themes in this chapter. 
The themes from interview participants’ responses gave insight into the perceptions of 
online banking system designers with regard to InfoSec user behaviour, including other 
related aspects that assist in developing secure and usable systems. 
 
There were six interview participants from the banking industry, and the analysis was 
performed using the framework analysis technique, based on open-coded data. Using five 
stages of framework analysis, interview data and qualitative survey data went through the 
stages, from familiarisation, to identifying a thematic framework, to indexing (coding), 
to charting, and to mapping and interpretation. Initially, the thematic framework had four 
themes; then, after the charting stage in framework analysis, two additional themes 
emerged. The final six themes were mapped to the 12 principles for final interpretation 
in the last stage of framework analysis. 
 
The analysis of interview and survey data reinforced some of the themes identified in the 
thematic framework that guided the interview schedule. These themes, together with 
newly emerging themes from open coding, then formed the basis for usable security 
design principles in the STInfoSec framework validated in Chapter 7. 
-- ooo --  
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CHAPTER 7 FRAMEWORK EVALUATION 
 
Figure 7-1: The research roadmap 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters presented quantitative and qualitative findings, respectively, 
of the MMR process followed in this study. Chapter 5 outlined the perceptions of users 
as they interacted with an online application that significantly relied on InfoSec to 
successfully fulfil its objectives. A number of hypotheses were developed and tested with 
the UTAUT model for technology adoption and continued use as foundation, based on 
540 valid responses obtained from online banking users, resulting in the development of 
a structural model that incorporated constructs from usability, security, and UTAUT2. 
Chapter 6 presented the views of the custodians of online banking on challenges faced 
when users interacted with the service, highlighting the impact of user behaviour on 
interactions with online InfoSec applications, especially in this environment with highly 
sophisticated attacks and users who were not particularly computer and InfoSec savvy. 
 
This chapter combines the findings of the previous two chapters in the development of a 
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framework highlights the socio-technical aspects of InfoSec that aid in the development 
of online InfoSec applications. The framework essentially takes into consideration users’ 
perceptions and expectations, as well as system designers’ perceptions, in the develop-
ment of such online applications. Given the increasingly social nature of InfoSec 
problems, emphasis on both the technical and social aspects of the problem is essential in 
creating applications that are both usable and secure. STInfoSec presents 12 usable secu-
rity principles that assist in achieving usable online applications. 
 
The chapter presents the evaluation process to validate the framework. The evaluation 
process was conducted using participants from academia and industry practitioners to 
obtain feedback from different perspectives for incorporation in the final framework. 
 
7.2 EVALUATION PROCESS 
The resulting usable security design principles from both the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses were evaluated by field experts from academia and the banking industry who 
had expertise in InfoSec, usability, and UX. The main objective of this process was to 
verify the significance of the usable security principles identified in the preliminary 
STInfoSec framework in addressing the problem of usable security in an online environ-
ment. Using the feedback from the evaluators, some of whom were participants in the 
qualitative interviews, the preliminary framework was finalised as a validated framework. 
The evaluation process involved the following steps. 
 
7.2.1 Step 1: Development of checklist items 
Checklist items were created for each of the selected principles, using a combination of 
the literature (previous studies), survey items, and the researcher’s discretion, in the 
context of the case study (online banking). The 12 principles each had between five and 
nine checklist items. (See Figure 7-2 and Appendix L.) The evaluation tool was loaded 
into an online tool using Google Forms. The evaluation tool consisted of five sections, 
each of which is explained briefly. 
 
Section A: Introduction – this section introduced the researcher and the background of 
the research topic to the participants, giving the context and insight into the evaluation 
process. It also explained the role of the evaluator and gave an estimate of the amount of 
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time needed to complete the evaluation process. Section B: Consent form – the consent 
form gave a brief description of the ethical considerations of the evaluation process. The 
section outlined the steps to be taken to ensure ethical conduct and protect participants’ 
privacy with regard to collection of personal information and evaluation responses. A 
detailed consent form and participation information sheets for the evaluation tool are 
provided in Appendix D. 
 
Section C: Instructions – this part had information on how to complete the evaluation 
tool. The section explained the rating scale for checklist items of the principles. The scale 
was based on these four options: very important, important, moderately important, and 
not important. Evaluators were requested to provide additional comments, which were 
optional, at the checklist item and principle level. Section D: Biographical information – 
biographical information was collected for verification purposes and to ascertain the level 
of expertise of participants. This information included their full name (optional), gender, 
age, qualifications, and years of experience in relevant fields, to mention just a few. 
Section E: Checklist items – this final section consisted of checklist items for each of the 
12 principles. It provided an introduction, with a rating scale, and reminded participants 
that they could provide additional comments. 
 
7.2.2 Step 2: Identification of participants 
The researcher identified and selected suitable participants based on the relevant expertise 
required to obtain valuable feedback. The identified expertise fields were usable security, 
InfoSec, usability, and UX. Experts from both academia and industry were invited to 
participate in order to obtain relevant knowledge from theoretical and practical perspec-
tives. Participants from academia were researchers working in the above-mentioned 
fields, while industry practitioners were banking personnel who designed and worked 
with digital channels (the same as the interview participants in Chapter 6). Table 7-1 
shows the profiles of the participants. There were seven participants, who included three 
from academia, two from private IT organisations, and two from two of the four major 
banks in South Africa (both of whom were also interview participants). 
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Table 7-1: Participants’ profiles 
Expert Specialisation Industry Experience 
(years) 
E1 Usability, UI design Academia 15 
E2 Usability Academia 11 
E3 Software testing Private IT company 2 
E4 Usable security, usability, UX Private IT company 8 
E5 Usable security, usability, UX Bank 10 
E6 Usable security, usability, UX Bank 5 
E7 Information security, usability Academia 10 
 
Five participants considered themselves to be at ‘expert’ level in at least one of the three 
relevant fields, namely, usable security, usability, and UX, with the intermediate and 
beginner levels having one participant each. Four participants had 10 or more years of 
experience in the relevant fields. The profiles showed that participants had sufficient 
experience and knowledge to provide valuable feedback in the evaluation process. The 
selection of participants from both academia and industry ensured the bridging of the gap 
between practice and theory by obtaining complementary views from diverse back-
grounds and experience. 
 
7.2.3 Step 3: Analysis of evaluation feedback 
The evaluation feedback on the framework from participants (see Appendix M for a 
sample of responses) is explained in detail in section 7.4. The analysis also incorporated 
any changes suggested by participants regarding the levels of both principles and check-
list items to improve the framework. 
 
7.3 EVALUATION FINDINGS 
The researcher sent 12 invitations to potential participants in the evaluation process, and 
seven responses were received. In line with Nielsen’s recommendations of around five 
expert evaluators for heuristic evaluation (Nielsen 1994a), the researcher obtained seven 
evaluations for consideration based on the relevant expertise. This section presents the 
feedback as provided by participants through the online evaluation tool for each principle, 
including individual checklist items. Table 7-2 provides the average scores for each 
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principle as scored by each evaluator (denoted by E1 to E7) to allow for a high-level 
analysis of the feedback. 
 
Table 7-2: Average evaluation scores 





1 Visibility 3.5 4 2.7 3.7 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.4 The system has to be user-
friendly and direct users to 
where to correct populated 
details. 
2 Learnability 3.3 3.6 2.6 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.4 3.3 The learnability principle 
is very important, 
especially for the older 
generation. 
3 Errors 3 3.6 3.4 3.1 2.5 4 3.5 3.3 There is still a need to hide 
some specific error 
information to avoid 
attacks that exploit too-
detailed error messages. 
For example, a reply that 
username and password do 
not match is preferred to 
precisely which detail is 
incorrect to avoid brute-
force attack vectors. 
Security is always a trade-
off with user experience. 
4 Availability 3 3.6 3 3.4 3 3.4 4 3.3 The new generation wants 
change. 
5 Satisfaction 3.2 3 2.7 3.6 2.9 2.7 4 3.2 None. 
6 Revocability 2.9 3.1 4 2.8 3 3.3 4 3.3 The provision of a 




3 3.2 3 2.8 2.4 2.4 4 3.0 None. 
8 User language 3.2 4 3.6 3 4 3 4 3.5 Again, too much 
information might be 
dangerous. We do not 
mention all the security 
capabilities of our systems 
to the end-user. 
9 User 
suitability 
2.8 3.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 4 3.0 It is important to always 
assume that the user is 
novice, especially in the 
information security field. 
10 Help and 
documentation 
3.1 4 3.4 3 3.9 3.2 4 3.5 None. 
11 Privacy 3.5 4 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 4 3.8 None. 
12 Security 3.6 4 3.7 4 4 4 4 3.9 None. 
 Average per 
participant 
3.2 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.9  
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Additional comments or feedback provided by participants is presented as recommenda-
tions. These are meant to improve each principle in addressing the relevant aspects of 
usable security in system design. Using a four-point Likert scale, the participants rated 
the importance of each checklist item included in a principle to determine whether the 
system developers needed to consider it during system development. The Likert scale 
used the following scores: 1 = not important, 2 = moderately important, 3 = important, 
and 4 = very important. 
 
Each participant’s evaluation of individual principles based on scores for individual 
checklist items averaged above three (shown as ‘Average per participant’). This indicated 
that all participants considered each principle to be at least ‘important’ for usable security 
design. In addition, the overall average for each principle across all participants (shown 
by the ‘Average per principle’ column) also indicated that the principle was considered 
by all participants to be at least ‘important’. 
 
Although, cumulatively, all principles scored above three (‘important’), some individual 
checklist items were scored ‘not important’ and ‘moderately important’ by some partici-
pants. This was due to some reservations regarding specific checklist items in certain 
situations. For example, even if it is important to always provide users with detailed error 
messages, in some instances, too much information helps attackers. An example men-
tioned by one participant from a bank was not telling users whether the username or pass-
word as entered was incorrect, but just indicating that the information did not match, as 
this would significantly decrease the chances of a brute-force attack being successful. 
 
One participant had reservations about system customisation to support both novice and 
expert users, stating the following: “Always assume the user is novice especially in the 
information security field.” This is contrary to suggestions by Nielsen (1995) to offer 
support for varying skills sets. The researcher, thus, concluded that, wherever possible, 
support for diverse skills levels was important. Only when such a design is not possible 
should the system default to novice-user settings. Hence, wherever possible, support for 
both user types is crucial. 
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7.4 VALIDATED STINFOSEC FRAMEWORK 
The validated STInfoSec framework after the evaluation process is presented in 
Figure 7-2. The framework provides mapping of themes and principles in the socio-
technical system, with some themes contributing to more than one component of the 
socio-technical matrix. For example, InfoSec and system development address aspects 
from both technology and tasks of the technical sub-system. In line with the original STS 
model, the four components are not independent from one another as they are all 
interrelated. The sections below briefly explain the four components of the socio-
technical sub-systems in relation to Figure 7-2, with emphasis on specific usable security 
principles to contextualise the framework. 
 
7.4.1 Structure 
Structure is the first component of the social sub-system and consists of regulations, 
usability, and communications. Regulations are a critical aspect in the structure compo-
nent. Although there are no principles directly linked to regulations, they form the funda-
mental building blocks of a regulated banking environment. The responsibility for formu-
lating regulations falls in the realms of the government, in consultation with business 
(financial institutions). Financial institutions can also form a coalition, such as the 
SABRIC consortium, to share ideas on a variety of areas. The government seeks to create 
a balance between providing a business environment where organisations can operate and 
make a profit, while – at the same time – protecting and looking after the interests of 
citizens. Such regulations in the South African context include PoPI for the protection of 
clients’ personal information that organisations collect and the incoming all-
encompassing Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (Cybercrime Bill 2017). The 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill aims to regulate offences committed in cyberspace, 
an area that currently has significant shortcomings in South African legislation. The 
structure component of the social sub-system also includes usability principles (visibility, 
learnability, and satisfaction) and communication-related principles, namely, user 
language and user suitability. 
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1 The system shows the user the progress status during a visible delay in response time. 
2 The system visibly shows the current selection/data input field. 
3 The system clearly highlights the problem field with regard to error messages. 
4 There is some form of feedback for every security-related action. 
5 The system visibly shows the location of security-related options.  
6 The help information for assisting the user is visible and easily accessible. 
B. Learnability 
1 The system provides easy-to-learn training material. 
2 There is a quick-start guide to assist the user. 
3 Security and non-security operations are easy to learn and use. 
4 Security items have been grouped into logical zones, and headings have been used to distinguish among the zones. 
5 The system presents security and non-security information in a standardised format. 
6 Security options are selected by default. 
7 The user interface makes it obvious which security items are currently selected. 
8 The system protects users against making serious errors. 
C. Satisfaction 
1 The actual process of using the system is fun and enjoyable. 
2 The most frequently used function keys are in the most accessible positions. 
3 Security-related prompts imply that the user is in control. 
4 Each individual security setting is a member of a family of security options. 
5 The security mechanisms of the system provide a sense of protection to the user. 
6 Colour has been used specifically to draw attention, communicate organisation, indicate status changes, and establish 
relationships for security- and non-security-related actions. 
7 Users can personalise their own system, session, file, and screen defaults, such as the landing page. 
8 The system fulfils its claimed capabilities. 
9 The system completes unambiguous partial input in a data entry field. 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
A. Availability 
1 The system is always available, with minimum and non-interruptive downtime. 
2 The system makes sure that all system functionalities are available at all times. 
3 Scheduled downtime is communicated in advance and scheduled during off-peak times. 
4 The system limits the frequency of changes to the user interface. 
5 Updates to the system’s user interface do not result in users having to learn the system all over again. 
B. Errors 
1 System error messages are grammatically correct and accurate in stating the problem, with enough information for 
corrective measures/actions. 
2 Security-related error messages inform the user of the severity of the error. 
3 Menu items are arranged logically to prevent users making serious errors. 
4 The system warns users if they are about to make a potentially serious error. 
5 The system allows users to recover from errors quickly and easily. 
6 The error messages of the system do not interfere with the users’ work, whenever possible. 
7 The system clearly asks for users’ confirmation of serious and possibly irrevocable actions. 
8 The system supports both novice and expert users and provides multiple levels of error message detail. 
C. Revocability 
1 Security options in menus make it obvious whether deselection is possible. 
2 Users can easily reverse their security and non-security actions. 
3 Prompts imply a necessary security action, with words in the message consistent with that action. 
4 The system has been designed so that keys with similar names do not perform opposite (and potentially dangerous) 
security actions. 
5 Users can cancel operations in progress. 
6 There are ‘undo’ and ‘redo’ functions at the level of a single security action or for a complete group of security actions. 
7 The system provides confirmation for actions that have drastic and possibly destructive consequences. 
8 The system has a clearly marked exit. 
COMMUNICATION 
A. User language 
1 The system allows the user to choose a preferred language. 
2 Security actions and objects are named consistently across all prompts in the design. 
3 Security information is accurate, complete, and understandable. 
4 Security questions are stated in clear and simple language, where used. 
5 The translation for preferred language selection is accurate. 
B. User suitability 
1 Security information is accurate, complete, and understandable to all types of 
system users (experienced and novice). 
2 Users can define and group their own synonyms for commands for easier access. 
3 Users can navigate forwards and backwards within operations. 
4 The system avoids the use of security and privacy jargon. 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
A. Help and documentation 
1 The help function is visible; for example, a key labelled HELP or a special menu is 
provided. 
2 The help function is easy to access, and return from, allowing users to resume their 
work from where they left off after accessing help. 
3 The help function covers security- and non-security-related information. 
4 The system provides an up-to-date security centre, with security training and 
awareness information. 
5 The system provides a 24-hour help desk for critical security incidents. 
6 The system provides a complete and accurate help function and a FAQs section. 
7 The help and FAQs materials are searchable and grouped in logical categories. 
8 The system provides detailed training and education material on how to complete 
basic tasks. 
9 The system provides a search function for locating system functions. 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
A. Security 
1 Critical transactions require out-of-band authentication such as an OTP/SMS. 
2 The system initiates a session lock after a period of inactivity or on user request. 
3 The system employs encryption techniques to prevent unauthorised disclosure of, and access 
to, information in storage and transmission. 
4 The system enforces a limit on consecutive invalid access attempts by a user during a period of 
time. 
5 The system implements an appropriate time-out logoff period. 
6 The system encrypts passwords in storage and in transmission. 
7 The system enforces password restrictions, such as complexity, length, expiry period, reuse, 
etc. 
8 System password requirements are complex enough to avoid simple password-cracking 
attacks. 
B. Privacy 
1 The system asks for consent before collecting personal information. 
2 The statements asking for user consent are written in clear and simple language that the user 
understands. 
3 The system clearly states what personal information is collected and for what purposes it will 
be used. 
4 The system requires users to confirm statements indicating that they understand the conditions 
of access. 
5 The system asks for permission before distributing personal information to third parties. 
6 The personal information collection and storage mechanisms comply with the data protection 
regulations of the country. 
7 Protected or confidential areas are accessible using password authentication. 
C. Expressiveness 
1 Users are initiators of security actions rather than respondents. 
2 The system correctly anticipates, and prompts for, the user’s probable next security-relat d 
activity. 
3 By looking, the user can tell the security state of the system and the alternatives for security-
related actions, if needed. 
4 The system clearly states its security capabilities. 
5 The system clearly states the users’ responsibilities in terms of security actions. 
BENEFITS 
1 Convenience 
2 Saving time 






Figure 7-2: Validated STInfoSec framework 
Online banking 
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7.4.2 People 
The people component consists of stakeholders in the online banking environment; these include 
users, developers, and management. These people play different roles in creating a secure and 
usable online banking service. Training and education make up the main theme in this component, 
as applicable to the assistance given to users to help them use the system effectively and efficiently 
through the principle of help and documentation. The theme of training and education also applies 
to the other stakeholders (developers and management) to assist them in carrying out their 
respective duties efficiently, although this falls outside the scope of this study. 
 
7.4.3 Technology 
The technology component in the technical sub-system consists of general system development 
and InfoSec mechanisms. System development ensures that the system addresses principles such 
as system availability, prevention of, and recovery from, errors, and revocability of transactions. 
In the context of InfoSec, the system provides technical capabilities to protect information assets 
in transit and in storage, such as system authentication, access control measures, and encryption 
mechanisms. Hence, the technology component essentially addresses actual development of 
InfoSec mechanisms that later provide the InfoSec tasks identified below. 
 
7.4.4 Tasks 
The second component of the technical sub-system, tasks, ensures that the system provides 
functionalities as expected by the users. These include actual online banking activities such as 
paying bills, managing accounts, and applying for new services. In addition, the system provides 
protection of personal and financial information using InfoSec mechanisms as provided by the 
system development component. These tasks are provided through the principles of security, 
privacy, and expressiveness. This component also includes the benefits offered by online banking 
tasks as identified by users through the qualitative section of the survey. 
 
In the final STInfoSec framework, the principles include each of the detailed checklist items for 
easy application during the development process. The principles can also be used to evaluate an 
existing online banking application to check whether the service addresses usable security 
requirements. No further adjustments were made to the preliminary STInfoSec framework based 
on feedback from participants. However, recommendations were made and implications pointed 
out regarding principles and checklist items, as noted in Table 7-2. The proposed STInfoSec 
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framework helps give direction on how exactly to develop usable security applications through a 
checklist that applies the identified principles. 
 
7.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The goal of this research was to assist in the development of online applications with a framework 
that applied a socio-technical view. Combined with UTAUT2, STS can be used to explain user 
acceptance and continued use of technology. UTAUT2 essentially predicts users’ behaviour in 
deciding to adopt or reject a technology artefact. Hence, aiding the development of such artefacts 
through improving aspects that significantly make users reject a technology, such as a lack of 
usability and security, while optimising positive aspects, helps improve the adoption and continued 
use of such technology. 
 
The preliminary framework was evaluated by seven evaluators from academia and the industry 
with a usability and InfoSec background. This process involved applying a heuristic evaluation 
method based on a checklist to each design principle to investigate the compliance of interface 
features with reputable usability principles. All 12 principles had above-average scores, and none 
of them were dropped from the final framework, shown in Figure 7-4. The principles were grouped 
into six identified themes. 
 
To achieve this goal, firstly, the factors that affect user behaviour and encourage or prevent users 
from doing the right thing, even when they know the risks associated with non-compliance with 
InfoSec requirements, should be identified. Secondly, the design of InfoSec in online applications 
needs to identify the factors that make users feel inclined to bypass or ignore InfoSec mechanisms. 
For these reasons, the researcher assert that a socio-technical approach to InfoSec systems design 
can fulfil the goal of creating applications that are secure and usable, and the STInfoSec framework 
is one such approach. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with an overall overview of the entire 
research. 
 
-- ooo -- 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
Figure 8-1: The research roadmap 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes the research by providing highlights that emanated from conducting this 
project. The research began with the main objective of developing a framework that assists in the 
development of secure and usable sensitive online applications based on the socio-technical 
approach. The framework was used to address usable security challenges in an online environment 
that relied heavily on conforming user behaviour by users who needed to be vigilant at all times 
to mitigate escalating online InfoSec threats. Unfortunately, it is difficult to rely on users’ ever-
changing behaviour; therefore, online application design must employ strategies that try to cater 
for user behaviour, taking into account inherent human limitations such as limited memory load. 
 
The resultant product of this research was the STInfoSec framework that essentially considered 
InfoSec as a social problem that required a socio-technical approach for a holistic view of the 
problem. Using online banking as a case study, the STInfoSec framework presented 12 usable 
security principles for developing and evaluating this service in addressing usable security aspects, 
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This chapter first presents a synopsis of the research questions and objectives that were outlined 
at the beginning of the study. This is followed by major contributions of the research to both the 
theoretical and practical body of knowledge. The limitations of the study are then presented, 
followed by potential further research areas to build on this research. 
 
8.2 SYNOPSIS OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The researcher outlined research questions and research objectives to be answered and achieved, 
respectively, for a successful research project. This section provides a mapping of these research 
goals to how they were addressed during the course of the project. 
 
The problem addressed in this research as mentioned in Chapter 1 was that sensitive online 
applications (such as online banking) do not meet both information security and usability 
objectives. The research proposed a framework to help in the development of secure and usable 
online InfoSec applications in the context of online banking. This led to the primary research 
question, formulated as follows: How can information security-sensitive online applications be 
designed to be both secure and usable? This question translated into the following primary 
objective of the study: To develop a socio-technical framework that assists in the development 
of secure and usable sensitive online applications. This section provides a synopsis of how sub-
questions were each addressed in answering the research question and achieving the research 
objective. 
 
8.2.1 Research question 1 
What are the requirements for a socio-technical framework for the development of secure and 
usable information security online applications? 
 
The design of a socio-technical framework requires an investigation of the socio-technical issues 
that need to be addressed by the framework. In the South Africa context, the adoption of online 
banking is considerably lower than the universal average, as cited in Section 2.10. This was the 
second motivation for choosing online banking as a case study. This question called for 
investigation and identification of factors that influenced user decisions in adopting or accepting 
a new technology. UTAUT2 is a widely used and accepted model for investigating technology 
adoption and continued use. The researcher contended that such factors, in the context of online 
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InfoSec applications, were socio-technical in nature. Therefore, for successful design, both the 
technical and social aspects needed attention. In light of this conclusion, the research postulated 
security and usability impacts as aspects that affected adoption, in addition to the conventional 
concepts identified by a unified model such as UTAUT2. The requirements were identified in the 
literature presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 highlighted online information security threats 
to which online users usually fell victim, while Chapter 3 identified usable security aspects for the 
design of online InfoSec applications. 
 
Based on survey and interview findings, supported by a literature review, the research identified a 
group of 12 usable security design principles for online banking service. These principles were 
presented in a preliminary framework in Chapter 3 for validation and improvement into a final 
STInfoSec framework for the design of secure and usable online InfoSec applications. 
 
Using SEM, the inferential part of the analysis investigated the significance of theorised constructs 
for overall adoption and acceptance of online banking in South Africa. The measurement models 
of SEM were computed for each construct before integrating all measurement models in the overall 
structural model. Two measurement models did not pass the goodness-of-fit tests (price value and 
user suitability), and these were excluded from the final SEM model. The hypotheses for the 
remaining 15 measurement models were tested, and a further six constructs were not supported. 
The final research model had nine constructs that were found to have a significant effect on online 
banking adoption and continued use. This was followed by multigroup analysis that sought to 
establish the effect of moderating factors on constructs based on dichotomous groups of 
respondents. Overall, the analysis found the effects on different groups to be mainly insignificant 
for most moderating factors, with the exception of two factors: experience and ethnicity. 
 
8.2.2 Research question 2 
How can a socio-technical framework for the development of secure and usable information 
security online applications be designed? 
 
Chapter 3 provided a preliminary framework for the design of online InfoSec applications, 
presented in Figure 3-4. The framework involved the integration of usability, security, and 
UTAUT2 constructs that fed into the four components of a socio-technical model based on online 
banking service, culminating in the 12 usable security design principles. Using an MMR design, 
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presented in Chapter 4, data was collected from both online banking users and developers. Chapter 
5 presented quantitative data collection and analysis, while Chapter 6 reported on qualitative data 
collection and analysis. 
 
SEM was applied to survey findings, highlighting the relationships among hypothesised 
constructs, moderated through a number of factors. This question was answered by the findings of 
the SEM model and multigroup analysis for moderating effects. The hypotheses included 
constructs from UTAUT2, InfoSec, and usability. The UTAUT2 model theorises concepts 
significant to individuals’ intention to accept and continue to use a technology. In this research, 
the model was applied to explain the adoption of online banking service, which is an information 
system application that relies significantly on InfoSec mechanisms to protect users’ financial and 
personal information. It was the contention of this research that the service was a socio-technical 
system that relied on both technical and social aspects for a secure environment; hence, two aspects 
that needed attention in systems design for the system to achieve its goals were added, namely, 
security and usability. The findings were presented in a structural model that explained user 
behaviour in online banking as a case study, as well as its relationship to service adoption and 
continued use. The results showed that usability principles, including SUS items, had a significant 
influence on users’ behavioural intention and adoption of online banking. From an InfoSec point 
of view, privacy issues were found to have a significant impact, while security was not significant. 
 
What transpired during interviews with participants was that online banking developers were 
aware of challenges posed by user behaviour in interaction with ISs, especially those with InfoSec 
mechanisms. The interview participants raised a number of issues that assisted in the design of 
usable security based on six themes: system development, InfoSec, training and education, 
usability, regulations, and communication. Specific issues were raised in each of these themes, as 
noted in Chapter 6, but the overwhelming theme alluded to the notion that a secure environment 
depended heavily on user behaviour for the achievement of InfoSec system goals. 
 
8.2.3 Research question 3 
How can a socio-technical framework for the development of secure and usable information 
security online applications be validated? 
 
   
 184 | P a g e  
 
The preliminary STInfoSec framework that was developed in Chapter 3 and the data collected and 
analysed on the identified design principles for a socio-technical approach in Chapters 5 and 6 
were validated in Chapter 7. The combination of the survey constructs of technology acceptance, 
information security, and usability of online applications yielded six main themes critical to usable 
security design in online banking. The themes were later mapped to the usable security design 
principles, showing areas where the principles might be addressed during system development. 
This mapping was provided in the final STInfoSec framework (Figure 7-2). The framework was 
validated using a heuristic evaluation method, based on checklist items (also included in Figure 7-
2) for each principle, to address usable security problems. On the one hand, the checklist items can 
be used as a usable security evaluation tool for existing online banking systems. On the other hand, 
the principles can be used to evaluate existing online banking applications by applying the 
checklist items to identify and address usability problems. The evaluation was conducted using 
seven experts in the fields of usability, information security, and usable security. 
 
8.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contribution of the research to the usable security body of knowledge was two-fold, namely, 
a theoretical contribution and a practical contribution; both contributed to the design of online 
InfoSec applications. 
 
8.3.1 Theoretical contribution 
Theoretically, the research contributed to the usable security body of knowledge by proposing a 
validated socio-technical STInfoSec framework for the development of online InfoSec 
applications. The research also hypothesised the impact of UTAUT2, InfoSec, and usability on 
adoption and continued use of online banking service. The STInfoSec framework views InfoSec 
as a social problem and presents 12 usable security design principles for the development of online 
InfoSec applications. The principles identified were specifically developed for online banking, but 
with minimum adaptation, these can be used to address other similar online applications. 
 
Furthermore, the STInfoSec framework consists of checklist items that can be used as an 
evaluation tool of existing online banking and other related applications to investigate whether 
these applications satisfy usable security design requirements. 
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The research provided new insights into the use of MMR design in information systems to 
investigate usable security based on a combination of survey and interview data collection 
techniques in the context of online banking. 
 
8.3.2 Practical contribution 
The results of STInfoSec framework validation by field experts showed that the final framework 
could contribute to the development of secure and usable online banking applications. This would 
help create a secure online environment to allow the service to meet its intended goals from the 
points of view of both financial institutions and online banking users. A secure online environment 
encourages the adoption of the service, which, in turn, allows financial institutions to achieve a 
return on their investment in digital channels. This allows the banks to reach a large customer base, 
while decreasing costs by cutting back on branch operations and onsite staff. A secure and usable 
online banking service allows users to trust the service, thus encouraging adoption; most 
importantly, users feel safe in conducting a wide range of online banking transactions, thereby 
optimising benefits such as convenience, time-saving, and ease of use. 
 
Apart from assisting in the development of usable security applications, the framework can be 
used to evaluate existing online banking applications using the checklist items validated for each 
principle. This process gives insight into the compliance of the current development process, while 
also simultaneously identifying areas of improvement. 
 
8.4 LIMITATIONS 
The research used online banking as a case study for the development of usable security of online 
applications. Hence, the application of the proposed framework to similar online applications 
might need small adaptations. The framework was limited to usable security principles, not 
extensive usability or information security principles in isolation. Therefore, principles that had 
no direct link to both usability and InfoSec were beyond the scope of this research project. 
 
The research investigated adoption and continued use problems of online banking based on 
perceptions of users who were currently using the service. Although these users could help bring 
to light factors that made potential users hesitant to take up the service, a more in-depth 
investigation of adoption problems can be achieved by obtaining the perceptions of users not using 
the service. Furthermore, given the method of questionnaire distribution used, the researcher 
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acknowledges the bias towards respondents that held higher education qualifications. This group 
of respondents was the most accessible to the researcher through online questionnaire distribution 
mechanisms. 
 
Besides the identified and investigated usability principles, there are numerous other principles not 
addressed, not because they are not important, but because they were beyond the scope of the 
study. These include accessibility, which focuses on system accessibility to a wider range of users, 
including those with disabilities (Preece et al. 2015), and efficiency, which measures the speed 
with which users can achieve their goals accurately and completely after learning to use the system 
to some expert level (Rubin & Chisnell 2008). 
 
Although the framework was evaluated by security and usability experts in both academia and 
industry, it was not tested in production settings. It has to be noted that, although the framework 
can assist in the development of a system, its application in a production setting will require that a 
number of other areas be addressed first. For example, external aspects such as cost and business 
goals often dictate the feasibility of any project in an organisation. Thus, the framework can assist 
in other initiatives currently in use to address development issues in usable security. 
 
The framework proposed was not intended to solve problems associated with user behaviour 
regarding InfoSec, but it was meant to complement current proposed solutions in the field by 
contributing to the body of knowledge. Hence, even its implementation would need to take into 
consideration further aspects that might come from other fields and research studies and should 
not take place in isolation, as the InfoSec issue has since been identified as a social problem, with 
many facets that require a holistic socio-technical approach to finding solutions. 
 
This holistic view requires the input of all stakeholders in the environment where information 
systems are developed and deployed, with emphasis on user-centred approaches. There is a need 
for the government to play a central role in educating citizens (especially at an early age) regarding 
the threats to InfoSec in a digital economy. This could possibly be done through the introduction 
of fundamental aspects in the school curriculum. There are countries already taking this initiative, 
with some degree of success (Cross, Shaw, Hadwen, Cardoso, Slee, Roberts, Thomas & Barnes 
2016). In the context of Africa and other developing countries, Von Solms and Von Solms (2014) 
offer some suggestions, and one can only assume that such awareness initiatives are bound to raise 
awareness and mitigate cybersecurity threats. 
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8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section provides information on further research opportunities in the area of this topic: usable 
security. These are suggestions that will assist in expanding the body of knowledge for secure and 
usable online applications. 
 
8.5.1 Adoption 
The perceptions of bank account holders with internet access, but not currently registered for 
online banking, will give an in-depth understanding of why these clients are not adopting the 
service. Hence, an investigation that involves only this group of respondents will assist in 
identifying the underlying factors that affect online banking adoption in South Africa. 
 
8.5.2 Information security 
InfoSec of online applications can be improved by using biometric technology, although there are 
still challenges. Research in this area is worthwhile to circumvent sophisticated online threats 
posed by organised crime organisations. Apart from mainstream use of biometric solutions, the 
usability of biometric technology needs further research for an improved InfoSec environment. 
 
8.5.3 Usability 
In terms of usability, further work could look at additional principles not included in this research. 
As noted in the literature review in Chapter 3, there are numerous usability and InfoSec principles 
that contribute to usable security design. Hence, an investigation of additional principles is 
necessary. 
 
8.5.4 User experience 
An investigation of in-depth UX of online InfoSec applications using online banking as a case 
study is warranted, given that we are currently moving beyond just the functionality and usability 
of online services for customer satisfaction, especially as users become technology savvy, and 
there are now a wide range of online services competing for users’ attention. UX is becoming more 
of a need than a want to gain customer loyalty and retain customers in the digital environment. 
 
8.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter concluded the research project by summarising the major aspects of the study, 
including giving a synopsis of the research questions and objectives. The chapter also highlighted 
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the theoretical and practical contributions of the research, followed by research limitations and 
suggestions for further work. 
 
In conclusion, InfoSec is increasingly becoming more complex, especially given the sophistication 
of attacks due to organised crime syndicates and the number of financial benefits associated with 
cybercrime. To make matters worse, more and more novice computer users are becoming 
participants in the digital world, with minimum or no InfoSec awareness of cyberthreats. 
Therefore, the concerted effort of all stakeholders is necessary to address the InfoSec problem in 
this digital environment in order to enable the development of holistic solutions. One aspect of 
such solutions is consideration of the involvement of human behaviour in the interaction of human 
beings with information systems. As such, this research is one step towards the needed holistic 
view of addressing InfoSec problems. 
 
-- ooo -- 
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Appendix B: Consent forms – Survey 
Respondent Number: _____________ 
 
 
Letter of informed consent to be signed by all respondents 
Research Project: USABILITY OF ONLINE BANKING SECURITY 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Researcher:  Mr. M. Mujinga 
Promoter: Prof. MM Eloff 
Co-Promoter: Prof. JH Kroeze 
School of Computing 
College of Science, Engineering and Technology 
University of South Africa 
 
Dear Prospective Respondent 
My name is Mathias Mujinga and I am doing research with Prof MM Eloff 
(Research Professor: Institute for Corporate Citizenship) and Prof JH Kroeze 
(Chair, Department: School of Computing) towards a PhD in Computer Science 
at the University of South Africa. I am inviting you to participate in a study 
entitled “USABILITY OF ONLINE BANKING SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES”. I am 
requesting your participation in this study. The research was reviewed and 
approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the College of Science, 
Engineering and Technology, Unisa. The study looks at the usability aspects of 
online banking security service, particularly; the design, development and 
human-related aspects of online banking websites and how these aspects affect 
the effective use of such service. Your participation will be in the form of a 
questionnaire respondent. 
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Data collected will remain confidential, but it can only be disposed after five 
years because of the university rules. After five years all material used in this 
survey will be destroyed. 
The questionnaire will take a maximum of ten (10) minutes to complete. Should 
you wish to participant in this study; please fill in and sign the section below 
I __________________________________________________________ (full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document 
and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the 
research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project 
at any time, should I so desire. I hereby give permission that my responses may 
be used in the above research project, provided that none of my personal details 
will be made public in the published research report. 
Should you wish to complete the online version of the questionnaire please click 
the button below: 
Take Online Survey Here 
 
Signature: __________________________________ Date: _________________ 
 
Place: ______________________________________ 
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COVER LETTER TO AN ONLINE ANONYMOUS WEB-BASED SURVEY 
 
Dear Prospective Respondent, 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey conducted by Mathias Mujinga for the 
research project entitled: “Usability of Online Banking Security Technologies” 
under the supervision of Prof MM Eloff (Research Professor: Institute for 
Corporate Citizenship) and Prof JH Kroeze (Chair, Department: School of 
Computing towards a PhD in Computer Science at the University of South Africa. 
 
The survey you have received has been designed to study the user acceptance 
and usability evaluation of online banking service in South Africa. You were 
selected to participate in this survey because you use online banking service 
provided by a South African bank. You will not be eligible to complete the survey 
if you do not use online banking service provided by any of the South African 
banks. By completing this survey, you agree that the information you provide may 
be used for research purposes only, including dissemination through peer-
reviewed publications and conference proceedings.  
 
It is anticipated that the information we gain from this survey will help us to 
develop a framework for the design of secure and usable online banking service. 
You are, however, under no obligation to complete the survey and you can 
withdraw from the study prior to submitting the survey.  The survey is developed 
to be anonymous, meaning that we will have no way of connecting the information 
that you provide to you personally. Consequently, you will not be able to withdraw 
from the study once you have clicked the send button based on the anonymous 
nature of the survey. If you choose to participate in this survey it will take up no 
more than 15 minutes of your time. You will not benefit from your participation as 
an individual, however, it is envisioned that the findings of this study will shed 
light into the design of online banking services to improve the security of the 
service by making it more user-friendly. We do not foresee that you will 
experience any negative consequences by completing the survey. The 
researcher(s) undertake to keep any information provided herein confidential, not 
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to let it out of our possession and to report on the findings from the perspective 
of the participating group and not from the perspective of an individual. 
 
The records will be kept for five years for audit purposes where after it will be 
permanently destroyed. Hard copies will be shredded and electronic versions will 
be permanently deleted from the hard drives of any computers used.  You will not 
be reimbursed or receive any incentives for your participation in the survey.  
 
The research was reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee of 
the College of Science, Engineering and Technology, Unisa. The primary 
researcher, Mathias Mujinga, can be contacted during office hours at 
mujinm@unisa.ac.za and 011 471 3154. The study leaders can be contacted 
during office hours at: Prof MM Eloff (eloffmm@unisa.ac.za and 012 433 4604) 
and Prof JH Kroeze (kroezjh@unias.ac.za and 011 670 9117).  Should you have 
any questions regarding the ethical aspects of the study, you can contact the 
chairperson of the Research Ethics Committee of the College of Science, 
Engineering and Technology, Prof E Mnkandla during office hours at 
mnkane@unisa.ac.za and 011 670 9059. Alternatively, you can report any 
serious unethical behaviour at the University’s Toll Free Hotline 0800 86 96 93. 
 
You are making a decision whether or not to participate by opening the survey 
link. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time prior to clicking the send 
button. 
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Appendix C: Consent forms – Interviews 
Respondent Number: _____________ 
 
Letter of informed consent to be signed by all participants 
Research Project: A FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SECURE AND USABLE ONLINE INFORMATION SECURITY 
APPLICATIONS 
Researcher:  Mr. M. Mujinga 
Promoter: Prof. MM. Eloff 
Joint Promoter: Prof. JH. Kroeze 
School of Computing, College of Science, Engineering and Technology 
University of South Africa 
Dear Prospective participant 
I am conducting research for my PhD studies on the usability of online banking 
security; I am requesting your participation in this study. The study investigates 
the usability aspects of online banking security technology, particularly; the 
design, development and human-related aspects of online banking security 
tools and how these aspects affect the effective use of such tools. Your 
participation will be in the form of an interview and the interview will take a 
maximum of one (1) hour to complete. 
Interviews will be recorded using a digital recorder. Data collected during the 
interview will remain confidential, but it can only be disposed after five years 
because of the university rules. After five years all material used in this interview 
will be destroyed. 
Anonymity of the participants will be strictly protected and all data collected 
from the participants will be treated with full confidentiality. Please note that 
only the researcher, promoter and joint promoter will have access to the data 
collected at any point in time during the course of the research. 
Should you agree to participant in this study, please fill in and sign the section 
below 
I _______________________________________________________ (full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document 
and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the 
research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project 
at any time, should I so desire. I hereby give permission that my responses may 
be used in the above research project, provided that none of my personal details 
will be made public in the published research report. 
 
Signature: __________________________________ Date: _________________ 
Place: _______________________________________ 
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PARTICIPANT’S INFORMATION SHEET 
Dear Prospective Participant 
My name is Mathias Mujinga and I am doing research with Prof MM Eloff 
(Research Professor: Institute for Corporate Citizenship) and Prof JH Kroeze 
(Chair, Department: School of Computing) towards a PhD in Computer Science 
at the University of South Africa. We are inviting you to participate in a study 
entitled “A Framework to Promote the Development of Secure and Usable Online 
Information Security Applications”. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework for secure and usable online 
banking service. I am conducting this research to investigate the current 
standards for design and development of online banking websites and investigate 
the general usability of this service to the user. We intend to develop a framework 
that incorporates user interface design principles that cater for security, usability 
and user experience goals. 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
I need to interview at least one member of the ICT sections of all four major South 
African banks and you have been chosen to represent your bank. 
I obtained your contact details from <name> and I invite you to participate in this 
research as you are currently working with ICT systems at <bank name>. I 
believe you can contribute to the current state of South African online banking 
security and their improved usability and user experience for clients by answering 
the questions posed in this study. 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY? 
The study involves the initial audio-recording of your responses to semi-
structured interviews with the likelihood of scheduling another follow-up interview. 
Your exact role in the interview for the research will be to answer the questions. 
The interview will take a maximum of one hour and will be scheduled at your 
convenience and at a location of your choice. 
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CAN YOU WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED 
TO PARTICIPATE? 
Participating in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent 
to participation. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information 
sheet to keep and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. During the interview session 
you can also decide not to answer any specific question without giving a reason. 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
The results of this study have the potential to assist the stakeholders with the 
development of online banking services that are user-friendly, which in turn 
fosters effective use and encourage adoption of the service. Potential 
stakeholders that are set to benefit from this research are financial institutions 
and online banking users. 
ARE THEIR ANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR YOU IF YOU 
PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT? 
The anticipated inconvenience will be finding the time to conduct the interview, 
hence the recommendation that you choose the time and place for the interview. 
WILL THE INFORMATION THAT YOU CONVEY TO THE RESEARCHER AND 
YOUR IDENTITY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
Please note that your name will not be recorded anywhere and no one will be 
able to connect you to your answers as you will be given a fictitious participant 
code associated with your responses. This code also applies to any publications 
or other research report methods such as presentations at conferences.  
Your answers will only be reviewed by people responsible for ensuring that 
research is done properly, including research promoters (supervisors), a 
transcriber, an external coder and members of the Research Ethics Committee. 
Therefore, the records that identify you will be available strictly to people working 
on the study, unless you give permission for other people to see the records.  
A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants 
will not be identifiable in such a report. Results will also be published in the thesis, 
which will be available on the Unisa Institutional Repository. 
HOW WILL THE RESEARCHER(S) PROTECT THE SECURITY OF DATA? 
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Interview recording digital files will be stored by the researcher for a period of five 
years on a password protected computer/hard drive. Future use of the stored 
data will be subject to a further Research Ethics Review and approval, if 
applicable. All data and information (documents and tape recorders) collected 
during the course of this research will be incinerated after five years.  
WILL YOU RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING 
IN THIS STUDY? 
We do not provide any financial benefit for participation, but you are given an 
opportunity to have your say and contribute towards enhancing the current state 
of online banking service. 
HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL? 
This study has received written approval from the Research Ethics Committee of 
the College of Science, Engineering and Technology, Unisa. A copy of the 
approval letter is attached to this information pack. Please do not hesitation to 
contact the researcher or any of the provided contacts for more information and 
clarity with regard to ethical issues. 
HOW WILL YOU BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS/RESULTS OF THE 
RESEARCH? 
If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact 
Mathias Mujinga on 011 471 3154 or mujinm@unisa.ac.za. The findings are 
accessible for a period of two (2) years after completion of the research. 
Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher 
about any aspect of this study, please contact him via the same telephone 
number or e-mail address. Should you have concerns about the way in which the 
research has been conducted, you may contact the study leaders Prof MM Eloff 
and Prof JH Kroeze via the contact details given below.  
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in 
this study. 
MATHIAS MUJINGA 
PhD Candidate (UNISA) | mujinm@unisa.ac.za | 011 471 3154 
PROMOTERS: 
Prof MM Eloff (UNISA)  | eloffmm@unisa.ac.za | 012 433 4604 
Prof JH Kroeze (UNISA)  | kroezjh@unisa.ac.za | 011 670 9117 
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Participant Number: _____________ 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
RESEARCH TITLE: A FRAMEWORKTO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SECURE AND USABLE ONLINE INFORMATION 
SECURITY APPLICATIONS 
 
I, ___________________________ (participant name), confirm that the person asking 
my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential 
benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation. 
I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the 
information sheet. 
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the 
study. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without penalty (if applicable) 
I am aware that the findings of this study will be anonymously processed into a research 
report, journal publications, and/or conference proceedings. 
I agree to the recording of the semi-structured interviews.  
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
I have received a written approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the College of 
Science, Engineering and Technology, UNISA. 
Participant Name & Surname……………………………………....……… (please print) 
Participant 
Signature………………………………………..Date……………….……………… 
Researcher’s Name & Surname………………………...……..………... (please print) 
Researcher’s 
Signature………………………………………Date……………………………… 
Witness Name & Surname............................................................................. (please print) 
Witness’s 
Signature………………………………................Date…............................................. 
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Appendix D: Consent form – Evaluation tool 
 




Letter of informed consent to be signed by all participants 
Research Project: 
A FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE AND 
USABLE ONLINE INFORMATION SECURITY APPLICATIONS 
 
Researcher:  Mr. M. Mujinga 
Promoter: Prof. MM Eloff 
Co-Promoter: Prof. JH Kroeze 
School of Computing 
College of Science, Engineering and Technology 
University of South Africa 
 
Dear Prospective Participant 
My name is Mathias Mujinga and I am doing research with Prof MM Eloff 
(Research Professor: Institute for Corporate Citizenship) and Prof JH Kroeze 
(Professor: School of Computing) towards a PhD in Computer Science at the 
University of South Africa. We are inviting you to participate in a study entitled 
“A Framework to Promote the Development of Secure and Usable Online 
Information Security Applications”. I am requesting your participation in this 
study. The research was reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the College of Science, Engineering and Technology, Unisa. The 
study looks at the usability aspects of online banking security service, 
particularly; the design, development and human-related aspects of online 
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banking websites and how these aspects affect the effective use of such service. 
Your participation will be in the form of an evaluator. 
Data collected will remain confidential, but it can only be disposed after five 
years because of the university rules. After five years all material used in this 
evaluation will be destroyed. 
The evaluation will take a maximum of thirty (30) minutes to complete. Should 
you wish to participant in this study; please fill in and sign the section below 
I __________________________________________________________ (full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document 
and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the 
research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project 
at any time, should I so desire. I hereby give permission that my responses may 
be used in the above research project, provided that none of my personal details 
will be made public in the published research report. 
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PARTICIPANT’S INFORMATION SHEET 
Dear Prospective Participant 
My name is Mathias Mujinga and I am doing research with Prof MM Eloff 
(Research Professor: Institute for Corporate Citizenship) and Prof JH Kroeze 
(Professor: School of Computing) towards a PhD in Computer Science at the 
University of South Africa. We are inviting you to participate in a study entitled “A 
Framework to Promote the Development of Secure and Usable Online 
Information Security Applications”. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework for secure and usable online 
banking service. I am conducting this research to investigate the current 
standards for design and development of online banking websites and investigate 
the general usability of this service to the user. We intend to develop a framework 
that incorporates user interface design principles that cater for security, usability 
and user experience goals. 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
You have been chosen due to your expert knowledge in the field of security and 
usability. I obtained your contact details from [NAME] and I invite you to 
participate in this research as you are currently working with ICT systems. I 
believe you can contribute to the validation of the proposed framework and the 
current state of online banking service in South Africa. 
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY? 
I request your participation as a field expert in the evaluation of the 12 selected 
design principles for secure and usable online banking interface. Each of the 
principles consists of between 3 and 9 checklist items where we need your input 
in determining the relevance and importance to the proposed framework. The 
exercise will take a maximum of 60 minutes of your time. We would appreciate it 
if you could return your evaluation report within 2 weeks of receiving the relevant 
documentation. 
CAN YOU WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED 
TO PARTICIPATE? 
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Participating in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent 
to participation. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information 
sheet to keep and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
The results of this study have the potential to assist the stakeholders with the 
development of online banking services that are user-friendly, which in turn 
fosters effective use and encourage adoption of the service. Potential 
stakeholders that are set to benefit from this research are financial institutions 
and online banking users. 
ARE THEIR ANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR YOU IF YOU 
PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT? 
The anticipated inconvenience will be finding the time to complete the evaluation 
exercise, hence we have given you 2 weeks to return the completed evaluation 
tool. You are welcome to request more time if this time frame is not conducive to 
your schedule. 
WILL THE INFORMATION THAT YOU CONVEY TO THE RESEARCHER AND 
YOUR IDENTITY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
Please note that your name will not be recorded anywhere and no one will be 
able to connect you to your answers as you will be given a fictitious participant 
code associated with your responses. This code also applies to any publications 
or other research report methods such as presentations at conferences.  
Your answers will only be reviewed by people responsible for ensuring that 
research is done properly, including research promoters (supervisors) and 
members of the Research Ethics Committee at Unisa. Therefore, the records that 
identify you will be available strictly to people working on the study, unless you 
give permission for other people to see the records.  
A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants 
will not be identifiable in such a report. Results will also be published in the thesis, 
which will be available on the Unisa Institutional Repository. 
HOW WILL THE RESEARCHER(S) PROTECT THE SECURITY OF DATA? 
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Participants’ responses in digital format will be stored by the researcher for a 
period of five years on a password protected computer and hard drive. Future 
use of the stored data will be subject to a further Research Ethics Review and 
approval, if applicable. All data and information in physical format collected during 
the course of this research will be incinerated after five years. 
WILL YOU RECEIVE PAYMENT OR ANY INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATING 
IN THIS STUDY? 
We do not provide any financial benefit for participation, but you are given an 
opportunity to have your say and contribute towards enhancing the current state 
of online banking service. 
HAS THE STUDY RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL? 
This study has received written approval from the Research Ethics Committee of 
the College of Science, Engineering and Technology, Unisa. A copy of the 
approval letter is attached to this information pack. Please do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher or any of the provided contacts for more information and 
clarity with regard to ethical issues. 
HOW WILL YOU BE INFORMED OF THE FINDINGS/RESULTS OF THE 
RESEARCH? 
If you would like to be informed of the final research findings, please contact 
Mathias Mujinga on mujinm@unisa.ac.za. The findings are accessible for a 
period of two (2) years after completion of the research. 
Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher 
about any aspect of this study, please contact him via the same telephone 
number or e-mail address. Should you have concerns about the way in which the 
research has been conducted, you may contact the study leaders Prof MM Eloff 
and Prof JH Kroeze via the contact details given below. 
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in 
this study. 
MATHIAS MUJINGA 
PhD Candidate (UNISA) | mujinm@unisa.ac.za | 011 471 3154 
PROMOTERS: 
Prof MM Eloff (UNISA)  | eloffmm@unisa.ac.za | 012 433 4604 
Prof JH Kroeze (UNISA)  | kroezjh@unisa.ac.za | 011 670 9117 
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Participant Number: _____________ 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
 
RESEARCH TITLE: A FRAMEWORKTO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SECURE AND USABLE ONLINE INFORMATION 
SECURITY APPLICATIONS 
I, ___________________________ (participant name), confirm that the person asking 
my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, procedure, potential 
benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.  
I have read (or had explained to me) and understood the study as explained in the 
information sheet. 
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the 
study.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without penalty (if applicable). 
I am aware that the findings of this study will be anonymously processed into a research 
report, journal publications, and/or conference proceedings.   
I agree to the recording of the semi-structured interviews.  
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
I have received a written approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the College of 
Science, Engineering and Technology, UNISA. 
Participant Name & Surname……………………………………….……… (please print) 
Participant 
Signature…………………………………..Date……………….……………… 
Researcher’s Name & Surname……………………………...…….…... (please print) 
Researcher’s 
Signature…………………………………Date……………………………… 




231 | P a g e  
 
Appendix E: Online banking evaluation survey 
The purpose of this survey is to obtain user acceptance and usability evaluation of online banking 
services in South Africa. The questions are based on the views of the users about their respective 
banks’ online banking websites (user interfaces). Please answer the questions to the best of your 
knowledge. All the information provided in this survey will be strictly confidential and will be used 
for research purposes only. Respondents’ identities are not collected and they will remain 
confidential and will not be published in any way. The survey will take you approximately 10 
minutes to complete. 
Consent Form 
Please note that by submitting this form you agree that you have not been put under any pressure 
to participate in this evaluation exercise and have willingly participated in it. Also, please note that 
participation is voluntary and that you may withdraw at any time without negative consequences. 
Please understand that the findings of the evaluation will be used for research purposes only and 
may be published in academic publications. Your privacy will be protected by not printing any 
names, position or institution in any such publication. Your answers to these questions will be 
used for academic purposes only. The data will be stored for five years at UNISA, after which it 
will be destroyed.  
Please tick the check box to voluntarily provide consent to participate in the study 
 
Indicate your choice by marking the appropriate blank block next to a number with an ‘X’.
SECTION A: Demographic details  
A1: Gender:                   
Male 1  
Female 2  
A2: Age:         
Younger than 20 years 1  
20─29 years      2  
30─39 years 3  
40─49 years 4  
50 years or older 5  
 
A3: Home language (specify): _________________ 
A4: Highest educational qualification: 
No formal education 1  
Matric 2  
Post-matric certificate or diploma 3  
Degree 4  
Postgraduate degree 5  
Other (specify below) 6  
A5: Employment status: 
Employed 1  
Self-employed 2  
Unemployed 3  
Retired 4  
Other (specify below)   
A6: Income per month before tax and other 
deductions: 
Less than  R10 000 1  
R10 000 – R19 999 2  
R20 000 – R29 999 3  
R30 000 – R39 999 4  
R40 000 – R49 999 5  
R50 000 or more 6  
A7: South African province (your current location): 
Eastern Cape 1  
Free State 2  
Gauteng 3  
KwaZulu-Natal 4  
Limpopo 5  
Mpumalanga 6  
North West 7  
Northern Cape 8  
Western Cape 9  
A8: Ethnic group: 
Black 1  
White 2  
Coloured 3  
Indian/Asian 4  
Other (specify below) 
 
5  
SECTION B: General questions  
B9: Please choose ONLY ONE South African bank 
that you use most for online banking and answer the 
rest of the questions based on the selected bank: 
ABSA 1  
Capitec 2  
FNB  3  
Investec 4  
Nedbank 5  
Standard Bank 7  
Other (specify below) 8  
B10: How long have you been using online banking? 
Less than 12 months 1  
1─2 years 2  
3─4 years 3  
5─6 years 4  
7 years or more 5  
B11: How often do you use online banking? 
Every day 1  
Once a week 2  
Once every two weeks 3  
Once a month 4  
Other (specify below) 5  
B12: Which device(s) do you use to connect to online 
banking? (Please select ALL that apply.) 
Computer (at home) 1  
Computer (at work) 2  
Public computer (Internet café) 3  
Laptop/portable device 4  
Mobile device 5  
Other (specify below) 6  
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SECTION C: ACCEPTANCE AND USE 
SECTION D: Usability 
Please select the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following 

















Performance Expectancy      
a. I find online banking useful in my daily life      
b. Using online banking helps me accomplish things more quickly        
c. Using online banking increases my productivity      
d. Online banking saves me time when I use it      
e. Online banking does everything I would expect it to do      
Effort Expectancy      
f. I find online banking easy to use      
g. It is easy for me to become skilful at using online banking      
h. Interacting with the online banking website does not require a lot 
of mental effort   
    
i. I can use online banking without written instructions      
j. Using online banking is effortless      
k. Online banking is user friendly      
Social Influence      
l. People who influence my behaviour think that I should use online 
banking   
   
m. People who are important to me think that I should use online 
banking   
   
n. People whose opinions I value recommend that I use online 
banking   
   
o. Using online banking is a status symbol in my life      
Facilitating Conditions      
p. I have the resources necessary to use online banking      
q. I have the knowledge necessary to use online banking      
r. Online banking works well with other technologies I use      
s. I can get help from others when I have difficulties using online 
banking   
   
Hedonic Motivation      
t. Using online banking is fun      
u. Using online banking is enjoyable      
v. Using online banking is entertaining      
w. The actual process of using online banking is pleasant      
Price Value      
x. Online banking is reasonably priced      
y. Online banking is good value for money      
z. At the current price, online banking provides good value      
Habit      
aa. The use of online banking has become a habit for me      
bb. I am addicted to using online banking      
cc. I must use online banking      
dd. Assuming I had access to online banking, I intend to use it      
ee. Given that I have internet access, I predict that I will continue 
using online banking   
   
Behavioural Intention      
ff. I intend to continue using online banking in the future      
gg. I will always try to use online banking regularly      
hh. I plan to increase the frequency of using online banking      
Please select the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following 
















The System Usability Scale      
a. I think that I would like to use online banking more frequently      
b. I find online banking unnecessarily complex      
c. I need the support of a technical person, to be able to use online 
banking  
    
d. I found the various functions in online banking to be well 
integrated  
    
e. I thought there was too much inconsistency in online banking      
f. I would imagine that most people would learn to use online 
banking websites very quickly  
    
g. I find online banking very difficult to use      
h. I feel confident using online banking      




SECTION E: Security AND PRIVACY 
i. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with 
online banking  
    
j. I thought online banking was easy to use      
Please select the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following 
















Learnability      
k. Learning how to use online banking is easy for me      
l. I learned easily to use online banking the first time I logged in      
m. I quickly became competent in using online banking      
n. The abbreviations used are easy to remember      
o. My interaction with the online banking website is clear and 
understandable   
   
User Suitability      
p. I understand the language used on the online banking website      
q. The online banking website allows me to choose my preferred 
language   
   
r. I think both regular and new users would like using online banking      
Satisfaction      
s. I am satisfied with using online banking        
t. Online banking works the way I want it to work      
u. I would recommend online banking to others      
v. I feel I need to have online banking      
w. Online banking is wonderful      
Availability      
x. The online banking website is always available      
y. The online banking transactions are always available      
z. There are frequent scheduled system downtimes      
aa. Internet connection problems prevent access to online banking      
bb. Frequent online banking website changes are confusing      
Errors      
cc. The online banking service error messages do not interfere with my 
online activity   
   
dd. The online banking service error messages are informative      
ee. The online banking service error messages highlight problem fields      
ff. I can recover from mistakes quickly and easily      
gg. The online banking service asks for user confirmation on irreversible 
actions   
   
Help and Documentation      
hh. The online banking service has a HELP function      
ii. The online banking service indicates the transaction processing 
status   
   
jj. The bank offered me training when I registered for online banking      
kk. I still need training on how to use online banking      
ll. The bank keeps me informed on the risks of using online banking      
mm. The online banking service provides a search option for locating 
functions   
   
Please select the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following 
















a. Using online banking is financially secure      
b. I trust in the ability of my online banking service to protect my 
privacy 
     
c. I trust in the technology my online banking service is using      
d. I trust my online banking service in the same way that I trust my 
bank’s branch 
     
e. I am not worried about the security of my online banking service      
f. Matters of security have no influence on my use of online banking      
g. I am confident that online banking in South Africa is secure      
h. I feel safe when I send personal information to the online banking 
website 
     
i. I trust that the online banking website only collects users' personal 
data that is necessary for its activities 
     
j. I trust that the online banking website will not provide my personal 
information to other companies without my consent 
     
k. I trust that the online banking website has sufficient technical 
capacity to ensure that the data I send will not be intercepted by 
hackers 
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SECTION F: OVERALL ASSESSMENT 






















THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
Mr M Mujinga, School of Computing, College of Science, Engineering and Technology, UNISA | 
mujinm@unisa.ac.za 
Prof MM Eloff, Institute for Corporate Citizenship, College of Economic and Management Sciences, School 
of Computing, UNISA (Promoter) 
Prof JH Kroeze, School of Computing, College of Science, Engineering and Technology, UNISA (Co-
promoter) 
  
l. The online banking website has a good reputation compared to 
other rival banks’ websites 
     
m. The online banking website keeps users informed about the security 
status 
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Appendix F: Interview questions 
Section A: Biographical information 
Participant number  








Bank   
Position in bank  Specialisation  
Years in position  
Section B:  Online banking service  
1. Does the bank offer new online banking (OB) clients training on how to use the service? 
2. Does the bank provide a 24-hour help desk specifically to assist OB and other digital 
channels’ clients? 
3. Do clients report any specific challenges when it comes to using OB and other digital 
channels? 
4. Does the bank charge a monthly subscription fee for using OB? 
5. Does the bank charge a fee for individual OB transactions? 
6. Does the bank have initiatives to encourage the usage of OB and other digital channels? 
7. Does the bank plan on scaling down on branch operations (reducing branches and branch 
staff), following the trend of other international banks? 
8. Can clients suggest/request certain OB capabilities for consideration? 
9. What responsibilities do OB clients have to protect their OB transactions from interception? 
10. Are these responsibilities communicated to clients upon OB adoption? If yes, how? 
11. What communication strategies are used to communicate with OB clients? 
Section C: Online banking system development  
12. Does the bank develop OB systems internally or externally (outsourced)? 
13. Does the development of OB systems/services take input from users of the system?  
14. Which (if any) development standards do you follow internationally or locally? 
15. What software engineering/application development principles/frameworks are followed for 
OB design and development? 
16. What IT management and governance frameworks are followed in OB development? 
17. What information security management frameworks are followed in OB development? 
18. Do you incorporate any usability and user experience design principles in the development 
of OB?  
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19. Do you have usability and user experience (UX) teams in OB design and development 
projects? 
20. Do you conduct usability/UX evaluations of OB systems before roll out to clients? 
21. Does your bank belong to any banking consortium, local or international? 
22. Do SA banks collaborate with third parties (e.g. information security practitioners) to 
improve OB and the general banking security environment? 
23. Do SA banks share ideas among themselves on general security-related problems to aid 
system development and improve their offerings? 
24. What are the advantages and disadvantages of legacy IT infrastructures and processes to the 
deployment of OB services? 
25. How scalable are legacy IT infrastructures in offering OB services? 
Section D: Online banking policy and regulations  
26. Do you have a dedicated OB information security policy or terms and conditions (Ts&Cs) 
that are separate from the general banking service? 
27. Do the terms and conditions cover access of client information to third parties? 
28. Which legislation governs the provision of OB between clients and banks in SA? 
29. Which legislation governs the protection of personal information of clients held by banks in 
SA? 
30. Are SA banks compelled to report any security breaches to a governing body? 
31. Do you communicate dispute resolution channels to clients for OB-related problems? 
32. In terms of dispute resolution, is there a separate system for clients to lodge OB related 
disputes? 
Section E: User training and awareness 
33. Does the bank have online fraud/threats awareness campaigns for clients? 
34. Does the bank provide channels to report any suspicious activities for online banking users? 
35. Where can the client get more information on OB fraud prevention? 
36. Does the bank have a fraud reporting system for clients? 
37. Does the bank communicate responsibilities and liabilities associated with the use of OB to 
clients? 
38. Are there any specific challenges the bank face in improving the end-to-end security of 
clients’ computers and the bank systems? 
39. Does the bank provide assistance to clients to improve the end-to-end security of the 
communication channel?  
40. Do you have any suggestions on how users can alter their behaviour/actions to create a more 
secure OB environment? 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!
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Appendix G: Survey responses sample 
Please tick the check box bA1. Gender: A2. Age: A3. Home language (Pleas A4. Highest educational qu A5. Employment status: 
I accept 1 3 1 5 1 
I accept 2 4 1 4 1 
I accept 1 2 2 4 1 
I accept 1 1 1 5 1 
I accept 1 5 1 5 2 
I accept 1 5 1 5 2 
I accept 1 5 1 3 1 
I accept 1 5 1 4 4 
I accept 1 5 1 5 1 
I accept 2 1 10 1 3 
I accept 2 3 10 5 1 
I accept 2 2 3 4 1 
I accept 2 2 10 4 1 
I accept 1 5 1 2 2 
I accept 1 3 10 5 1 
I accept 1 3 10 5 1 
I accept 1 2 1 4 1 
I accept 1 4 1 2 1 
I accept 1 5 1 4 2 
I accept 1 3 10 5 1 
I accept 2 3 10 5 1 
I accept 2 3 3 5 1 
I accept 1 3 10 5 1 
I accept 1 3 1 5 1 
I accept 1 3 10 5 1 
I accept 2 3 10 5 1 
I accept 2 2 3 5 1 
I accept 1 3 4 5 1 
I accept 1 4 1 5 1 
I accept 1 2 1 5 1 
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A6. Income per month bef oA7. South African province A8. Ethnic group: B9. Please choose ONLY B10. How long have you b eB11. How often do you us 
6 3 1 3 3 1 
3 3 2 1 5 2 
2 9 2 3 4 1 
4 9 3 5 4 3 
6 3 2 1 5 1 
6 3 2 1 5 1 
3 4 2 6 5 1 
3 9 2 6 5 2 
4 9 2 6 5 3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 3 1 6 5 2 
1 3 1 6 3 1 
1 3 1 6 1 4 
2 9 2 3 4 1 
4 8 1 6 5 1 
4 3 1 6 3 1 
2 9 3 2 4 1 
1 9 2 2 2 4 
6 3 2 1 5 1 
3 3 1 2 2 3 
4 1 1 3 4 2 
2 4 1 6 5 2 
4 4 1 6 5 2 
3 4 1 3 4 2 
3 1 1 6 5 1 
3 4 1 6 5 1 
3 3 1 3 4 1 
6 3 1 3 2 3 
5 2 1 6 4 4 
4 3 1 1 3 2 
3 3 1 5 3 2 
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B12. Which device(s) Computer (at work) Public computer (internet cafe) Laptop/portable device Mobile device Other a. I find online banking use 
1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 0 1 0 5 
1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
0 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 0 0 0 5 
1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
0 1 0 1 1 0 5 
1 1 0 0 0 0 5 
1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
0 1 0 0 1 0 5 
0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
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b. Using online banking he C.  Using online banking in d. Online banking saves m e. Online banking does ev f. I find online banking eas g. It is easy for me to beco 
5 5 5 2 4 5 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
4 5 5 3 5 4 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
5 5 5 3 4 5 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
5 3 5 4 4 5 
4 4 4 2 3 3 
5 5 5 4 5 4 
5 5 5 4 5 3 
5 5 5 5 5 4 
5 5 5 4 4 4 
5 5 5 1 5 4 
5 5 5 3 2 3 
5 4 4 5 4 5 
5 4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 3 4 4 
4 3 5 3 5 4 
5 5 5 5 4 4 
5 4 4 3 4 4 
5 2 4 2 5 4 
5 5 5 3 4 5 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
5 5 5 5 4 4 
5 5 5 4 5 4 
5 5 5 3 4 5 
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Appendix H: Complete list of frequencies 
Table H-1: Frequencies (n=540) 




Male 314 58.1 58.1 
Female 226 41.9 100.0 
Age 
Below 20 years 26 4.8 4.8 
20-29 years 122 22.6 27.4 
30-39 years 195 36.1 63.5 
40-49 years 88 16.3 79.8 
Above 50 years 109 20.2 100.0 
Language 
English 241 44.6 44.6 
Afrikaans 117 21.7 66.3 
Zulu 57 10.6 76.9 
Sotho 34 6.3 83.2 
Xhosa 33 6.1 89.3 
Venda 5 0.9 90.2 
Tsonga 5 0.9 91.1 
Swazi 3 0.6 91.6 
Ndebele 8 1.5 93.1 
Other 37 6.9 100.0 
Education 
No formal education 3 0.6 0.6 
Matric 58 10.7 11.3 
Post-matric 
certificate/diploma 
124 23.0 34.3 
Degree 104 19.3 53.5 
Postgraduate degree 239 44.3 97.8 
Other 12 2.2 100.0 
Employment 
Employed 431 79.8 79.8 
Self-employed 53 9.8 89.6 
Unemployed 28 5.2 94.8 
Retired 14 2.6 97.4 
Other 14 2.6 100.0 
Income 
Less than R10 000 73 13.5 13.5 
R10 000-R19 999 68 12.6 26.1 
R20 000-R29 999 102 18.9 45.0 
R30 000-R39 999 130 24.1 69.1 
R40 000-R49 999 46 8.5 77.6 
R50 000 or more 121 22.4 100.0 
Province 
Eastern Cape 44 8.1 8.1 
Free State 25 4.6 12.8 
Gauteng 250 46.3 59.1 
KwaZulu-Natal 59 10.9 70.0 
Limpopo 8 1.5 71.5 
Mpumalanga 3 0.6 72.0 
North West 5 0.9 73.0 
Northern Cape 7 1.3 74.3 
Western Cape 139 25.7 100.0 
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Black 198 36.7 36.7 
White 234 43.3 36.7 
Coloured 23 4.3 80.0 
Indian/Asian 85 15.7 84.3 
Bank 
Absa 90 16.7 100.0 
Capitec 53 9.8 16.7 
FNB 162 30.0 26.5 
Investec 12 2.2 56.5 
Nedbank 83 15.4 58.7 
Standard Bank 140 25.9 74.1 
Experience 
Below 1 year 39 7.2 100.0 
1-2 years 46 8.5 15.7 
3-4 years 96 17.8 33.5 
5-6 years 97 18.0 51.5 
7 years and above 262 48.5 100.0 
Use frequency 
Every day 185 34.3 34.3 
Once a week 214 39.6 73.9 
Once in two weeks 71 13.2 87.1 
Once a month 65 12.0 99.1 
Other 5 0.9 100.0 
Device 
Mobile 398 73.7  
PC 390 72.2  
Laptop 331 61.3  
Device 
combinations 
Any 1 device 134 24.8 24.8 
2 or more devices 406 75.2 100.0 
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Appendix I: SEM measurement models 
This appendix provide figures and tables for each SEM measurement model referred to in 
chapter 5 section 5.7.1. 
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I1. Testing of PE model 
The measurement model of the latent variable performance expectancy (PE) consists of five 
observable variables – PEa, PEb, PEc, PEd, and PEe – that are measured by means of a five-
point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-1. 
 
 
Figure I-1: Measurement model of PE 
Table I-1 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-1: Model fit indices of PE measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 41.848 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.961 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.117 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.016 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.969 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
The results of Table I-1 show that the fit indices CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the only indices 
that showed good fit of the model, while model modification would be recommended for the 
rest of the fit indices (2 and RMSEA). Taken together, the fit indices indicated that the model 
was not a good fit and needed improvement. In order to modify the measurement model so that 
it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had the highest modification indices were 
identified and treated as free parameters. Table I-2 shows the identified residual covariance 
pairs that had the highest modification indices that needed to be treated as free parameters.  
Table I-2: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e3 <--> e4 14.585 
e5 <--> e4 7.555 
After treating e3 and e4, as well as e5 and e4, as free parameters, the measurement model was 
rerun. Figure I-2 shows the modified model. 
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Figure I-2: Modified PE model 
Table I-3 shows the extracted fit indices, with all indices, taken together, showing a good model 
fit. 
Table I-3: Model fit indices of PE modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 8.450 Ratio 2.1 ≤ 
(χ2/df) ≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is within the range; this 
indicates that the model 
shows good fit 
df 3 
2/df 2.817 
CFI 0.994 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.058 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Within the range; this shows 
good fit 
SRMR 0.011 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; 
this shows good fit 
GFI 0.994 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I2. Testing of EE model 
The measurement model of the latent variable effort expectancy (EE) consists of six observable 
variables – EEa, EEb, EEc, EEd, EEe, and EEf – that are measured by means of a five-point 
Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-3. 
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Figure I-3: Measurement model of EE 
Table I-4 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-4: Model fit indices of EE measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 65.550 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of 
the range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.962 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.108 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.019 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.961 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
The results of Table I-4 show that the fit indices CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the only indices 
that showed good fit of the model, while model modification would be recommended for the 
rest of the fit indices (2 and RMSEA). Even though more than half of the fitness test showed 
a good fit, a better model could be achieved by modifying the models that suggested 
modification. In order to modify the measurement model, pairs of residual covariances that had 
the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. Table I-5 shows 
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the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification indices that needed to 
be treated as free parameters. 
Table I-5: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e2 <--> e1 27.973 
e6 <--> e4 5.210 
e6 <--> e1 5.014 
e4 <--> e3 4.098 
After treating the identified pairs of residual covariances as free parameters, the measurement 
model was rerun, and Figure I-4 shows the modified model. 
 
Figure I-4: Modified EE model 
Table I-6 shows the extracted fit indices, and all indices show a good model fit. Taken together, 
the fit indices indicate a good model fit. 
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Table I-6: Model fit indices of EE modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 
Threshold Recommendations for 
the measurement model 
Chi-
squared 
2 14.889 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; 
this indicates that the 
model shows good fit 
df 5 
2/df 2.978 
CFI 0.993 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.061 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Within the range; this 
shows good fit 
SRMR 0.010 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold 
value; this shows good fit 
GFI 0.991 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I3. Testing of SI model 
The measurement model of the latent variable social influence (SI) consists of four observable 
variables – SIa, SIb, SIc, and SId – that are measured by means of a five-point Likert scale. 
The model is represented in Figure I-5. 
 
Figure I-5: Measurement model of SI 
Table I-7 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-7: Model fit indices of SI measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 12.832 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.994 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this shows 
good fit  
RMSEA 0.100 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.025 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.989 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this shows 
good fit  
The results of Table I-7 show that the fit indices CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the only indices 
that showed good fit of the model, while model modification would be recommended for the 
rest of the fit indices (2 and RMSEA). Taken together, the fit indices indicate that the model 
is not a good fit and needs improvement. 
In order to modify the measurement model, pairs of residual covariances that had the highest 
modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. After treating the identified 
residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification indices as free parameters, the 
model became poorer than it had been before modification; therefore, the research reverted to 
the original model. The results of the original model can be accepted, as three out of five indices 
showed good fit. 
I4. Testing of FC model 
The measurement model of the latent variable facilitating conditions (FC) consists of four 
observable variables – FCa, FCb, FCc, and FCd – that are measured by means of a five-point 
Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-6. 
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Figure I-6: Measurement model of FC 
Table I-8 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-8: Model fit indices of FC measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 33.628 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.931 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.171 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) ≤ 
0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.064 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.971 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
The results of Table I-8 show that the SRMR and GFI were the only fit indices that showed 
good fit of the model, while model modification would be recommended for the rest of the fit 
indices (2, CFI, and RMSEA). Taken together, the fit indices indicate that the model is not a 
good fit and needs improvement. In order to modify the measurement model, pairs of residual 
covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free 
parameters. Table I-9 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest 
modification indices that needed to be treated as free parameters.  
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Table I-9: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e4 <--> e3 29.095 
After treating the modification indices in Table I-13 as free parameters, the measurement model 
was rerun, and Figure I-7 shows the modified model. 
 
Figure I-7: Modified FC model 
Table I-10 shows the extracted fit indices, and all indices show a good model fit. Taken 
together, the fit indices indicate a good model fit. 
Table I-10: Model fit indices of FC modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 2.943 Ratio 2.1 ≤ 
(2/df) ≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 




CFI 0.996 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.060 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Within the range; this shows 
good fit 
SRMR 0.010 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.997 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I5. Testing of HM model 
The measurement model of the latent variable hedonic motivation (HM) consists of four 
observable variables – HMa, HMb, HMc, and HMd – that are measured by means of a five-
point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-8. 
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Figure I-8: Measurement model of HM 
Table I-11 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-11: Model fit indices of HM measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 21.703 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.984 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.135 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.022 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.981 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit 
The results of Table I-11 show that three out of five indices showed good fit, while two indices 
suggested model modification. CFI, SRMR, and GFI were the indices that showed good fit, 
while 2 and RMSEA suggested model modification. In order to modify the measurement 
model so it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had the highest modification indices 
were identified and treated as free parameters. 
Table I-12: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e4 <--> e1 12.392 
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Table I-12 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure 9 shows the modified 
model. 
 
Figure I-9: Modified HM model 
Table I-13 shows the extracted fit indices, and all indices show a good model fit. Taken 
together, the fit indices indicate a good model fit. 
Table I-13: Model fit indices of HM modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 2.837 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 
indicates that the model 
shows good fit 
df 1 
2/df 2.837 
CFI 0.999 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.058 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) ≤ 
0.080 
Within the range; this shows 
good fit 
SRMR 0.010 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; 
this shows good fit 
GFI 0.997 GFI ≥ 0.90 
 
Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I6. Testing of PV model 
The measurement model of the latent variable price value (PV) consists of three observable 
variables – PVa, PVb, and PVc – that are measured by means of a five-point Likert scale. The 
model is represented in Figure I-10. 
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Figure I-10: Measurement model of PV 
Table I-14 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-14: Model fit indices of PV measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 0.00 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is undefined; df is 0, 
meaning that there are no 
degrees of freedom 
df 0 
2/df Undefined 
CFI 1.000 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.914 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.000 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good fit 
GFI 1.000 GFI ≥ 0.90 
 
Above the threshold; this shows 
that the model has good fit  
The results of Table I-14 show that only two models had a good fit, that is, SRMR and GFI; 
the rest suggested model modification. The 2 value showed degrees of freedom of zero. 
According to (Kline 2015), when the degrees of freedom are zero, that means that there is no 
way to affirm or reject the model; it means that the data have no ‘freedom’ to vary, and there 
is no ‘freedom’ to conduct research with this data set. Therefore, this measurement model will 
not be used in the structural model. 
I7. Testing of H model 
The measurement model of the latent variable habit (H) consists of five observable variables – 
Ha, Hb, Hc, Hd, and He – that are measured by means of a five-point Likert scale. The model 
is represented in Figure I-11. 
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Figure I-11: Measurement model of H 
Table I-15 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-15: Model fit indices of H measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 200.127 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.717 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.269 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.153 RMR ≤ 0.08 Above the threshold value; this 
shows that the model needs 
modification 
GFI 0.869 GFI ≥ 0.90 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification 
The results of Table I-15 show that none of the fit indices showed a good fit – hence, suggesting 
modification. In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual 
covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free 
parameters.  
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Table I-16: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e3 <--> e2 133.074 
e2 <--> e1 10.229 
e5 <--> e3 11.366 
Table I-16 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-12 shows the 
modified model. 
 
Figure I-12: Modified H model 
Table I-17 shows the extracted fit indices, and all indices show a good model fit. Taken 
together, the fit indices indicate a good model fit. 
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Table I-17: Model fit indices of H modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 5.644 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 
indicates that the model 
shows good fit 
df 2 
2/df 2.822 
CFI 0.995 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.058 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) ≤ 
0.080 
Within the range; this shows 
good fit 
SRMR 0.022 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; 
this shows good fit 
GFI 0.996 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I8. Testing of BI model 
The measurement model of the latent variable behavioural intention (BI) consists of three 
observable variables – BIa, Bib, and BIc – that are measured by means of a five-point Likert 
scale. The model is represented in Figure I-13. 
 
 
Figure I-13: Measurement model of BI 
Table I-18 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-18: Model fit indices of BI measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 0.000 Ratio 2.1 ≤ χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is undefined; df is 0, 
meaning that there are no 
degrees of freedom 
df 0 
2/df Undefined 
CFI 1.000 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.401 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.000 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
GFI 1.000 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
The results of Table I-18 show that three models had a good fit, that is, CFI, SRMR, and GFI, 
while the other two suggested model modification. The 2 value showed degrees of freedom 
of zero. As mentioned earlier, when the degrees of freedom are zero that means that there is no 
way to affirm or reject the model (Kline 2015). It means that the data have no ‘freedom’ to 
vary and that there is no ‘freedom’ to conduct research with this data set. However, because 
the construct BI is a mediator of several variables from the original UTAUT model, this model 
cannot be rejected; therefore, the research will use it as is in the structural model. 
I9. Testing of UL model 
The measurement model of the latent variable usability – learnability (UL) consists of five 
observable variables – ULa, ULb, ULc, ULd, and ULe – that are measured by means of a five-
point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-14. 
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Figure I-14: Measurement model of UL 
Table I-19 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-19: Model fit indices of UL measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 107.779 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.934 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.195 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.036 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
GFI 0.929 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
The results of Table I-19 show that two fit indices – SRMR and GFI – out of the five measure-
fit indices showed a good fit. Three of the fit indices, namely, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, suggested 
model modification. In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual 
covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free 
parameters. 
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Table I-20: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e5 <--> e4 88.323 
e4 <--> e2 4.247 
Table I-20 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-15 shows the 
modified model. 
 
Figure I-15: Modified UL model 
Table I-21 shows the extracted fit indices, and all indices show a good model fit. Taken 
together, the fit indices indicate a good model fit. 
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Table I-21: Model fit indices of UL modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 7.897 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 




CFI 0.997 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.055 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Within the range; this shows 
good fit 
SRMR 0.009 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.994 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I10. Testing of UUS model 
The measurement model of the latent variable usability – user satisfaction (UUS) consists of 
three observable variables – UUSa, UUSb, and UUSc – that are measured by means of a five-
point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-16. 
 
Figure I-16: Measurement model of UUS 
Table I-22 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-22: Model fit indices of UUS measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 0.00 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is undefined; df is 0, 
meaning that there are no 
degrees of freedom 
df 0 
2/df Undefined 
CFI 1.000 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.331 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.000 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
GFI 1.000 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit  
The results of Table I-22 show that only two models had a good fit, that is, SRMR and GFI; 
the rest suggested model modification. The 2 value showed degrees of freedom of zero. When 
the degrees of freedom are zero that means there is no way to affirm or reject the model. 
Therefore, the measurement model for US will not be used in the structural model. 
I11. Testing of US model 
The measurement model of the latent variable usability – satisfaction (US) consists of five 
observable variables – USa, USb, USc, USd, and USe – that are measured by means of a five-
point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-17. 
 
Figure I-17: Measurement model of US 
Table I-23 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-23: Model fit indices of US measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 67.289 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.948 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.152 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.032 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
GFI 0.951 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
The results of Table I-23 show that two fit indices – SRMR and GFI – out of the five measure-
fit indices showed a good fit. Three of the fit indices, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model 
modification. In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual 
covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free 
parameters. 
Table I-24: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e5 <--> e4 29.494 
e4 <--> e2 8.972 
e4 <--> e1 11.603 
Table I-24 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-18 shows the 
modified model. 
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Figure I-18: Modified US model 
Table I-25 shows the extracted fit indices. Four out five indices showed a good model fit. 
RMSEA was the only model fit that was slightly below the minimum of the threshold required. 
On the one hand, considering the complexity of SEM, achieving four models of fitness out of 
the five required is acceptable; hence, no further modification was done. On the other hand, 
further modification might result in other model fit indices such as 2 again falling out of range.  
Table I-25: Model fit indices of US modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 4.385 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 
indicates that the model 
shows good fit 
df 2 
2/df 2.193 
CFI 0.998 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.047 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) ≤ 
0.080 
Slightly below the minimum 
required; this shows that it 
needs modification 
SRMR 0.007 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; 
this shows good fit 
GFI 0.997 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I12. Testing of UA model 
The measurement model of the latent variable usability – availability (UA) consists of five 
observable variables – UAa, UAb, UAc, UAd, and UAe – that are measured by means of a 
five-point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-19. 
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Figure I-19: Measurement model of UA 
Table I-30 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-26: Model fit indices of UA measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 78.125 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.896 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.165 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.133 RMR ≤ 0.08 Above the threshold value; this 
shows that the model needs 
modification 
GFI 0.940 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
The results of Table I-30 show that only GFI out of the five measure-fit indices showed a good 
fit. Four of the fit indices, namely, CFI, SRMR, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model 
modification. In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual 
covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free 
parameters. 
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Table I-27: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e5 <--> e3 27.699 
e4 <--> e3 29.827 
Table I-27 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-20 shows the 
modified model. 
 
Figure I-20: Modified UA model 
Table I-28 shows the extracted fit indices. Three out five indices showed a good model fit. 
RMSEA and 2 were the two model fit indices that were out of range – hence, suggesting 
further modification. Further modification resulted in an unidentifiable model; therefore, the 
research settled for the maximum fit that could be obtained, as shown in Figure I-20. It is 
important to note that, after accepting such model fit, when the measurement models are put 
together to form the structural model, if the structural model does not fit and requires further 
modification by deleting some constructs or construct items, then measurement models such 
as that of UA will be the first to consider for deletion. 
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Table I-28: Model fit indices of UA modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 0.53 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is below the minimum 
threshold; this indicates that the 




CFI 1.000 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.000 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Below the minimum threshold, 
this shows that the model needs 
modification 
SRMR 0.001 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 1.000 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I13. Testing of UE model 
The measurement model of the latent variable usability – errors (UE) consists of five 
observable variables – UEa, UEb, UEc, UEd, and UEe – that are measured by means of a five-
point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-21.  
 
Figure I-21: Measurement model of UE 
Table I-29 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-29: Model fit indices of UE measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 52.869 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of 
the range of the threshold; 




CFI 0.890 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this 
shows that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.133 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) ≤ 
0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.056 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; 
this shows that the model has 
good fit 
GFI 0.961 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has 
good fit 
The results of Table I-29 show that GFI and SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices showed 
a good fit. The CFI, RMSEA, and 2 fit indices suggested model modification. In order to 
modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had the highest 
modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. 
Table I-30: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e2 <--> e1 19.287 
e5 <--> e4 13.913 
e5 <--> e2 15.789 
Table I-30 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-22 shows the 
modified model. 
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Figure I-22: Modified UE model 
Table I-31 shows the extracted fit indices. Four out five indices showed a good model fit. Only 
RMSEA suggested model modification. However, when the measurement model of RMSEA 
is rounded off to the nearest two decimal places, as it is in the threshold, its value becomes 
0.05, which is equal to the minimum of the RMSEA threshold; hence, the RMSEA was 
accepted as showing good fit. 
Table I-31: Model fit indices of UE modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 4.576 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 




CFI 0.994 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.049 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Equal to the minimum 
threshold when rounded off to 
two decimal places; hence, the 
model is a slightly good fit 
SRMR 0.018 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.997 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I14. Testing of UHD model 
The measurement model of the latent variable usability help and documentation (UHD) 
consists of six observable variables – UHDa, UHDb, UHDc, UHDd, UHDe, and UHDf – that 
are measured by means of a five-point Likert scale. The model is represented in Figure I-23. 
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Figure I-23: Measurement model of UHD 
Table I-32 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-32: Model fit indices of UHD measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 69.503 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.898 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.112 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.071 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
GFI 0.956 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
The results of Table I-32 show that GFI and SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices showed 
a good fit. The CFI, RMSEA, and 2 fit indices suggested model modification. In order to 
modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had the highest 
modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. 
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Table I-33: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e6 <--> e4 19.287 
e4 <--> e3 13.913 
e6 <--> e2 15.789 
Table I-33 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-24 shows the 
modified model. 
 
Figure I-24: Modified UHD model 
Table I-34 shows the extracted fit indices. Four out of five indices showed a good model fit, 
with the exception of 2, which suggested model modification. Modifying the model for 2 
could result in both 2 and RMSEA not fitting. Therefore, in order to achieve maximum fit, the 
research accepted the modified model, as shown in Figure I-24. 
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Table I-34: Model fit indices of UHD modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 26.175 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.966 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.079 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Equal to the minimum 
threshold when rounded off to 
two decimal places; hence, the 
model is a slightly good fit  
SRMR 0.036 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.985 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
 
I15. Testing of S model 
The measurement model of the latent variable security (S) consists of five observable variables 
– Sa, Se, Sf, Sg, and Sm – that are measured by means of a five-point Likert scale. The model 
is represented in Figure I-25. 
 
Figure I-25: Measurement model of S 
Table I-35 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-35: Model fit indices of S measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 35.552 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.943 CFI ≥ 0.950 
 
Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs modification  
RMSEA 0.106 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.067 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good fit 
GFI 0.974 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this shows 
that the model has good fit 
The results of Table I-35 show that GFI and SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices showed 
a good fit. Three of the fit indices, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model modification. In 
order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had 
the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. 
Table I-36: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e3 <--> e2 23.359 
Table I-36 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-26 shows the 
modified model. 
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Figure I-26: Modified S model 
Table I-37 shows that all the extracted fit indices showed a good model fit. 
Table I-37: Model fit indices of S modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 9.837 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 




CFI 0.989 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this shows 
good fit  
RMSEA 0.052 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) ≤ 
0.080 
Equal to the minimum threshold 
when rounded off to two 
decimal places; hence, the 
model is a slightly good fit 
SRMR 0.026 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.993 GFI ≥ 0.90 
 
Above the threshold; this shows 
good fit  
 
I16. Testing of P model 
The measurement model of the latent variable privacy (P) consists of seven observable 
variables – Pb, Pc, Pd, Ph, Pi, Pj, and Pk – that are measured by means of a five-point Likert 
scale. The model is represented in Figure I-27. 
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Figure I-27: Measurement model of P 
Table I-38 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
Table I-38: Model fit indices of P measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 343.524 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.868 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.209 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.076 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows that the model has good 
fit 
GFI 0.830 GFI ≥ 0.90 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification 
The results of Table I-38 show that only SRMR out of the five measure-fit indices showed a 
good fit. Four of the fit indices, GFI, CFI, RMSEA, and 2, suggested model modification. In 
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order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual covariances that had 
the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free parameters. 
Table I-39: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e6 <--> e5 96.118 
e2 <--> e1 91.605 
e3 <--> e2 60.852 
e6 <--> e2 47.591 
e7 <--> e6 42.326 
e3 <--> e1 14.702 
Table I-39 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-28 shows the 
modified model. 
 
Figure I-28: Modified P model 
Table I-40 shows that all the extracted fit indices showed a good model fit. 
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Table I-40: Model fit indices of P modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 19.204 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 




CFI 0.996 CFI ≥ 0.950 
 
Above the threshold; this shows 
good fit  
RMSEA  
0.051 
0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Within the range; hence, the 





RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.990 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this shows 
good fit  
 
I17. Testing of SUS model 
The measurement model of the system usability scale (SUS) consists of 10 observable variables 
– SUSa, SUSb, SUSc, SUSd, SUSe, SUSf, SUSg, SUSh, SUSi, and SUSj. The latent variable 
SUS is measured by means of the 10 observable variables with a five-point Likert scale. The 
model is represented in Figure I-29. 
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Figure I-28: Measurement model of SUS 
Table I-41 demonstrates the extracted results from Amos output of the measurements of the fit 
indices compared to their thresholds. 
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Table I-41: Model fit indices of SUS measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 506.622 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (χ2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
χ2/df is too large and out of the 
range of the threshold; this 




CFI 0.656 CFI ≥ 0.950 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification  
RMSEA 0.158 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Above the threshold; this 
suggests that the model needs 
modification  
SRMR 0.109 RMR ≤ 0.08 Above the threshold value; this 
shows that the model needs 
modification 
GFI 0.812 GFI ≥ 0.90 Below the threshold; this shows 
that the model needs 
modification 
The results of Table I-42 show that none of the fit indices showed a good fit – hence, suggesting 
modification. In order to modify the measurement model so it could fit, pairs of residual 
covariances that had the highest modification indices were identified and treated as free 
parameters. 
Table I-42: Extract of modification indices of covariances from Amos output 
Error terms Modification index covariance 
e10 <--> e8 93.738 
e6 <--> e4 67.894 
e4 <--> e1 31.161 
e8 <--> e6 26.936 
e10 <--> e6 41.175 
e7 <--> e2 26.848 
e9 <--> e1 20.305 
e10 <--> e4 13.033 
e8 <--> e4 17.753 
e5 <--> e4 11.822 
Table I-42 shows the identified residual covariance pairs that had the highest modification 
indices that needed to be treated as free parameters. After treating the identified modification 
indices as free parameters, the measurement model was rerun, and Figure I-30 shows the 
modified model. 
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Figure I-30: Modified SUS model 
Table I-43 shows the extracted fit indices, and all indices show a good model fit. Taken 
together, the fit indices indicate a good model fit. 
Table I-43: Model fit indices of SUS modified model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 




2 74.535 Ratio 2.1 ≤ (2/df) 
≤ 3.1 
2/df is within the range; this 




CFI 0.964 CFI ≥ 0.950 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
RMSEA 0.061 0.05 ≤ (RMSEA) 
≤ 0.080 
Within the range; this shows 
good fit 
SRMR 0.045 RMR ≤ 0.08 Below the threshold value; this 
shows good fit 
GFI 0.973 GFI ≥ 0.90 Above the threshold; this 
shows good fit  
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Appendix J: SEM integrated model 
This appendix presents the integrated SEM model and analysis of moderating factors. 
Table J-1: Dichotomous recoding of moderator variables 
# Variable Original coding New coding 
1 Gender 1 = Male 
2 = Female 
Used as is 
2 Age 1 = Below 20 years 
2 = 20-29 years 
3 = 30-39 years 
4 = 40-49 years 
5 = Above 50 years 
1 = Below 30 years (1-2) 
2 = 30 and above years (3-5) 
3 Experience 1 = Below 1 year 
2 = 1-2 years 
3 = 3-4 years 
4 = 5-6 years 
5 = Above 7 years 
1 = 4 years and below 
2 = Above 4 years 
4 Education 1 = No formal education 
2 = Matric 
3 = Post-matric/diploma 
4 = Degree 
5 = Postgraduate degree 
6 = Other 
1 = No tertiary education (1-2) 
2 = Tertiary education (3-6) 
5 Employment 1 = Employed 
2 = Self-employed 
3 = Unemployed 
4 = Retired 
5 = Other 
1 = Employed (1-2) 
2 = Not employed (3-5) 
6 Ethnicity 1 = Black 
2 = White 
3 = Coloured 
4 = Indian/Asian 
1 = Black (1) 
2 = Non-black (2-4) 
7 Devices 1 = One device 
2 = More than one device 
Used as is 
8 Income 1 = Less than R10 000 
2 = R10 000-R19 999 
3 = R20 000-R29 999 
4 = R30 000-R39 999 
5 = R40 000-R49 999 
6 = R50 000 or more 
1 = Less than R30 000 (1-3) 
2 = R30 000 or more (3-6) 
9 Use frequency 1 = Every day 
2 = Once a week 
3 = Once every two weeks 
4 = Once a month 
5 = Other 
1 = Daily (1) 
2 = All other (2-5) 
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Group 1 (b2_1) 
 
Group 2 (b2_2) 
 
Figure J-1: Dichotomous models 
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10 24.061 0.007 Supported  
The p-value was below 0.05, meaning that the groups were 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference 
between gender groups; hence, gender did not moderate the 
relationship between hedonic motivation (HM) and behavioural 
intention (BI). 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference 
between gender groups; hence, gender did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and habit (H). 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference 
between gender groups; hence, gender did not moderate the 






10 18.285 0.050 Supported  
The p-value was equal to 0.05, meaning that the groups were 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
age groups; hence, age did not moderate the relationship between 
BI and HM. 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
age groups; hence, age did not moderate the relationship between 
BI and H. 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
age groups; hence, age did not moderate the relationship between 
adoption and H. 
 






10 20.625 .024 Supported  
The p-value was less than 0.05, meaning that the groups were 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
        
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
experience groups; hence, experience did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and HM. 
BI  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
experience groups; hence, experience did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 
1 6.367 0.012 Supported  
Multigroup analysis showed that there was a difference between 
experience groups; hence, experience moderated the relationship 
between adoption and H. 
Less 
experienced 
    0.24 The moderating effects of experience on the relationship between 
adoption and H were greater for less experienced participants 
than the more experienced. More 
experienced 









The p-value was above 0.05, meaning that the groups were not 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
education levels; hence, education level did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and HM. 
BI  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
education levels; hence, education level did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
education levels; hence, education level did not moderate the 
relationship between adoption and H. 






10 19.181 0.038 Supported  
The p-value was below 0.05, meaning that the groups were 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
employment levels; hence, employment did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and HM. 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
employment levels; hence, employment did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
employment levels; hence, employment did not moderate the 





10 23.384 0.009 Supported  
The p-value was below 0.05, meaning that the groups were 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 
1 6.521 0.011 Supported  
Multigroup analysis showed that there was a difference between 
ethnicity groups; hence, ethnicity moderated the relationship 
between BI and HM. 
African     0.21 The moderating effects of ethnicity on the relationship between 




    0.28 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference among 
ethnicity groups; hence, ethnicity did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 
1 5.198 0.023 Supported  
Multigroup analysis showed that there was a difference among 
ethnicity groups; hence, ethnicity moderated the relationship 
between adoption and H. 
African     0.14 




    0.15 
The moderating effects of ethnicity on the relationship between 










The p-value was above 0.05, meaning that the groups were not 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
participants who used one devices to access internet banking and 
those who used two or more devices; hence, the number of 
devices did not moderate the relationship between BI and HM. 
BI  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
participants who used one devices to access internet banking and 
those who used two or more devices; hence, the number of 
devices did not moderate the relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
participants who used one devices to access internet banking and 
those who used two or more devices; hence, the number of 






10 25.564 0.004 Supported  
The p-value was less than 0.05, meaning that the groups were 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 
1 4.208 0.040 Supported  
Multigroup analysis showed that there was a difference between 
low-income earners and high-income earners when it came to the 
relationship between adoption and H; hence, income moderated 
the relationship between adoption and H. 
Below 
R30 000 
    0.283 The moderating effects of income on the relationship between BI 
and HM were greater for individuals who earned R30 000 per 
month or more than for those who earned less than R30 000. Above 
R30 000 
    0.315 
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BI  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
participants who earned less than R30 000 and those who earned 
above R30 000. Therefore, income did not moderate the 
relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
participants who earned less than R30 000 and those who earned 
above R30 000. Therefore, income did not moderate the 










The p-value was above 0.05, meaning that the groups were not 
different at model level. Further investigation needs to be done 
for different hypothesised relationships. 
BI  HM 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
daily users of online banking and all other users. Therefore, use 
frequency did not moderate the relationship between BI and HM. 








Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
daily users of online banking and all other users. Therefore, use 
frequency did not moderate the relationship between BI and H. 
Adoption  H 
Chi-
squared test 




Multigroup analysis showed that there was no difference between 
daily users of online banking and all other users. Therefore, use 
frequency did not moderate the relationship between adoption 
and H. 
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Appendix K: Interview transcript sample 
NOTE: The interviews were transcribed verbatim from the audio recordings, and no (spoken) 
grammar errors were fixed. 
 
Researcher (R): Are there are any training for what are the responsibilities? 
 
Participant (P): So, the customer we don’t give a formal or set of training documentation 
or offer that they can come for training. We do not do that. But we do put certain statements 
on the system where they can like questions and answers (FAQ) type of thing, which can 
help them with certain things. But we don’t go out to the customer and help him to use his system 
properly. In the retail space it’s a bit difficult if you have 6.5 million customers to offer training 
so we do offer guidelines but not formal training. 
 
R: What if a specific person or customer need specifically or ask for something? 
 
P: So, if a customer call, okay lets I think one of your questions was, do we have a process 
for handling customer queries or controls or questions around online banking? We do have call 
centre where they can call into. Uhm so when they call into the call centre they deal with all 
queries but there’s one specific line you go to if you have an internet banking or online banking 
query. You will then be reverted to a desk probably that is technical that can help you with either 
the technical issues or explain to you how it works. 
 
R: To go about? 
 
P: How the thing go, if you want make a payment how the thing will work if you want to if 
a see an error code, what it actually means and you don’t understand and also if you need advice 
on security they will give that as well. So, we have a dedicated call centre for all those and all 
calls are recorded and tracked and feedback is given to the customer that way, so technical and 
non-technical. 
 
R: So, the call centre is it 24 hour or office hours? 
 
P: I think uhm I think it’s not a fully 24 hour unless you have a fraud query. It is fraud 
query that’s 24/7 so if you have a fraud issue on your online banking. And let’s say your online 
banking has been compromised, that’s 24/7 you can call immediately it will be blocked so that 
you cannot be, if they are phishing you, you can be certain you can block immediately and no 
further phishing attempts would be ava... well we would actually try to track them and close 
them down. So, does that answer your question? 
 291 | P a g e  
 
 
R: Yeah it does and are there any client reports any specific challenges on the different 
channels? 
P: So the clients do have various options on complaining, so first of all those who use 
internet banking has a specific place where they can complain. Although they can complain 
another over another normal channels, like a call centre or branch or anywhere they want to 
complain because all our contact areas with customers they can complain on any of those. Even 
on the app that we have or the internet banking site itself, there’s an area where they can actually 
communicate to us or complain. 
 
R: So, in terms of that feedback, are there any form or channels, which the users can 
actually request those like, is it like by writing you an email is it sufficient groups? 
 
P: So, there are, even on the app there is a communications area within the app where its’ 
secure although slow. But they can also send us an email, and then they can also go through our 
call centre there is a specific call centre number. But most people use the, use a email as 
communication, majority of them. Because the people at the branch may get it and may have no 
idea of what the guy is saying and then you don’t get the idea. 
 
R: What are the incentives put in place to encourage digital banking? 
 
P: No charges, yeah, I think majority of the banks have no charges for digital. So there, but 
I do not know of any charges. You don’t pay to sign up, you don’t pay a monthly fee it’s usually 
included all your products in bundles. 
 
R: Yeah you mentioned the terms and conditions, you provide them besides are there 
incentives to make sure? 
 
P: So there are several awareness campaigns either in branches or at business sometimes at, 
if there are small business forums for example we may have thing, get them to say be aware of 
the following scams, phishing whatever and look out for the following, it will be good if you 
install Trustier and we will rehash the awareness around what the terms and conditions are as 
well. So, we definitely have, i want to ongoing campaigns of various natures to actually inform 
customers of their roles, their responsibilities. As well as the dangers that goes with sharing of 
passwords, opening emails with attachments, malware so we do have a lot of communication and 
awareness that goes with that and various channels, not just. 
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R: Yes, because I was asking in respect before this Cyber bill that is coming, that were their 
gaps in the current copy of the electronic communication act? 
P: Yeah, I think the gaps are more in the implementation practical implementation side. 
Also, I think, I’m not sure if the legislative capability to legislate for new technology at this 
moment. I think there’s definitely gaps. For example, cyber has a big issue with things like block 
chain, yet it is a very good method to protect your information. Use the hash and things to protect 
integrity. But they have no understanding of it and now they say you can’t do that because of the 
bitcoin link. But if they really know how it works they would probably say it’s a very good 
technology to use. So, I think the gaps are that there’s a lack of understanding of knowledge 
in the regulator perspective on how this technology actually work and how it is, what are the risks 
related to that. And then they don’t know what to or how to legislate stuff. I just think that the 
regulator also haven’t made the connection to say that but if you take mobile, if you take digital, 
if you take cyber, they actually all inter linked. And if you looked at the legislative 
communications area they really effective. I mean and then if you look at the banking legislation 
they very effective. So, they don’t have that over all coordinated view so I think the gaps are very 
much still there. Yeah so I don’t think they are 100% effective or efficient to actually legislate 
what is required. I mean even the legal side, if there are legal issues related to cyber I don’t know 
if our legal environment has enough people who understand IT and Law, especially IT I don’t 
know many advocates that can do that. 
 
R: And you mentioned SABRIC? Is there a, is it just a coming together? 
 
P: SABRIC is a formal association of all the South African banks, or any banks in South 
Africa. 
 
R: Is it compulsory for any bank in South Africa? 
 
P: Yeah, I think, I don’t think you have to be a member but most of the banks are. SABRIC 
is the basically I can’t tell you exact acronym stands for. It stands for South African banking 
something against crime, it’s there to actually prevent fraud and crime. Criminal activities against 
banks and their customers. 
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Appendix L: Framework evaluation tool 
SECTION A: Introduction 
My name is Mathias Mujinga, and I am doing a PhD study at UNISA under the supervision of 
Prof MM Eloff (Research Professor: Institute for Corporate Citizenship) and Prof JH Kroeze 
(Professor: School of Computing). I invite you to participate in this framework evaluation process. 
The purpose of this evaluation tool is to validate the proposed socio-technical information security 
(STInfoSec) framework for the design of secure and usable online information security 
applications. 
The framework is part of a PhD study entitled “A Socio-Technical Framework for Secure and 
Usable Online Information Security Systems”. The framework is specifically designed for online 
banking service as a case study, but is intended to be applicable to other general online information 
security applications, with appropriate adaptations tailored to those applications. The principles 
provided here for evaluation were first selected from previous studies in literature, then based on 
survey and interview findings from online banking users and banking personnel, respectively, the 
list has been refined in the context of online banking service. Checklist items for each principle 
were developed into this preliminary framework. 
As an evaluator, you are requested to rate the importance of each of the proposed design principles 
and their respective checklist items with regard to their relevance in addressing security- and 
usability-related problems of the service. Specifically, these principles are envisaged to assist the 
design and, ultimately, improve the service. Your participation in this study is highly appreciated. 
Please kindly complete and submit the evaluation survey to the researcher as soon as possible. The 
evaluation tool will take at most approximately 60 minutes to complete. 
SECTION B: Consent form 
Please note that by submitting this form, you agree that you have not been put under any pressure 
to participate in this evaluation exercise and are willingly participating in it. Also, please note that 
participation is voluntary and that you may withdraw at any time without negative consequences. 
Please understand that your answers to these questions will be used for academic purposes only; 
likewise, the findings of the evaluation will be used for research purposes only and may be 
published in academic publications. Your privacy will be protected by not printing any names, 
positions, or institutions in any such publication. The data will be stored in a password-protected 
computer and locked file cabinet at Unisa for a period of five years, after which it will be 
incinerated. 
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SECTION C: Instructions 
All questions marked with an asterisk (*) need to be answered. The information requested in 
Section D is for verification purposes only and responses will only be identified through a pseudo 
name/number, with no reference to any individual whatsoever. 
Section E consists of the checklist items that system designers need to address. There are 12 usable 
security principles specifically tailored to online banking service. Each principle has a varying 
number of checklist items, ranging from five to nine, that help in understanding and applying the 
principle during the design of the user interface. We request your input in rating the importance 
of each of the checklist items to determine the usefulness of the principle as a whole. Each 
checklist item is rated based on a scale with the following four options: very important, important, 
moderately important, and not important. Evaluators are requested to provide additional 
information that they think might improve the framework at both a checklist and a principle level. 
SECTION D: Biographical information 
Please note that the information requested here is for verification purposes only; your responses 
will only be identified through a pseudo name/number, with no reference to your name 
whatsoever. 
Full name  




Job title  
Job specialisation  
Years in position  
IT/IS security experience  
Usability/UX experience  
Usable security experience  
Other experience (please specify)  
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SECTION E: Checklist items 
Your assessment is based on the importance of the 12 principles and their respective checklist 
items in addressing security and usability aspects of system development. Additional comments 
are welcome at both a checklist item and a principle level. 
Please indicate your choice by selecting one of the provided options as follows: 1 = Not important, 
2 = Moderately important, 3 = Important, and 4 = Very important. 
1 
Visibility: the system should visibly keep users informed about their 
security status 
  Checklist items 
1.1 Does the system show the user the progress status during a visible delay in response time? 
1.2 Does the system visibly show the current selection/data input field? 
1.3 Does the system clearly highlight the problem field with regard to error messages? 
1.4 Is there some form of feedback for every security-related action? 
1.5 Does the system visibly show the location of security-related options? 
1.6 Is help information for assisting the user visible and easily accessible? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
2 
Learnability: the system should ensure that security actions are easy to 
learn and remember 
  Checklist items 
2.1 Does the system provide easy-to-learn training material? 
2.2 Is there a quick-start guide to assist the user? 
2.3 Are security and non-security operations easy to learn and use? 
2.4 Have security items been grouped into logical zones, and have headings been used to 
distinguish between the zones? 
2.5 Does the system present security and non-security information in a standardised format? 
2.6 Are security options selected by default? 
2.7 Does the user interface make it obvious which security items are currently selected? 
2.8 Does the system protect users against making severe errors? 
 Additional comments (optional) 




Errors: the system should provide users with detailed security error 
messages that they can understand and act on 
  Checklist items 
3.1 Are system error messages grammatically correct and accurate in stating the problem, with 
enough information for corrective measures/actions? 
3.2 Do security-related error messages inform the user of the severity of the error? 
3.3 Are menu items arranged logically to prevent users from making serious errors? 
3.4 Does the system warn users if they are about to make a potentially serious error? 
3.5 Does the system allow users to recover from errors quickly and easily? 
3.6 Do the error messages of the system not interfere with the users’ work, whenever possible? 
3.7 Does the system clearly ask for users’ confirmation of serious and possibly irrevocable 
actions? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
4 
Availability: system services must be available all the time, with minimum 
down time, and have minimum interruptions 
  Checklist items 
4.1 Is the system always available, with minimum and non-interruptive down time? 
4.2 Does the system make sure that all system functionalities are available at all times? 
4.3 Is scheduled down time communicated in advance and scheduled during off-peak times? 
4.4 Does the system limit the frequency of changes to the user interface? 
4.5 Do updates to the system user interface not result in users having to learn the system all over 
again? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
5 
Satisfaction: the system should ensure that users have a good experience 
when using the system and its security features 
  Checklist items 
5.1 Is the actual process of using the system fun and enjoyable? 
5.2 Are the most frequently used function keys in the most accessible positions? 
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5.3 Do security-related prompts imply that the user is in control? 
5.4 Is each individual security setting a member of a family of security options? 
5.5 Do the security mechanisms of the system provide a sense of protection to the user? 
5.6 Has colour been used specifically to draw attention, communicate organisation, indicate 
status changes, and establish relationships for security- and non-security-related actions? 
5.7 Can users personalise their own system, session, file, and screen defaults, such as the landing 
page? 
5.8 Does the system fulfil its claimed capabilities? 
5.9 Does the system complete unambiguous partial input on a data entry field? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
6 
Revocability: the system should allow users to revoke any of their security 
actions 
  Checklist items 
6.1 Do security options in menus make it obvious whether deselection is possible? 
6.2 Can users easily reverse their security and non-security actions? 
6.3 When prompts imply a necessary security action, are the words in the message consistent with 
that action? 
6.4 Has the system been designed so that keys with similar names do not perform opposite (and 
potentially dangerous) security actions? 
6.5 Can users cancel operations in progress? 
6.6 Are there ‘undo’ and ‘redo’ functions at the level of a single security action or for a complete 
group of security actions? 
6.7 Does the system provide confirmation for actions that have drastic, possibly destructive 
consequences? 
6.8 Does the system have a clearly marked exit? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
7 
Expressiveness: the system should guide users on security in a manner that 
still gives them freedom of expression 
  Checklist items 
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7.1 Are users initiators of security actions rather than respondents? 
7.2 Does the system correctly anticipate, and prompt for, the user’s probable next security-related 
activity? 
7.3 By looking, can the user tell the security state of the system and the alternatives for security-
related actions, if needed? 
7.4 Does the system clearly state its security capabilities? 
7.5 Does the system clearly state the users’ responsibilities in terms of security actions? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
8 
User language: the system should use plain language that users can 
understand with regard to security 
  Checklist items 
8.1 Does the system allow the user to choose a preferred language? 
8.2 Are security actions and objects named consistently across all prompts in the design? 
8.3 Is security information accurate, complete, and understandable? 
8.4 Are security questions stated in clear and simple language, where used? 
8.5 If language selection is possible, is the translation accurate, without errors? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
9 
User suitability: the system should provide options for users with diverse 
levels of skill and experience in security 
  Checklist items 
9.1 Is security information accurate, complete, and understandable to all types of system users 
(experienced and novice)? 
9.2 Can users define and group their own synonyms for commands for easier access? 
9.3 Can users navigate forwards and backwards within operations? 
9.4 Does the system avoid the use of security and privacy jargon? 
9.5 If the system supports both novice and expert users, are multiple levels of error message detail 
available? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
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10 
Help and documentation: the system should make security help apparent 
and easy to find for users 
  Checklist items 
10.1 Is the help function visible, for example, a key labelled HELP or a special menu? 
10.2 Is it easy to access, and return from, the help function, allowing users to resume their work 
from where they left off after accessing help? 
10.3 Does the help function cover security- and non-security-related information? 
10.4 Does the system provide an up-to-date security centre, with security training and awareness 
information? 
10.5 Does the system provide a 24-hour help desk for critical security incidents? 
10.6 Does the system provide complete and accurate help and a FAQs section? 
10.7 Is the help and FAQs material searchable and grouped in logical categories? 
10.8 Does the system provide detailed training and education material on how to complete basic 
tasks? 
10.9 Does the system provide a search function for locating system functions? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
11 
Security: the system should provide trusted communication channels 
between the user and the data servers 
  Checklist items 
11.1 Do critical transactions require out-of-band authentication such as an OTP/SMS? 
11.2 Does the system initiate a session lock after a period of inactivity or on user request? 
11.3 Does the system employ encryption techniques to prevent unauthorised disclosure of, and 
access to, information in storage and transmission? 
11.4 Does the system enforce a limit on consecutive invalid access attempts by a user during a 
period of time? 
11.5 Does the system implement an appropriate time-out logoff period? 
11.6 Does the system encrypt passwords in storage and in transmission? 
11.7 Does the system enforce password restrictions, such as complexity, length, expiry period, 
reuse, etc.? 
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11.8 Are system password requirements complex enough to avoid simple password-cracking 
attacks? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
12 
Privacy: the system should protect user information against unauthorised 
access by third parties 
  Checklist items 
12.1 Does the system ask for consent before collecting personal information? 
12.2 Are the statements asking for user consent written in clear and simple language that the user 
understands? 
12.3 Does the system clearly state what personal information is collected and for what purposes it 
will be used? 
12.4 Does the system require users to confirm statements indicating that they understand the 
conditions of access? 
12.5 Does the system ask for permission before distributing personal information to third parties? 
12.6 Do the personal information collection and storage mechanisms comply with the data 
protection regulations of the country? 
12.7 Can protected or confidential areas be accessed with certain passwords? 
 Additional comments (optional) 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation 
Thank you once again for your participation and please feel free to contact me or the study 
promoters with any questions on the contact details below: 
Mr M Mujinga, School of Computing, College of Science, Engineering, and Technology, Unisa, 
mujinm@unisa.ac.za 
Prof. MM Eloff, Institute for Corporate Citizenship, College of Economic and Management 
Sciences, School of Computing, Unisa (promoter) 
Prof. JH Kroeze, School of Computing, College of Science, Engineering, and Technology, Unisa 
(co-promoter) 
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Appendix M: Framework evaluation results sample 
Please tick the 
checkbox 2. Gender: 3. Age: 
4. Highest 
educational 
qualification 5. Occupation: 6. Job title: 
7. Job 
specialisation: 
8. Years in 
position: 
I accept Female 51 years or older Postgraduate degree Lecturer Lecturer 
Information 
System 11 years 
I accept Male 41-50 years Postgraduate degree Lecturer Lecturer 
teaching, research 
and community 
engagement  15 
I accept Male 31-40 years Postgraduate degree Tester Test Analyst Software Testing 2 




Technician  Desktop Support 8 















and strategy 10 
I accept Male 31-40 years Postgraduate degree 







5 and six 
months 
I accept Male 31-40 years Postgraduate degree Academia Lecturer 
Information 
security 10 
        





11. Usable security 
experience: 
12. Other experience 
(please specify): 
1.1 Does the 
system show the 
user the progress 
status during a 
visible delay in 
response time? 










with regard to 
error messages? 
1.4 Is there 




Intermediate Expert Intermediate 
UI (User Interface 
experience) the 
design of the 
interaction points 
between user and 
system 4 3 3 3 
Intermediate Expert Intermediate  4 4 4 4 
Beginner Beginner Beginner  2 2 3 3 
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Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Networking  4 4 3 4 




design 2 3 1 2 
Expert Expert Expert 
Business 
Management 3 3 4 3 
Expert Expert Expert none 4 4 3 4 
        
1.5 Does the system 
visibly show the 
location of security-
related options? 









2.1 Does the system 
provide easy-to-learn 
training material? 
2.2 Is there a 
quick-start guide 





easy to learn 
and use? 
2.4 Have security 
items been 
grouped into 
logical zones, and 
have headings 











4 4  4 4 3 3 3 
4 4  4 4 4 4 4 
3 3  3 3 2 3 2 
3 4  4 3 4 4 4 
4 4 
Giving end user precise 
feedback of security 
errors that occurred 
exposes the system to 
potential threats. As a 
bank we never specify 
which authentication 
credential was 
incorrect for example, 
we just reply that 
username password did 
not match, telling the 
user that only the 
password was wrong, 3 3 3 1 3 
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makes the system 




System has to be user 
friendly and direct 
users as to where to 
correct populated 
details 3 3 3 4 3 
4 3  2 1 4 4 4 
        
2.6 Are security 
options selected by 
default? 










2.8 Does the system 
protect users against 
making severe errors? 
Additional comments 
(optional) 




accurate in stating 










user of the 
severity of the 
error? 






3.4 Does the 
system warn 
users if they 




3 3 3 
The learnability 
principle is very 
important especially 
to the older 
generation. 3 3 3 3 
2 3 4  4 4 3 3 
3 2 3  3 4 3 3 
4 3 4  4 3 3 4 
2 3 4  2 2 3 2 
3 4 4  4 4 4 4 
4 4 4  3 4 4 4 
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